Chronicle of Social Change Article on Native Foster Home(s) in L.A.

Here.

In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which was meant to keep Native American families together, after foster care and adoption practices had seen thousands of Native children taken from their families, ancestral lands and culture to be placed in non-native homes. That law created a system of “preferred placements” for Native children who enter care. The first choice is to place children with family members, followed by members of the same tribe and finally Native foster parents from other tribes. The last resort is placement in non-native homes.

But the federal government has never compelled states to share how well they satisfy that “preference,” leaving little or no data to indicate who is doing a good job placing Native children in Native homes.

The reporting that does exist is spotty at best.

In 2005, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) surveyed all 50 states and Washington D.C. about their ability to identify Native children in the system who were subject to ICWA in 2003.

“Only five states—Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington—were able to provide these data,” according the GAO report.

It doesn’t appear that reporting on ICWA compliance improved much in the subsequent years.

In 2015, Casey Family Programs, one of the largest charitable foundations in all of child welfare, tried to ascertain ICWA compliance in a brief entitled “Measuring Compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act.”

“Although cross-jurisdictional and collaborative efforts are emerging, compliance measurement remains characterized by relatively small, idiosyncratic efforts,” the thin report reads. “Empirical study results are scattered, inconsistent, and highly specific to the state and jurisdiction being examined.”

Commentary on the Native American Children’s Safety Act

Last week, the Department of the Interior published final regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, along with a legal opinion from the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior regarding the authority to issue such regulations. The Department’s regulations, and the accompanying legal opinion, garnered a lot of attention across Indian country and Indian child welfare advocates, and may prove to be the capstone on the Administration’s work for Native children.

However, last week the President also signed of the “Native American Children’s Safety Act” (S.184 or “NACSA”). NACSA amended 25 U.S.C. § 3207 – requiring character investigations for certain individuals who have regular contact with Indian children.

As its title suggests, NACSA is intended to protect Indian children in tribal foster care by doing several things:

  1. Prohibiting child placement in foster care, or licensing foster homes, unless the tribe has completed a criminal background check on each individual residing in the foster home and certified that each of those individuals meets the requirements of the statute;
  2. Requiring tribes to adopt placement standards in accordance with the statute;
  3. Requiring tribes to recertify existing foster homes to ensure that they meet the new standards required under the statute; and,
  4. Requiring the Department of the Interior to issue guidance on appropriate placement standards (and subjecting tribal standards to the Department’s guidance).

Given its subject matter and intent, NACSA moved through Congress with little opposition and broad support. But, the details of the statute’s mandates seem to have caught a number of tribal courts and social services agencies off-guard. Some tribal judges (including one of the authors of this post), tribal social services agencies, and Indian child welfare advocates are concerned about unintended consequences that could flow from the mandates in this new law. Those mandates include the following:

  1. Tribal courts and agencies are required to conduct fingerprint-based checks of national crime databases, as well as checks of state abuse and neglect databases in every state where any adult in the foster home resided for the past five years.
  1. If those checks reveal that any adult in the home has been convicted of a felony in any federal, state, or tribal court for crimes listed in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A)(i) or (ii), tribal courts and agencies are prohibited from placing children in the foster home. Those crimes are a host of felonies, but also include “drug-related offenses.” Because the statute makes a cross-reference rather than specifically enumerating the crimes, it’s not clear whether the five-year limit in the referenced statute carries over as a limit on this provision.
  1. The Department of the Interior is required to issue “guidance” sometime in the next two years that is binding on Indian tribes regarding placement standards. That guidance must address “self reporting requirements” for the head of the household if he/she knows that another adult in the house is listed on any tribal or state abuse registry, or has been convicted of any of the crimes listed above.

While well intended, these provisions will leave tribal foster care agencies and tribal courts without any discretion to certify foster homes and make placements within their communities. It is likely to further limit the availability of eligible foster homes in tribal communities.

