Idaho COA Dismisses Jurisdictional Challenge to Indian Country Criminal Conviction on Procedural Grounds

Here is the opinion in State v. Wolfe:

State v. Wolfe

An excerpt:

The district court recognized the possible merit of Wolfe’s contentions that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charged offense. The court ordered further briefing from the State and the tribe. The tribe did not provide any briefing.

When denying the initial Rule 35 motion and later dismissing the second successive post-conviction petition (alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to raise the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction), the district court addressed only the procedural issues of whether the pleadings were timely. Although the district court concluded “there is a genuine issue of whether the court had had jurisdiction because there is credible admissible evidence that [the victim] was in fact a Native American,” it weighed the policies of fundamental justice with the need for finality of judgments and decided, in this case, that the need for finality of judgments outweighed other considerations. In doing so, it noted the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Wolfe’s underlying criminal case was long-ripe for consideration and Wolfe had had prior opportunities to assert the claim. Thus, the court applied the limitations of the post-conviction procedures as written. Accordingly, the court concluded Wolfe was time-barred from asserting his claim for relief in a post-conviction petition.

The trial court noted:

There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe’s offense. “Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction under § 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress.” United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1232 n. 11 [ (1980) ]; see, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or assumed, Pub.L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized in I.C. § 67–5101. Murder is not included.

Idaho Court of Appeals Decides PL 280 Case

Here is the opinion in Lawyer v. State.

An excerpt:

In his application, Lawyer alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to change venue. Specifically, he asserted the crime he was convicted of occurred on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, that he is a member of the Nez Perce Tribe, and the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. On appeal, he appears to renew this argument, stating that his trial and appellate counsel were “not aware and sensitive to Tribal Court Jurisdiction.” Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5101, the State of Idaho has jurisdiction for the criminal enforcement of state laws concerning various matters arising in Indian country, including “[o]peration and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state.” Idaho courts have previously held that “the State of Idaho has authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws of this state in Indian Country pursuant to the consent provided in Public Law 280 and as implemented by the Idaho Legislature in I.C. § 67-5101.” State v. Beasley, 146 Idaho 594, 597, 199 P.3d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 2008). It is undisputed that Lawyer was stopped and arrested while driving on State Highway 12 on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation. Therefore, Lawyer was driving on a state highway, over which the State of Idaho has expressly assumed jurisdiction.

 

Idaho Court Decides ICWA Active Efforts/Qualified Expert Witness Case

Here is the opinion in Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe.

Idaho Court of Appeals Rejects Treaty Right to Travel as Jurisdictional Defense to Criminal Conviction

The opinion in State of Idaho v. Oatman is here. An excerpt:

The 1855 Nez Perce Treaty grants the members of that tribe the same right to travel that is enjoyed by all citizens of the United States. The right to travel enjoyed by citizens of the United States may be restricted as a result of criminal incarceration or probation. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419, 101 S. Ct. 2434, 69 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1981)(holding that a state many infringe upon the fundamental right to travel when “a person has been convicted of a crime within a State. He may be detained within that State, and returned to it if he is found in another State.”); State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 231, 657 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, “as a condition of granting freedom to a probationer, society has the right to impose . . . restrictions on important liberties such as the right to travel.”). Oatman argues, in effect, that the Treaty grants members of the Nez Perce Tribe an absolute immunity from any criminal prosecution which could result in a term of confinement or probation. Such immunity would not be a rightin common with citizens of the United States.

We are also unconvinced that Oatman’s interpretation was the interpretation contemplated by the parties to the Treaty, for it subsequently provides that the tribe “agrees not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for trial.” Treaty with the Nez Perces, art. VIII, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957. If the parties intended that members of the tribe not be subjected to criminal proceedings which may result in incarceration or probation, such language would be unnecessary. We conclude that Oatman’s arguments are meritless. Accordingly, Oatman’s judgment of conviction for misdemeanor assault is affirmed.

Hyde v. Fisher — Idaho Court of Appeals Keeps Inmate Religious Freedom Case Alive

I looks like this is the second time Hyde v. Fisher (here is Hyde I) has reached the Idaho Court of Appeals. This time the Court holds that a complete ban on smudging is not the least restrictive means of maintaining safety in prison under RLUIPA. Here is an excerpt:

We conclude that Hyde has shown no error in the district court’s procedure on remand. The district court correctly ruled that IMSI’s complete ban on sweat lodge ceremonies and implementation of a personal property policy does not violate Hyde’s constitutional rights or those conferred upon him by RLUIPA and FERPA. However, we conclude that IDOC has not demonstrated that completely banning smudging ceremonies at IMSI is the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest of safety and security at the institution.

State v. Beasley — Idaho Court of Appeals Affirms Conviction at Fort Hall

Here is the opinion. An excerpt:

The district court did not err by denying Beasley’s motion to dismiss. Trooper Winans was not outside his jurisdiction when he arrested Beasley, as the state and the Shoshone-Bannock tribes share concurrent jurisdiction over Interstate 15 where it crosses the Fort Hall Indian Reservation. Furthermore, the tribal extradition code does not apply to arrests by state agents in areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Therefore, the arrest was not illegal and the district court was not required to relinquish jurisdiction over Beasley. Beasley’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.