Here is the opinion. An excerpt:
This case presents the question whether the State of Washington may exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation who commit crimes on reservation land. To answer that question, we must interpret a 2014 Washington State Proclamation that retroceded—that is, gave back—“in part,” civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Yakama Nation to the United States, but retained criminal jurisdiction over matters “involving non-Indian defendants and non-Indian victims.” If “and,” as used in that sentence, is conjunctive, then the State retained jurisdiction only over criminal cases in which no party—suspects or victims—is an Indian. If, by contrast, “and” is disjunctive and should be read as “or,” then the State retained jurisdiction if any party is a non-Indian. We conclude, based on the entire context of the Proclamation, that “and” is disjunctive and must be read as “or.” We therefore affirm the district court.
Briefs here. Oral argument video here.
Here is the unpublished opinion in Campbell v. Honor the Earth:
Here are the non-sealed materials in Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. County of Mille Lacs (D. Minn.):
96 Tribe Motion to Quash
110 Tribe Opposition to Motion to Compel
130 Magistrate Report
Prior post here.
Here is the petition:
1. Under Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901) and United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924), did the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe’s failure to file a land claim under the 1851 Act extinguish any of the Tribe’s rights as to Section 36 as conveyed to the State of California for school purposes under the Enabling Act of 1853?
2. Given that this Court has found that states take title to property under the Enabling Acts subject to aboriginal title only where a preexisting treaty has preserved the aboriginal title, does the absence of any Chemehuevi Indian Tribe reservation at the time Section 36 was conveyed to the State of California under the Enabling Act of 1853 bar any claim by the Tribe or its members that Section 36 constitutes Indian country?
3. Does the Appropriation Doctrine bar any claim by the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe or its members that the 1907 Secretarial Order could transfer Section 36 to the Tribe after the property had already been conveyed to the State of California for school purposes under the Enabling Act of 1853?
Lower court materials here.
Here are the briefs in Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. City of Toppenish:
Lower court materials here.
Here is the opinion in Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. McMahon.
It is undisputed that the Sheriff cannot enforce regulatory traffic laws in “Indian country.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360. “Indian country” includes, but is not limited to, land within the boundaries of a reservation. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. The issues for decision today are (1) whether the individual Tribe members and the Tribe can challenge the citations through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action; and, if so, (2) whether Section 36 is Indian country. We hold that the individual plaintiffs, but not the Tribe, can challenge the citations under § 1983. And, we conclude that all the citations occurred within Indian country. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint as to the individuals but affirm the judgment as to the Tribe.