As people across Indian country know, many households on the reservation include temporary residents – including extended family members, adult children, family friends, or other community members in need. A member of the household may have gone through the tribe’s healing to wellness court. NACSA does not leave tribal agencies much flexibility to account for these homes or living arrangements. Where tribal courts and agencies previously had discretion to make those judgment calls, NACSA removes that discretion. Any adult living in the home with a prior drug-related offense may automatically disqualify that home from being approved as a foster care placement.

In addition, NACSA requires the Department of the Interior to issue binding guidance on implementation of the statute, including procedures for “self-reporting” by the head of the household if he/she has knowledge that any other adult in the home was convicted of a crime listed above. Tribes will be required to enforce this mandate, but it is unclear how.

NACSA’s mandate that tribes conduct background checks on state databases presumes that state agencies will cooperate with tribal agencies in their efforts to conduct such searches. The statute does not provide Indian tribes with any legal tools, other than the authority to enter into “voluntary agreements with State entities,” to require such cooperation. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which state agencies are uncooperative in conducting those searches, thus slowing down foster care placement in Indian country. It is one thing for a tribe to have solid relationships with a local county or even the state—it is quite another to have to reach out to every state where an individual lived in the past five years (let’s say, Ohio, for example) for cooperation.

Perhaps most importantly, NACSA does not provide tribal courts and social services agencies with any additional resources to carry out these new mandates. The courts and agencies with the least amount of resources will now have to spend more money to remain in compliance with federal law. Failure to remain in compliance with these new mandates will likely jeopardize the already meager federal funds that flow into tribal courts and child welfare agencies.

None of this is to say tribal judges or social services agencies don’t have an interest in making sure that foster children are placed in safe homes, or that the proponents of NACSA had bad intentions. As a tribal court judge and ICWA advocate, we applaud the fact that Congress and policy makers care about the importance of safe foster homes in Indian country.

But NACSA may turn out to be a law with drastic unintended consequences (we hope not). This statute could benefit from some amendments to allow tribal courts and agencies to have more discretion to solve problems at the local level, as well as authorization of funding to help tribes meet these new requirements. Absent those amendments, the Department of the Interior must work closely with tribal judges and social services workers to ensure that the law is implemented in a way that prevents unintended consequences.

 

 

Child Welfare League of America Statement of Support of ICWA Rule

Here.

The regulations put forward a standard of practice for Indian children and families that is consistent with other federal law and nationally-recognized practice standards (including CWLA’s) for all children. As part of a coalition of 18 nationally-recognized child advocacy organizations, we recognize ICWA as the “gold standard” in child welfare practice.

With these regulations, CWLA will redouble its work to ensure that service providers fully implement ICWA and the CWLA standards of excellence in child welfare.

Previous posts here and here.

ICWA Defense Project Press Release on ICWA Final Rule

Here.

The Initial Observations post has been updated through out the day today with additional information from some of the first 300 pages, including the fact the Department plans to issue updated Guidelines in the next 180 days.

Initial Observations on the ICWA Regulations

Today’s additions to this post have been added in red text.

The Rule is organized in much the same way as the Guidelines. They do not mirror each other, however. These are just highlights of the actual rule, not the 300+ pages addressing all of the comments, which look to be incredibly useful.

The Department anticipates issuing updated Guidelines in the next six months, before the final rule goes into effect. p.10, “Overview of Final Rule”

The Rule does not use the phrase “existing Indian family”, but pp 90-94 of the text explain that the Rule overrules the application of the EIF through other means:

The final rule no longer uses the nomenclature of the exception, and instead focuses on the substance, rather than the label, of the exception. Thus, the final rule imposes a mandatory prohibition on consideration of certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute applies. If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statutory definition of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICW A does not apply to the case based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and his or her Indian parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum.  

Rule at 93.

