Court of Federal Claims – Page 6

Federal Claims Court Dismisses Crow Creek Sioux Water Rights Takings Claim

June 5, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Crow Creek has sued the United States through the Department of the Interior alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of its reserved water rights. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–78, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Its motion has several bases, including standing, ripeness, and issues related to the statute of limitations. Defendant also contends that the Government’s bare trust relationship with Crow Creek does not provide the “money-mandating” statute or regulation necessary for jurisdiction in this court. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976).

Plaintiff’s pleadings do not show how damages from an alleged taking could have accrued currently, and oral arguments did not clarify this threshold issue. Nevertheless, plaintiff urged the court to permit sufficient discovery for it to address defendant’s jurisdictional arguments. Given the opportunity to inquire into the extent of defendant’s diversion of its rights in the waters of the Missouri River, the Tribe argued it would be able to definitively establish damages. Plaintiff believes that granting defendant’s dispositive motion at this stage would be premature.

Crow Creek would pursue expensive and time-consuming litigation to find some evidence that defendant has taken an amount of water that the Tribe could have used for another, unnamed purpose. For example, counsel stated during oral arguments that plaintiff could hire experts to submit reports on various methods of obtaining appraised values for those waters. Plaintiff believes that those values would supply evidence of the damages that its case now lacks.

The relationship between Native American tribes and the United States is a special one in this court; plaintiff is entitled to every latitude in its efforts to establish a cause of action. In this case, however, opening discovery in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss would result in a waste of resources for both parties. We must grant defendant’s motion for the reasons described below.

Court of Federal Claims Dismisses Pro Se Treaty Rights Claim

April 27, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the available materials in Walking Eagle v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

1 Complaint

14 DCT Order

The remaining pleadings are sealed.

An excerpt from the opinion:

Plaintiff, Clarence Walking Eagle, Jr., is a Sioux Native American in the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe and resides on Fort Peck in Brockton, Montana. Appearing pro se, he filed his complaint on August 8, 2016, seeking $10,000,000.00 in compensatory damages under various treaties and statutes due to, among other alleged wrongs, “being unlawfully alienated from the exclusive use and benefit of [his] trust land and exposed to foreign jurisdiction without consent for the benefit of non-Indian concerns for almost ninety-nine years.” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 48. Plaintiff also seeks $10,000,000.00 in punitive damages and various forms of equitable relief, such as an order restraining state law enforcement agencies from exercising jurisdiction within the boundaries of Fort Peck.

On December 5, 2016, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that plaintiff’s claims accrued outside this court’s six-year statute of limitations and that plaintiff is precluded from bringing these claims due to his participation in the Cobell class-action settlement, which is described in more detail below. See Cobell v. Salazar, No. 96-1285(TFH), 2011 WL 10676927 (D.D.C. July 27, 2011); Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) Ex. 4 (copy of the Cobell settlement agreement). We agree and deem oral argument on this motion unnecessary. Because we find that plaintiff’s claims accrued outside of this court’s six-year statute of limitations and that, in any event, plaintiff is precluded from bringing these claims due to the Cobell settlement agreement, we grant defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Incarcerated Cobell-Eligible Beneficiary’s Federal Trust Claims May Proceed

March 23, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Godfrey v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

1 Complaint

8 US Motion to Dismiss

12 Response

15 DCT Order

Federal Claims Court Dismisses Action by “Chakchiuma Nation”

December 14, 2016December 14, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Chakchiuma Nation v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

Federal Claims Court Dismisses Menominee Sex Offender Claim

November 18, 2016November 18, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Zhuckkahosee v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

Federal Denies Summary Judgment in Quapaw Trust Claims

September 13, 2016September 13, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Goodeagle v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

147-goodeagle-motion

155-1-us-motion

158-us-response-to-147

161-goodeagle-reply

162-goodeagle-response-to-155

172-us-reply

182-dct-order

An excerpt:

This case involves many significant claims against the United States for breaches of fiduciary duty, among other things. Both parties assert that multiple claims can be resolved through summary judgment. The Quapaw Tribe relies heavily on the claim that an accounting document known as the Quapaw Analysis is binding upon the Government, and thus asserts that its claims grounded on this document should be granted through summary judgment. The Government disputes the binding authority of the Quapaw Analysis entirely and asserts multiple defects in the Quapaw Tribe’s claims that bar it from recovery. As explained below, the Court finds that the Quapaw Analysis is binding as to its factual findings only, but not as to the valuation, extrapolation, and calculation models it contains to calculate damages. In addition, the Court finds no merit in any of the arguments for summary judgment presented by the Government. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding the Quapaw Analysis is GRANTED IN PART, but in all other respects, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED.

