Native Wholesale Supply v. California ex rel. Becerra Cert Petition

Here:

Native Wholesale Petition

Appendix

Questions presented:

1. Whether a contract for the purchase of goods entered into, and fully performed by, an Indian Tribe outside the exterior boundaries of the state in which the Tribe’s reservation is located can constitutionally subject the out of state vendor to the specific personal jurisdiction of the buyer’s state, under state laws purporting to regulate the sale of those goods in the buyer’s state.
2. Whether a state has specific personal jurisdiction to regulate a purchase of goods contract between an Indian on an Indian reservation outside the state and an Indian Tribe located within the state’s boundaries when the contract is performed on the
out of state Indian reservation.
3. Whether there is a constitutional or statutory right afforded to an Indian of one tribe to conduct business free from state regulation with an Indian of a different tribe, both of which are located in Indian country, under the Indian Commerce Clause.
4. Whether a tribally chartered corporation wholly owned by a member of a federally recognized Indian Tribe is an Indian for purposes of the protections afforded to Indians under federal law.

Lower court materials here.

California COA Rejects Fourth Effort by Private Party to Shut Down Beer Sales by Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians

Here is the unpublished opinion in Barrett v. Selnek-is Tem-al Corp.:

barrett-opinion.pdf

Published Notice Case from California Court of Appeals [ICWA]

Here

One might think, given that as of the end of July, California had more than 70 ICWA notice violation cases and in 41 one of them (fifty six percent of the time) the appellate court sent it back down to get inquiry and notice correct, the state agency might spend less time arguing why they shouldn’t do notice at all and instead just do notice right the first time. Also, this is one of those cases that makes me furious given that the Tribe intervened in mother’s case when SHE was a dependent child. But instead, let’s look at what the state argued it should do rather than give notice to the Picayune Rancheria:

It is well established that a non-Indian parent has standing to assert an ICWA notice violation on appeal. (In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 339.) Nonetheless, the County argues that this court does not have jurisdiction, the case is not ripe for appeal, and parents do not have standing because they did not first bring a petition for invalidation in the juvenile court.

***

The County argues that because this specific remedy [25 U.S.C. 1914]  for ICWA violations exists, appeal is an improper remedy. It argues that a petition for invalidation is the exclusive remedy available for ICWA notice and inquiry violations and, as such, parents were required to unsuccessfully pursue such a petition in the juvenile court prior to seeking relief on appeal. Because they did not do so, it reasons, this court is without jurisdiction to hear their appeal.

Yet despite arguing that a petition for invalidation is the exclusive remedy for an ICWA violation, the County also argues parents do not have standing to file such a petition for invalidation. It argues the petition is only available to parents of Indian children—not parents of a potential Indian child for whom ICWA inquiry and notice was not effectuated. (emphasis added)

***

We also decline the County’s invitation to reexamine the “non-forfeiture doctrine”—or, more accurately described as the principle that a parent is not foreclosed from raising an ICWA inquiry or notice violation even if the issue could have been more timely raised by appeal from an earlier order.

***

Again, the County suggests we revisit established case law and depart from the requirement that the agency give ICWA notice to tribes when there is reason to know a child may be eligible for membership and require notice only when the court knows or has reason to know the child is definitively a member (or knows a parent is definitively a member and the child is eligible for membership). We decline the invitation.

Therefore,

Here, having reason to know the minor may be an Indian child, the juvenile court ordered the County to provide notice to the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in accordance with the ICWA. The County knew that the maternal grandfather was a member of that tribe and that he lived on the tribe’s reservation. It also knew, or should have known, that mother was found to be an Indian child when she was a dependent of the court and that the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe had intervened in that case. We conclude, as did the juvenile court in this case, that the County was required to send ICWA notice to the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in this case. (emphasis added)

And the kicker (court’s emphasis not italics, mine in red):

Here, the County sent notice to the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe on January 25, 2016, of the “Pre-Jurisdictional Status Conference,” which was scheduled for February 9, 2016. The juvenile court was apprised that the tribe had not received the notice but proceeded with the hearing, which was ultimately held on February 23, 2016. Thereafter, no notice of any subsequent hearing was ever sent to either the tribe or the BIA. Nonetheless, the court held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on February 23, 2016, sustained the petition, removed the minor, and ordered reunification services. After that hearing, the County “resent” notice—apparently resending the same documents (i.e. the family history, section 300 petition, and notice of the then-passed February 9, 2016 hearing date)—thus, only providing the tribe with notice of a hearing which had already passed. The tribe received that notice on March 3, 2016. On April 26, 2016, less than 60 days thereafter, the juvenile court held an unnoticed ICWA compliance hearing and found the ICWA did not apply.

 

California COA Opinion in People ex rel. Becerra v. Native Wholesale Supply

Here:

People ex rel Becerra v NWS

Briefs:

Appellant Brief

State Answer Brief

Reply

Tribal Standing Issue in California Court of Appeals ICWA Decision

Here

Mother next contends the juvenile court’s order granting the Tribe’s petitions for modification, and giving full faith and credit to an amended tribal customary adoption order, must be reversed because the Tribe did not have standing to file section 388 petitions for modification. We reject her contention.

California COA Affirms Dismissal of Workers’ Comp. Challenge to Blue Lake Rancheria Business

Here is the opinion in American Cargo Express v. Superior Court:

American Cargo Express v Superior Court

California Court of Appeals Holds Contract Breach Claim Preempted by IGRA

Here is the opinion in Sharp Image Gaming v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (Cal. Ct. App.). An excerpt:

We conclude that IGRA preempts state contract actions based on unapproved “management contracts” and “collateral agreements to management contracts” as such agreements are defined in the IGRA regulatory scheme. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to determine whether the ELA and the Note were agreements subject to IGRA regulation, a necessary determination related to the question of preemption and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We further conclude that the ELA is a management contract and the Note is a collateral agreement to a management contract subject to IGRA regulation. Because these agreements were never approved by the NIGC Chairman as required by the IGRA and were thus void, Sharp Image’s action is preempted by IGRA. Consequently, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 

Briefs here.