Highlights:

The definitions of continued custody, custody, and domicile are extensive and helpful, includes tribal custom and tribal law, makes clear that any custody at any time in the past counts as “continued custody” and makes the child’s domicile dependent on the custodial parent, not just mother. 23.2.

The active efforts definition is marginally different than the one in the Guidelines. It does not specifically state they are more or different than ASFA’s reasonable efforts, but it does say they must be “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely”. The list of elements under what active efforts “may include, for example” are also slightly different, and combine some of the Guideline elements (4 in the regs is 9&5 in the Guidelines; 7 is 10&14). 23.2.

The Department’s reasoning regarding ASFA is as follows, though is contrary to how state courts have been comparing the two at the appellate level, and not entirely helpful:

Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule does not define “active efforts” in comparison to “reasonable efforts.” After considering public comments on this issue, the Department concluded that referencing “reasonable efforts” would not promote clarity or consistency, as the term “reasonable efforts” is not in ICW A and arises from different laws (e.g., the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as modified by the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), see 42 U.S.C. 670, et seq., as well as State laws). Such reference is unnecessary because the definition in the final rule focuses on what actions are necessary to constitute active efforts.

Rule at 50.

“When Does ICWA Apply?” addresses the issue of “continued custody” thrown into doubt by Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. It also specifically states a child’s blood quantum may not be considered by the state court. 23.103(c).

State laws that provide higher protections to the rights of the parent control over the regulations. 23.106.

State courts must ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child. 23.107(a).

A parental request for confidentiality in a voluntary proceeding does not relieve the court, agency, or other party from any duty of compliance with ICWA, including the obligation to verify whether the child is an Indian child. 23.107(d).

Only tribes can determine if a child is an Indian child under the law, that is a final determination that cannot be substituted by the state, and the state can use tribal enrollment documentation (for example) to make the judicial determination a child is an Indian child. 23.108.

A court must determine domicile of the child in any voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding. 23.110(a).

If a parent or Indian custodian appears in court without an attorney, the court must inform them of their rights under the law, including the right to appointed counsel, the right to request transfer to tribal court, the right to object to transfer, the right to request additional time, and the right to intervene in the child custody proceedings. 23.111(g).

23.113 Emergency removals (or the Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming section) addresses all the requirements of emergency removal including length of time (30 days), how to terminate an emergency proceeding (initiate a proceeding subject to the provisions of ICWA, transfer to the tribe, or send the kid home), and the standard of “imminent physical damage or harm to the child”.

The regs direct state courts what they cannot consider “good cause” not to transfer a case to tribal court, but do not specify what is good cause not to transfer. States cannot consider advanced stage, prior proceedings where there was no petition to transfer, whether transfer will affect placement, cultural connections, and socioeconomic conditions. 23.118(c).

There is no standard of evidence for active efforts (states are still split on this), but similar to the Guidelines, the evidence must show a causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Evidence with no causal relationship of poverty, isolation, single parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not on its own constitute evidence that continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 23.121

Who can be a qualified expert witness is fairly vague, but the regulation specifically excludes the social worker regularly assigned to the Indian child from being the QEW. 23.122(c)

The state court must determine if a child is an Indian child in voluntary proceedings, and that determination may mean contacting the child’s tribe to verify. 23.124(b)

Consent to a voluntary adoption largely mirrors the law, but also includes that when a parent request confidentiality, the execution of consent must still be before a court of competent jurisdiction, but not in open court. 23.125(d).

Good cause to not follow the placement preferences must be made on the record, the party seeking to deviate bears the burden of proving good cause by clear and convincing evidence, and may not be based “solely on ordinary bonding or attachment that flowed from time spent in a non-preferred placement that was made in violation of ICWA.” 23.132

The regs do give good cause reasons to depart from the preferences. They include the request of one or both parents if they attest they have reviewed the placement preferences that comply with the order of preference, the request of the child, the presence of a sibling attachment, the extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child, and the unavailability of a suitable placement after the court finds a diligent search was conducted. 23.132(c).