Prior postings here.

Indian Trust Breach Claim over Estate in Probate Deferred until Conclusion of Admin. Proceedings

February 29, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Fredericks v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

7 US Motion to Dismiss

15 Response

17 Reply

39-1 US Supplemental Brief

43 DCT Order

Federal Court Dismisses (Most of) Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona Trust Breach Claim [Updated 8/23/19]

February 23, 2016August 23, 2019Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

10 Motion to Dismiss

[Tribal response sealed]

16 Reply

22 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Pending before the court is a motion filed by defendant the United States (“government”) to dismiss this action filed by plaintiff Inter–Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (“ITCA”) for breach of tribal trust obligations. The ITCA, which represents nineteen Arizona tribes,¹ claims that the government is liable for a breach of trust by failing to fulfill its obligations under the Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100–696, 102 Stat. 4571, 4577–93 (1988) (“the Act”); 25 U.S.C. § 162a; and the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103–412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994)(“the Trust Fund Reform Act”).

Title IV of the Act, which is sometimes referred to as the Arizona–Florida Land Exchange Act, ratified an agreement between the government and the Barron Collier Company, Collier Development Corporation, and Collier Enterprises (together “Collier”) to exchange federally owned property in Arizona for wetlands in Florida owned by Collier. Compl. ¶ 57. The ITCA alleges that under the Act the government is required to make payments into a trust that was established for the benefit of the ITCA’s member tribes and for ensuring a lump sum payment to the ITCA’s trust fund at the end of a 30–year payment period. Under the Act, the trust was held by the government and maintained by annual payments from Collier. Under the terms of the trust agreement, Collier was also obligated to pay into an annuity fund designed to ensure a lump sum payment at the end of 30 years. The trust agreement gave the government a security interest in land owned by Collier as collateral on the 30–year payment obligation.

Collier stopped making payments into the trust and into the annuity fund in 2012. The ITCA alleges that the government has breached its trust obligations by failing to make the payments itself when Collier stopped paying. The ITCA also charges that the government is liable for breach of trust by allowing a private bank, rather than the government, to hold the annuity and by failing to make payments into the annuity fund when Collier stopped paying. The ITCA also claims that the government breached its trust responsibility by failing to properly maintain collateral intended to ensure a full payment at the end of the 30–year period. Finally, the ITCA claims that the government breached its trust obligations by failing to prudently invest the trust funds and by failing to provide a proper accounting of the funds.

The government has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the government does not have any obligation under the Act to make up Collier’s missed payments to either the trust fund or the annuity. The government further argues that it has no trust obligation under the Act to monitor or supplement the value of the collateral or security obtained from Collier. In this connection, the government also argues that to the extent the ITCA’s breach of trust claims relate to the release of collateral more than 6 years ago, this portion of the claim is barred by the 6–year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. In addition, the government asserts that the ITCA’s claims with regard to the collateral are not ripe because the government is in ongoing litigation against Collier in United States District Court for the District of Arizona (“the district court”) to resolve the collateral issues. The government further argues that the ITCA has failed to state a claim with regard to the government’s management of the trust fund. The government states that the Act gave the government unreviewable discretion in making investment decisions and that there is no allegation of facts to show mismanagement. Finally, the government asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant the ITCA’s claim for an accounting on the grounds that the ITCA cannot establish a claim for money damages based on management of the trust fund. In such circumstances, the government argues that the ITCA must go to the district court for an accounting. Based on these arguments, the government asks the court to dismiss the ITCA’s claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6).

For the reasons below, the court agrees with the government that this court does not have jurisdiction over the ITCA’s claims based on the government’s failure to make up Collier’s missed payments. These claims fail for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the ITCA has not established a fiduciary obligation to make the payments under the Act and thus the ITCA has failed to establish a money-mandating breach of trust claim.

However, the court finds that the ITCA has identified potential money-mandating breach of trust claims with regard to the government’s alleged failure to monitor and maintain adequate collateral to ensure the final payment into the fund. Yet, a portion of the collateral-related claims may be barred by the 6–year statute of limitations. Thus, the court finds that a final decision on its jurisdiction to hear those claims must await a determination of the merits. See Oswalt v. United States, 41 F. App’x 471, 472 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, at 237 (2d ed.1990)). In addition, the court finds that the ITCA has failed to state a claim to the extent that it argues the government breached its trust obligations by failing to hold the trust fund payments security in trust at the Department of Treasury rather than in a private annuity and certain interests in real property.

Update (8/23/19):

58 Second Amended Complaint

59 US Motion to Dismiss

62 Response

63 Reply

69 DCT Order

74 Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment

82 Response

83 Reply

84 DCT Order re 74