California Court of Appeals — Fourth District – Page 6

This case arises from unsuccessful negotiations between the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians (Pauma) and Caesars Entertainment, Inc. (Caesars), for Caesars’s development and operation of an expanded casino on Pauma’s reservation, and the merger during the negotiations of Caesars and Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc. (Harrah’s), which operates a nearby casino for the Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians (Rincon). ¹ In Harrah’s appeal, the issue is whether a $ 30 million judgment against it on the cause of action in Pauma’s complaint for intentional interference with prospective economic relations must be reversed because the jury’s special verdict is fatally inconsistent. We answer the question in the affirmative. The complaint’s causes of action for a violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.), and for tortious interference were both predicated solely on the same alleged wrong, an agreement between Harrah’s and Caesars to restrain trade by allocating or dividing customers or territories. The jury found in Harrah’s favor on the Cartwright Act claim, but in Pauma’s favor on the tortious interference claim. Because the inconsistency cannot be reconciled, we reverse the judgment insofar as it concerns these two causes of action against Harrah’s, and direct the court to enter an order granting Harrah’s motion for a new trial.

California Appellate Court Rejects ICWA Claims on Indian Grandmother

September 10, 2009Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in In re G.L. (Cal. App. Dist. 4), where the court holds:

Michael L. appeals a judgment declaring his minor daughter, G.L., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and removing G.L. from parental custody. Michael, an enrolled member of the Viejas Band of Mission Indians (Viejas tribe), contends the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order must be reversed because the court and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) affecting the rights of the paternal grandmother, Mary W., who was G.L.’s Indian custodian. Michael further contends the court erred by declining to place G.L. with Mary under ICWA’s placement preferences.

We conclude ICWA’s notice requirements for an Indian custodian were not violated, and to the limited extent Mary’s rights as G.L.’s Indian custodian were implicated, any error was harmless. We further conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that good cause existed to deviate from ICWA’s statutory placement preferences. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.