Courts should allow participation by telephone, videoconferencing, or other methods. 23.133.

If there are certain changes in an adopted Indian child’s status (the voluntary termination by the adoptive parent, or the final decree of adoption was set aside or vacated), the biological parent, prior Indian custodian, and tribe must be noticed. 23.139. Of course, the child remains an Indian child regardless of the adoption, so ICWA should apply to these situations anyway.

The state must maintain certain records of every voluntary or involuntary foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive placement of an Indian child, including the petition or complaint, all substantive orders, the complete record of the placement determination. That record must be made available within 14 days of a request by the child’s Tribe or the Secretary. 23.141.

 

Solicitor’s Opinion on the New ICWA Regulation

US DOI Solicitor Opinion on the implementation of ICWA through legislative rule:

Congress understood that these issues went beyond reservations and significantly impacted Indian children who lived off reservations as well. Congress noted that there were approximately 35,000 Indian children in foster care, adoptive homes, or institutions whose families did not “live on or near reservations”52 and yet who were subject to the same problematic State child custody proceedings. In the AIPRC Final Report, which was included as part of the Senate Report on ICWA, the Commission recommended that any final legislation address the fact that because “[m]any Indian families move back and forth from a reservation dwelling to border communities or even to distant communities, depending on employment and educational opportunities,” problems could arise when Tribal and State courts offered competing child custody determinations, and that legislation therefore had to address situations where “an Indian child is not domiciled on a reservation and [is] subject to the jurisdiction of non-Indian authorities. ”  Congress accordingly fashioned ICWA to address the removal of Indian children, as defined in the statute, regardless of where their families were located.

Final Indian Child Welfare Act Regulations

Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Federal Rule Here. The rule itself starts on page 321.

The new regulations are not binding for 180 days (6 months), and will be located at 25 CFR 23. As the document appears to be about 300 pages long, we’ll have more analysis of it in a later post.

Press release here

Q&A here.

Two Recent State Supreme Court Oral ICWA Arguments

Here is the argument for In re B.B. case in the Utah Supreme Court, where the unmarried Native father appealed the trial court’s decision denying him intervention in a voluntary adoption case, primarily based on Utah’s definition of paternity. Father is asking the state to interpret “acknowledge and establish” under ICWA broadly. The Utah Court of Appeals sent it on directly to the Supreme Court with no decision.

Here is the argument for In re T.A.W. in the Washington Supreme Court, addressing the issue of applying WICWA to step-parent adoption proceedings, particularly the requirement of active efforts. Here is the decision being appealed.

Burden of Proof ICWA Case out of South Dakota

Here.

In this case, Mother challenged the QEW and the burden of proof requirement for termination of parental rights. The concurrence is particularly useful:

The circuit court in this case found many of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt where that was not the correct standard of proof and failed to find certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt where applying that high standard is required. This may indicate that confusion exists on the applicable standards of proof in abuse or neglect proceedings, including those where ICWA applies. I write specially to clarify the standards of proof by which the court must issue certain findings.

The concurrence also explains that South Dakota is a state that requires active efforts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a termination of parental rights. Contra State of New Mexico v. Yodell. B. (N.M. Ct App. 2015) 

Developments in Carter v. Washburn (Goldwater Litigation)

Here is the latest in the class action lawsuit arguing that ICWA is unconstitutional:

In the past month, the plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint with new named class representatives. Both the federal and state government again filed motions to dismiss.

Gila River then filed a motion to ask the court to make a decision on their motion to intervene, which the court denied in a particularly aggravating order.

Finally, in one of the strangest and most unprecedented actions in the case, the Ohio AG filed an amicus brief in support of Goldwater and against the Arizona AG’s motion to dismiss. For those who have contacts in their state AG’s offices, we continue to encourage you to be in touch with them and offer to provide information regarding ICWA and this case.