Alaska Supreme Court – Page 4

Alaska SCT Upholds Subsistence Hunting Rules against Challenge from Conservation Group

March 27, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State:

Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund v State

An excerpt:

Regulations promulgated by the Alaska Board of Game establish two different systems of subsistence hunting for moose and caribou in Alaska’s Copper Basin region: (1) community hunts for groups following a hunting pattern similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene Nene’ community; and (2) individual hunts.1 A private outdoors group, the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund, argues that this regulatory framework violates the equal access and equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution by establishing a preference for a certain user group. The Fund also argues that the regulations are not authorized by the governing statutes, that they conflict with other regulations, and that notice of important regulatory changes was not properly given to the public. But because we conclude that the Board’s factual findings support a constitutionally valid distinction between patterns of subsistence use, and because the Board’s regulations do not otherwise violate the law, we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, upholding the statute and the Board regulations against the Fund’s legal challenge.

Briefs:

Alaska Brief

Appellant’s Opening Brief

Appellant’s Reply Brief

Brief of Appellee Ahtna Tene Nene’

Alaska SCT Vacates Restrictive Visitation Schedule Involving Fort Peck Father

March 13, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Red Elk v. McBride.

An excerpt:

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their
daughter; the mother resides in Homer and the father resides on the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother
because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their
daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter
in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody,
it failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and
allocating visitation expenses. Consequently we remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

The two Fort Peck Court of Appeals opinions referenced in the Alaska opinion are here and here.

Contested ICWA Adoption Case out of Alaska Supreme Court

December 27, 2014December 27, 2014Kate Fort2 Comments

Here.

An example of how state law is going to determine how potential Baby Girl cases are decided:

A married couple sought to adopt an Indian child over the objection of the biological father, who wished to maintain visitation rights. The couple and the biological mother appeal the superior court’s denial of the adoption, claiming that the biological father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent is not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that the biological father had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. We affirm.

Alaska SCT Holds Tribal Council Does Not Have Standing to Appeal Indian Child Custody Matter

November 21, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion in Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler. An excerpt:

The superior court awarded Wheeler primary physical custody. Neither Wheeler nor Myre has appealed the superior court’s decision, but the tribal council appeals, arguing that the superior court lacked modification jurisdiction. The narrow question before us in this appeal is thus whether the tribal council has standing to appeal the superior court’s modification decision in light of the parents’ election not to appeal that decision. We conclude that under this circumstance, the tribal council does not have standing, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.

Alaska SCT Applies Adoptive Couple to Affirm Non-Native Adoption

September 15, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher5 Comments

Here is the opinion in Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (Alaska).

An excerpt:

We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing and oral argument on the effect of the Supreme Court’s Baby Girl decision on the adoption appeal currently before us.26 We now hold that because the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on issues of federal law bind state courts’ consideration of federal law issues — including the Indian Child Welfare Act — the decision in Baby Girl applies directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court’s holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not “formally [seek] to adopt” Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, “there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]” and therefore ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s [placement] preferences are inapplicable.”27 We affirm the superior court’s order granting the Smiths’ petition to adopt Dawn and vacate our remand order in Tununak I requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. We do not otherwise disturb our decision in Tununak I.

We posted briefs here.

Expert Witness ICWA Case Out of Alaska

August 25, 2014August 25, 2014Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

Applying the correct meaning of the phrase “professional person having substantial education in the area of his or her specialty,” we hold that Cosolito and Kirchoff should have been qualified as experts under the third BIA guideline. As social workers, both were “professional persons.” Both had “substantial education in the area of [her] specialty”: master’s degrees in social work, internships in relevant subject areas as required for their degrees, agency training, and continuing professional education. The experience of both witnesses further demonstrated the required “expertise beyond the normal social worker qualifications.” Cosolito described her work as an OCS supervisor overseeing hundreds of cases, identifying safety threats, and having ultimate responsibility for custody decisions; as an OCS line worker assessing reports of harm; and as a school administrator and social worker in Arizona working with the diverse behavioral and education needs of students and their families. Her testimony demonstrated regular and in-depth exposure to the very types of family and behavioral issues that were central to Candace’s case, including the possibility that Candace would be assaulted again, be re-traumatized, and engage in more self-destructive behavior.

Kirchoff appeared even more amply qualified to testify about the risks of serious emotional or physical harm if Candace were returned to her home. Kirchoff had a lengthy work history as a mental health clinician, working with children with emotional and behavioral problems in a variety of institutional and agency settings, as well as a private practice of custody investigations and adoption home-studies. As Candace’s own clinician, treating her in both individual and group therapy, Kirchoff was uniquely qualified to testify with authority about Candace’s susceptibility to emotional harm.

Alaska SCT Decides Alaska Native Regional Corporation Shareholder Rights Case

August 11, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.:

Pederson v Arctic Slope Regional Corp.

Alaska SCT Briefs in Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler

July 30, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council Opening Brief

Wheeler Response Brief

Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council Reply

Here are the questions presented (from the opening brief):

1. Whether, in light of this Court’s prior precedents, particularly State v. Native Village of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2011), a Superior Court may try a custody action in a matter involving an Alaska Native child without adhering to the requirements of Alaska’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), AS 25.30.300, et seq., when a tribal court has previously entered an initial determination regarding the child.

2. Whether the Superior Court erred in interpreting Alaska’s UCCJEA, AS 25.30.300, et. seq., as excluding tribal courts within the meaning of “court” in AS 25.30.909(6) and erred in failing to register the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court custody order, in light of the Court’s prior precedents, particularly State v. Native Village of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2011).

3. Whether the Superior Court erred in concluding that it had “at least concurrent jurisdiction over the issue of Jacob’s custody,” and proceeded to enter an initial child custody determination without giving comity to or contacting the Asa‘carsarmiut Tribal Court and requesting that the Asa‘carsarmiut Tribal Court determine that it no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or, alternatively, establishing that the Superior Court “would be a more convenient forum.”

4. Whether, if it is found that the Superior Court properly had jurisdiction to modify the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court order pursuant to AS 25.30.320, the Superior Court erred by failing to enter an Order Modifying Custody that stated its authority to modify the Asa‘carsarmiut Tribal Court order as well as its findings regarding a *3 substantial change of circumstances, pursuant to AS 25.20.110 rather than a Final Custody Decree and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

5. Whether, in light of the Court’s prior precedent, particularly John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999), a Superior Court may try a custody action in a matter involving an Alaska Native child without engaging in a comity analysis when a tribal court had previously entered a custody order regarding the child.