Here are the materials in Gilbert v. Weahkee (D.S.D.):
Here is the complaint in Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
Amicus Briefs in Support of Petitioner:
Amicus Briefs in Support of Respondent:
Cert Stage Materials:
Please check out my new paper, “The Rise and Fall of the Ogemakaan,” now available on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Anishinaabe (Odawa, Bodewadmi, and Ojibwe) legal and political philosophy is buried under the infrastructure of modern self-determination law and policy. Modern Anishinaabe tribes are rough copies of American governments. The Anishinaabeg (people) usually choose their ogemaag (leaders) through an at-large election process that infects tribal politics with individualized self-interest. Those elected leaders, what I call ogemaakaan (artificial leaders) preside over modern governments that encourage hierarchy, political opportunism, and tyranny of the majority. While modern tribal governments are extraordinary successes compared to the era of total federal control, a significant number of tribes face intractable political disputes that can traced to the philosophical disconnect from culture and tradition.
Anishinaabe philosophy prioritizes ogemaag who are deferential and serve as leaders only for limited purposes and times. Ogemaag are true representatives who act only when and how instructed to do so by their constituents. Their decisions are rooted in cultural and traditional philosophies, including for example Mino-Bimaadiziwin (the act of living a good life), Inawendewin (relational accountability), Niizhwaaswii Mishomis/Nokomis Kinoomaagewinawaan (the Seven Gifts the Grandfathers or Grandmothers), and the Dodemaag (clans). I offer suggestions on how modern tribal government structures can be lightly modified to restore much of this philosophy.
Other briefs TK
Lower court materials here.
Here is the complaint in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. State of Washington (W.D. Wash.):
Here is the opinion. An excerpt:
We recognize that in interpreting federal statutes in Indian affairs we “provide for a broad construction when the issue is whether Indian rights are reserved or established, and for a narrow construction when Indian rights are to be abrogated or limited.” Felter, 752 F.2d at 1512; see also F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 224–25 (1982). In Felter, we determined the hunting and fishing rights of the individuals were not abrogated because the statute did not clearly abrogate them—this is a narrowing construction. But we cannot also conclude that the Termination Act implicitly gave the Uintah Valley Shoshone Tribe authority to exercise Ute tribal rights with respect to hunting and fishing, when the Act plainly established those rights within the Ute Tribe.