North Dakota ICWA Case on Qualified Expert Witness

Here: Interest of K.S.D. and J.S.D., 2017 ND 289

The lack of qualified expert testimony on whether the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child leaves this record without evidence necessary for the district court to find the State established the ICWA requirement by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 U.S.C. There is a line of authority that upholds termination of parental rights absent an ICWA qualified expert witness. We choose to follow the other branch of authority because the United States Code and the United States Code of Federal Regulations require—and do not merely suggest—that a qualified expert witness testify on the ICWA requirements in all ICWA terminations.

 

(Unrelated, one has to love a Court that only allows opinions to be downloaded as WordPerfect documents. That’s commitment.)

Press Release and Coverage Regarding Texas v. Zinke (ICWA Challenge)

California Tribal Families Coalition, News Release Tribal Coalition Urges Attorneys General to Protect Tribal Children

A coalition of California tribes and leaders today urged state attorneys general across 18 states and U.S. territories to stand with tribes in support of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) as it faces an outrageous legal challenge that seeks to unwind decades of critical legal protections for tribal children and families.

The letter sent on November 4, 2017 by the Sacramento-based California Tribal Families Coalition to the Conference of Western Attorneys General comes on the heels of an Oct. 25th federal lawsuit filed by the State of Texas and two foster care parents challenging the constitutionality of the ICWA.

California Daily Journal, Critics Distort Indian Child Welfare Law.

Law 360, New Indian Child Welfare Act Challenges On The Horizon

The Texas v. Zinke documents are here.

 

(I have seen and am choosing not to post the recent National Review op-ed by Tim Sandefur.)

 

ICWA Expert Witness Case out of Colorado

Opinion here. The Colorado Court disagrees with holdings in Montana and Michigan on the same issue–what does a qualified expert witness have to say for it to count under 25 U.S.C. 1912(f).

Congress’s primary reason for requiring qualified expert testimony was to prevent courts from basing decisions “solely upon the testimony of social workers who possessed neither the specialized professional education nor the familiarity with Native [American] culture necessary to distinguish between cultural variations in child-rearing practices and actual abuse or neglect.” Steven H., 190 P.3d at 185 (quoting L.G. v. State, 14 P.3d 946, 952- 53 (Alaska 2000)). This purpose would not necessarily be furthered by a requirement that an expert witness recite the precise language of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).

***

Although [the Regulations and Guidelines] emphasize the need for a qualified expert witness to offer testimony supporting a finding regarding likely damage to the child, they stop short of demanding a verbatim recitation of the statutory standard by the expert.

***

Additionally, the Department presented testimony from a
qualified expert witness under ICWA — a social worker with Navajo Children and Family Services. The social worker did not directly opine that the child would suffer damage in mother’s care. Rather, when asked to give her opinion regarding whether the child would suffer serious emotional or physical harm if returned to a parent, the social worker indicated that mother had not fulfilled the treatment requirements to address the reasons for the child being placed in the Department’s custody. The social worker also testified that the recent domestic violence issues between the parents were concerning.

Supreme Court Declines to Take S.S. v. CRIT (ICWA case)

Here is the order.

Here are the documents.

Remember, now in your ICWA briefs you can add that cert. denied signal if you like.

Texas and Prospective Adoptive Parents File Constitutional Challenge to ICWA and Regulations

Complaint here (northern district of Texas).

Additional documents will be posted here.

Plaintiffs thus bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief and pray that this court:

(1) vacate and set aside the Final Rule;

(2) declare that Sections 1901–1923 and 1951–1952 of ICWA violate the Constitution;

(3) declare that Section 1915 of ICWA violates the Constitution;

(4) enjoin the defendants from implementing or administering Sections 1901–1923 and 1951–1952 of ICWA; and

(5) enjoin the defendants from implementing or administering Section 1915 of ICWA.

ICWA Inquiry Case out of Colorado Court of Appeals

Here.

To decide if the trial court complied with ICWA, we must answer a question that has yet to be decided in Colorado: When a trial court inquires at an initial temporary custody hearing at the commencement of the dependency and neglect proceeding whether there is a reason to know that the child is an Indian child, must it make another inquiry when termination is sought? We conclude that the answer is “yes,” at least when the court has not already identified the child as an Indian child and the petitioning party has not disclosed what efforts it has made to determine if the child is an Indian child.

Cert Stage Filings In S.S. v. CRIT (ICWA Case)

This is the cert petition from the Arizona Court of Appeals decision applying ICWA to step-parent or third party adoptions, where Dad attempted to terminate Mom’s rights so Step-Mom could adopt children.

Cert petition filed by the Goldwater Institute purportedly on behalf of the children.

Amicus in Support of the Cert Petition filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation

Brief in Opposition filed by the Colorado River Indian Tribes

Goldwater Reply

 

 

Termination of Parental Rights ICWA Case Out of Missouri

Here.

This case is illustrative of a lot of the things we talk about regarding practicing in an unfamiliar forum, and getting objections on the record.

The Tribe (Nenana Native Village) brought an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights, though the Tribe also has motions pending at the trial level to transfer jurisdiction and/or get the children in a preferred placement.

The state filed its petition against the Mom on June 11, 2015. The state sent notice on February 23, 2016. No reason for the eight month delay on notice is given in the opinion. In November of 2016 the state filed a petition to terminate parental rights. At that time, Mom agreed to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. This is a regular issue under ICWA, because while Mom is voluntarily relinquishing, it is under state threat of termination. The Tribe argued that the state needed to at least follow 25 U.S.C. 1913’s requirements for voluntary relinquishment (it didn’t).

The court agreed the tribe had standing to bring the appeal (after much writing, but 25 U.S.C. 1914 ensures the tribe’s standing to appeal violations of 1911, 1912, or 1913), but disagreed that either the qualified expert witness was a problem, or that the state not following 1913 was a “manifest injustice”.

As a side note, the court also fundamentally misunderstands the difference between federal guidelines and federal regulations:

The Tribe’s argument on this point relies upon 25 C.F.R. Sec. 23.122(a), which provides guidance in interpreting Section 1912(f). Promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and published as regulations for interpreting the I.C.W.A., Section 23.122 notes that: [a] qualified expert must be qualified to testify regarding whether the child’s continued custody by the parent . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child and should be qualified to testify as to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian child’s Tribe. 25 C.F.R. Sec. 23.122(a).

We note that while “[t]hese guidelines are helpful[, they] are not binding upon state proceedings.” C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d at 953 (citing Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 307 (Ind. 1988)). This is because the “primary responsibility for interpreting language used in the [I.C.W.A.] rests with the courts that decide . . . cases [involving Native American children].” Id.

Finally, case also illustrates a point Victoria Sweet and I have presented on a number of times–preserving the record for appeal. Part of the issue with the case is the lack of objection from the Tribe below about the QEW, her testimony, or the termination itself. There are a lot of reasons why this might happen, but I’m using this case to reiterate: if a tribe disagrees with something that is happening in trial court, SAY SO OUT LOUD IN COURT (on the record).  It might be terrifying to do so. The judge might get angry, but ultimately the proceeding will continue. Later, though, if the tribe decides to appeal, the issue is preserved. Absent that preservation, the court of appeals will use a lower standard to review the trial court (if it reviews it at all), and as in this case, use a “plain error” standard and find there is none.

This is an opinion full of incredibly annoying legal details the court wanted the Tribe do to, while the state failed to follow any of the legal details in ICWA.