notice

California Supreme Court on Issues ICWA Notice Opinion

Kate Fort

Here.

This is the In re Isaiah H. decision, where amici included the United States and California Indian Legal Services on behalf of appellant mother. Briefing was completed in this case more than a year ago, and oral arguments were heard in May.

We granted review to decide whether a parent who does not bring a timely appeal from a juvenile court order that subsumes a finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability may challenge such a finding in the course of appealing from a subsequent order terminating parental rights. Because ICWA imposes on the juvenile court a continuing duty to inquire whether the child is an Indian child, we hold that the parent may a challenge a finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability in an appeal from the subsequent order, even if she did not raise such a challenge in an appeal from the initial order.

***

The continuing nature of a juvenile court‘s duty to inquire into a child‘s Indian status appears on the face of section 224.3(a). As noted, that provision reads: “The court . . . ha[s] an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . has been . . . filed is or may be an Indian child in all dependency proceedings and in any juvenile wardship proceedings if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.” (§ 224.3(a).) The plain language of this provision — declaring an “affirmative and continuing duty” that applies to “all dependency proceedings” — means that the juvenile court in this case had a present duty to inquire whether Isaiah was an Indian child at the April 2013 proceeding to terminate Ashlee‘s parental rights, even though the court had previously found no reason to know Isaiah was an Indian child at the January 2012 proceeding to place Isaiah in foster care. Because the validity of the April 2013 order is necessarily premised on the juvenile court‘s fulfillment of that duty, there is nothing improper or untimely about Ashlee‘s contention in this appeal that the juvenile court erred in discharging that duty.

Briefs here.

ICWA Published Notice Case out of Michigan

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

Given the multiple references in the record to possible Cherokee heritage, the DHHS had adequate information to make an “initial determination” that C.J. “may be a member” of the Cherokee tribe, implicating a duty to “exercise due diligence to contact” the Cherokee tribe “in writing so that the tribe may verify membership or eligibility for membership.” MCL 712B.9(3) (emphasis added). This was not done. Furthermore, assuming that the DHHS was “unable to make [such] an initial determination” relative to the Cherokee tribe, there is no indication in the record, nor does the DHHS argue on appeal, that the tribe or tribes located in Kalamazoo County were given written notification, which is a minimal requirement under the final sentence in MCL 712B.9(3).FN9 Indeed, the DHHS does not even present an appellant argument under MCL 712B.9(3), despite respondent’s partial reliance on the provision. Accordingly, MCL 712B.9(3), along with 25 USC 1912(a) and MCL 712B.9(1), serves as a basis to order conditional reversal in regard to C.J. On remand, notice must be sent to the Cherokee tribe and, if one exists, to any tribe or tribes in Kalamazoo County.

As for FN9, where the Michigan Court of Appeals admits it does not know if there is a tribe in Kalamazoo County–if only there was a way to find out that information.

Thanks to everyone who sent this one in.

Now Published Case out of California on Application of ICWA to Eligible Children

Kate Fort

Here. (original unpublished opinion we posted last week). Appellants requested this opinion be published, so the published opinion is here.

We’d like to point out that the fact that mother was a minor and a dependent of the court meant that the state should have been treating MOTHER’S own case as an ICWA case, which does not seem to have happened (and if you’re keeping track, yes, I’ve now used italics, allcaps, AND red ink on this one).

In this case, BOTH the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa AND the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe responded to the Department’s notice. Both Bands stated the children were eligible for enrollment, and Red Cliff asked for more information. Mother was a minor and a runaway from her placement. But instead of sending the information, or following up to assist in getting the children enrolled, or provide active efforts, the Department requested the juvenile court find that ICWA did not apply. Which the juvenile court did. Specifically:

Our record discloses no further action after November 2013, until an interim review report, dated April 22, 2014, stated, “[i]t is respectfully requested that the Court make a finding as to the children’s Indian Child Welfare Act Status.” The report further stated that ICWA “does or may apply” as each child might be an Indian child in the Chippewa tribe and was ICWA “eligible” (capitalization & boldface omitted). SSA proposed the court find “ICWA does not apply,” and the juvenile court’s minute order, dated April 22, 2014, contains the finding, “ICWA does not apply.” In a minute order dated June 19, 2014, the juvenile court again stated: “Court finds ICWA does not apply.”

The Court of Appeals held:

Given the above cited authorities, the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA did not apply. Not only did insufficient evidence support that finding, but also two tribes responded to SSA’s ICWA notice, by stating that the children were eligible to enroll in them. The court was thereafter required to proceed as if the children were Indian children.

Under these circumstances, we must reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions for the juvenile court to order SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children. (In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 458–459.)

Updated List of Designated Tribal Agents for ICWA Notice

Kate Fort

Somehow in all of the recent ICWA-related new, we missed the March 16 release of the updated list of designated tribal agents for ICWA notice.

Here, at 81 Fed. Reg. 10887 (March 16, 2016). We did a quick control+F search in the list for “Mohawk,” and the St. Regis Mohawk designated agent for ICWA popped right up. This list should be bookmarked on every state child welfare worker’s computer.

Unpublished California ICWA Notice Case

Kate Fort1 Comment

Reason #678 why my response to state actors when they complain about notice issues is “are you absolutely certain you did notice correctly?”:

In this short unpublished decision, the Department concedes that it concluded not once, but twice, that there is no federally recognized Mohawk tribe.

B266865

 

Doe v. Jesson, now Piper, Partially Survives Motion to Dismiss

Kate Fort

Here. This is the federal case challenging the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act.

