Here is the opinion.
Here is the opinion.
Here.
Here is the opinion in State v. Scott.
An excerpt:
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. On appeal, he alleges multiple errors in his trial. We affirm all issues but one. On that issue, we remand for further proceedings on a potential Batson violation.
What a case — McGuire v. Aberle. Law profs looking for a good fact pattern check these first two paragraphs out:
In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker’s eight children each inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers are Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her undivided one-eighth interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick is a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. Carletta is a non-Indian. Patrick subsequently conveyed his interest to his son. Before this suit, Patrick’s son transferred the property back to Patrick. As a result, Patrick and Carletta each own an undivided one-sixteenth interest.
Sometime after Patrick and Carletta acquired their interests, a dispute arose between the Aberles and the Becker children who still retained an interest in the property. The Becker children commenced this action in circuit court, seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for partition. Patrick also moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Patrick argued that because he was a member of the Tribe, and because he had become an owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest in property on the Reservation, the circuit court possessed no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. Aberles contended the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court had jurisdiction.
On remand, the trial court will have to answer the following riddle:
But the problem in this case is that the record does not reflect how and under what authority the land in question was initially alienated. That is significant because counsel for the Tribe and Aberles contended at oral argument that this land could not have been alienated under the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was not created until 1889). Counsel also argued that we should read the 1908 Act differently than the General Allotment Act. Moreover, counsel for the Becker children agreed that the nature of the patent and the Act under which it was granted is important to the jurisdiction question. But that information is not known or reflected in this record.
Here is the opinion in In re S.H.E.
An excerpt:
The record demonstrates that DSS actively attempted to reunify the family. The services provided to Father, in conjunction with DSS’s considerable efforts to help Mother1 and Mother2, satisfy the “active efforts” requirement under ICWA. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that reasonable and active efforts were made to reunify the family.
Decision here.
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe filed a writ of mandamus to the South Dakota Supreme Court, trying to stop the practice of the lower courts using 25 USC 1922 to justify ignoring ICWA’s requirements for weeks after a removal of a child. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ.
In this case, the original removal was on July 6. At a hearing on July 23, the judge stated that the hearing was a “continuation of the emergency hearing, and that ICWA placement preferences were not yet applicable.” The Supreme Court upheld this decision, and the inapplicability of ICWA to emergency or temporary custody proceedings.
After the court justified ignoring the plain language of the section (applying it to all Indian children, and ignoring the “imminent physical damage or harm” requirement of a 1922 action), the court went on to state:
Tribe also asserts a violation of state law in the temporary custody hearing based upon an alleged lack of evidence of a need for temporary custody as required by SDCL 26-7A-18. Tribe ignores, however, that the temporary custody hearing proceeded on the State’s petition for temporary custody and the accompanying police report and ICWA affidavit from a DSS specialist . . . While these documents might not constitute evidence within the normal bounds of the Rules of Evidence, those rules are not applicable at a temporary custody hearing.
It would be interesting to know what rules do apply to temporary custody hearings in South Dakota.
Here is the opinion in Bernie v. Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls. And the opinion in a related case.
An excerpt:
A number of former students who attended an elementary boarding school alleged that they had been sexually abused while attending the school. They sued some of the alleged perpetrators and four entity defendants, including the Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls.1 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Diocese on all three of the students’ substantive claims. We affirm.
Here is the opinion in State v. Graham.
An excerpt:
John Graham was convicted of felony murder. He appeals, contending that: he was tried on the felony murder charge in violation of the specialty doctrine of federal extradition law; the circuit court erred in admitting hearsay; there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; and, his life sentence without parole was unauthorized by statute and was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
Here is the opinion in Detmers v. Costner. ![]()
News coverage of the case (but not the opinion) is here. News coverage of the decision is here.
Here is the website of the sculptor.
Here is today’s opinion in In re L.S.
An excerpt:
In the circumstances here, however, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe requires an application for membership. See Constitution and By-Laws of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe of Fort Thompson, South Dakota, Art. II, Membership. An Indian tribe’s determination of its membership and eligibility for membership is binding and conclusive in an ICWA proceeding. In re Adoption of C.D., 751 N.W.2d 236, 241-42 (N.D. 2008). C.S. has not taken the necessary steps to enroll in the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, even though she had sixteen months to do so from the time L.S. was removed. Therefore, L.S. is not a biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
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