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear the Does’ complaint, but only against the government defendants. The Court will dismiss Commissioner Moose from the case because he is a tribal officer and not a state officer; does not enforce MIFPA; and is not restricted by the constitutional clauses at issue here. But even though the Court may proceed to the merits of the Does’ complaint against the government defendants, the Court will not decide the merits now. The parties necessarily and understandably devoted nearly all of the briefs to the numerous preliminary issues. Although the jurisdictional questions were well briefed, the Does’ equal protection and due process claims received less attention than they deserved. Accordingly, in deciding these motions the Court will express no opinion on the merits – only on the preliminary matters. It may be that Defendants’ positions on the merits are correct – or incorrect – but those questions will be decided another day.

Three Recent California ICWA Cases

Kate Fort

Reported case on notice, where the social service agency attempted to fix the notice issues while the case was on appeal. Fourth District remanded for proper notice.

An unreported case where the trial court refused to apply ICWA because of a lack of written communication from the tribe, though the agency received verbal confirmation of the children’s membership. The case was reversed, also by the Fourth District.

Finally, an unreported case using the “family lore” argument to find there was no notice necessary. Haven’t seen a family lore case in California since 2011. Those cases were all out of the Second District, while this one is out of the First.

Reported ICWA Notice Case out of California

Kate Fort

Here

Here, the juvenile court properly inquired about Shahida’s Indian ancestry at each hearing, and the Department conscientiously interviewed several family members to obtain additional information. During these family interviews, the maternal great uncle informed the Department he had Creek and Seminole ancestry. The maternal grandmother also informed the Department she believed, based at least in part on photographs she no longer possessed, she had Blackfeet ancestry. The court found the Blackfeet claim insufficiently supported and, according to the Department, the Creek and Seminole ancestry too remote.
Neither explanation proffered by the court and the Department constitutes an adequate ground for failure to give notice of Kadence’s dependency case to the identified tribes. As to the remoteness of Kadence’s possible connection to the Seminole and Creek tribes, although the suggestion of Creek and Seminole ancestry was based on information about her great-great-great grandparents, nothing was presented to the juvenile court or included in the record on appeal concerning the membership rules for those tribes. It could well be, for example, that membership under tribal rules is passed to successive generations, as a matter of right, through bilineal or double descent without regard to intermarriage or blood quantum and that the absence of formal enrollment does not affect tribal membership. Under those circumstances Kadence could be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.(See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 72, fn. 21 [98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 [Indian tribe is final arbiter of its membership rights] . . .

Unpublished Michigan ICWA Notice Case

Kate Fort

Here. From Kalamazoo County.

Of note: There are six tribes in Michigan alone that should be noticed if a parent family in a “Chippewa tribe,” and DHHS noticed one of them. MIFPA requires the notice of the tribe in the county where the case arises, though the Pokagon Band service area does not include Kzoo county, while the other two (unnoticed) Potawatomi tribes do cover the county. Finally, it’s not clear from the opinion why Cherokee was noticed at all.

There is no question that the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements were triggered early in these proceedings when father indicated at an April 2013 preliminary hearing that he might have some family membership—specifically, through his brother—in the “Chippewa tribe.” There is some indication in the record that respondent-mother also claimed potential Indian heritage, although it is unclear what tribes, if any, she identified. Because “sufficiently reliable information” of possible Indian heritage was provided, the trial court had “reason to know” that an Indian child could be involved, thus triggering the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. 25 USC 1912(a); MCL 712B.9(1); In re Morris, 491 Mich at 109.

The record indicates that DHS sent notifications to several different tribes, including the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee, the Cherokee Nation, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. DHS also sent a notification to the Midwest Bureau of Indian Affairs. On June 18, 2013, both the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians responded and indicated that the child was not eligible for membership. The Cherokee Nation also responded with a request for more family information, although there is no indication that further information was thereafter provided. There is also no indication that the remaining tribes or the Bureau of Indian Affairs responded. Based on the responses that had been received, the trial court indicated at a November 2013 review hearing that the ICWA/MIFPA inquiry was “at an end.”

We conclude that the record sufficiently evidences DHS’s compliance with the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. DHS sent notifications to several tribes, as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On appeal, father does not identify any other tribes that should have been notified. Moreover, while father takes issue with the fact that DHS apparently never provided further information to the Cherokee Nation, he does not identify what further information could have been provided, nor does he argue that he provided the information requested to DHS but that DHS failed to forward it to the Cherokee Nation. Moreover, we note that DHS does not have an affirmative responsibility “to conduct independent research to obtain a parent’s detailed genealogical information.” In re Morris (On Remand), 300 Mich App 95, 105; 832 NW2d 419 (2013). Finally, despite father’s argument to the contrary, the trial court did in fact make a conclusive determination that the child was not an Indian child by noting that the issue was “at an end” and by leaving unchecked, in its subsequent orders, the box indicating that the proceedings involved an Indian child. There was no plain error affecting substantial rights.

Here is DHHS’s map of tribal service areas in Michigan.

Published California Court of Appeals ICWA Notice Case

Kate Fort

Here. Out of the Second Appellate Division, L.A. County. The State has the ongoing duty to send updated notices when they receive additional information.

The issue presented in this case is whether there is a duty under the ICWA to send updated notices to the relevant tribes when additional information regarding the child‟s ancestors (such as previously omitted birthdates, aliases, and/or alternate spellings) is obtained after the original ICWA notices were sent. We conclude there is such a duty. Because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) in this case failed to send updated notices after it obtained additional information, we reverse the order terminating the parental rights of appellant W. H. (mother) with regard to her daughter, I.B.,2 for the limited purpose of compliance with the ICWA.