Here.
Yale Law Journal Comment on the OSG’s Certiorari Decisionmaking
Here.
Here.
Available here, drawing from his book Making Democracy Work.
Here is an excerpt:
After the decision [in Worcester], Justice Joseph Story wrote to his wife: “Thanks be to God, the Court can wash their hands clean of the iniquity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.” A few days later, he wrote to another
correspondent: “The Court has done its duty. Let the Nation now do theirs.” Story added: “Georgia is full of anger and violence. . . . Probably she will resist . . . , and if she does, I do not believe the President will interfere . . . .”And that is just what happened. Georgia said it would resist the decision as a “usurpation” of power. And this is the case about which President Andrew Jackson supposedly said, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”
The President considered he had as good a right as the Court to decide what the Constitution meant and how it should be enforced. Worcester stayed in jail. John Marshall wrote to Story: “I yield slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that our Constitution cannot last.”What was wrong with Jackson’s position? The President soon found out. South Carolina, noticing what Georgia could do, decided it would follow suit— but in respect to federal taxes. It passed a law prohibiting the payment of federal customs duties. And Jackson then began to realize the threat to the Union inherent in the principle. He quickly obtained a “force bill” from Congress, authorizing him to send troops to South Carolina. And South Carolina withdrew its law. The press began to write about Georgia and the Cherokees: how did Georgia and Worcester differ from South Carolina and taxes? And Georgia began to back down. It reached an agreement with Worcester, releasing him from jail. And so the Court’s order was ultimately enforced. Or was it?
There is no happy ending here. Jackson sent troops to Georgia, but not to enforce the Court’s decision or to secure the Indians their lands. To the contrary, he sent federal troops to evict the Indians. He found a handful of Cherokees willing to sign a treaty requiring departure; he ignored 17,000 other Cherokees who protested that they would die rather than agree to go; and he forced the tribe to move to Oklahoma, walking there along the Trail of Tears, so-called because so many Cherokees died along the way. Their descendants live in Oklahoma to this day.
This episode suggests a negative answer to Hotspur’s question. The Court may follow the law—even in an unpopular matter. But that does not matter very much. Force, not law, will prevail. The summoned “spirits” will not come.
Lightning in the Hand: Indians and Voting Rights
Written by Pamela S. Karlan, [View as PDF]
120 Yale L.J. 1420 (2011).
American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights
By Laughlin McDonald
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010, pp. 347. $55.00.
Pamela Karlan has posted the abstract of her forthcoming review of Laughlin McDonald’s book “American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights” on SSRN (link here). Here is the abstract:
This review essay discusses Laughlin McDonald’s book, American Indians and the Fight For Equal Voting Rights (2010), to explore questions of disenfranchisement, dilution, and constitutional design. McDonald examines the barriers to full political equality faced by Indians in communities in five Western states and describes litigation under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 attacking these barriers. In many ways, the Indian voting rights cases resemble the cases brought, often a generation earlier, by black citizens in the South and Latino citizens in the Southwest. But as McDonald explains, Indians occupy a distinctive status within the American political order. Indians are citizens not only of the United States and the state where they reside but often also (and particularly in those regions where they are most likely to bring voting rights claims) of a separate sovereign as well – their tribe. This fact has inflected both the history of Indian disenfranchisement and the course of litigation under the Voting Rights Act.
Part I describes the history of Indian disenfranchisement in light of their distinctive constitutional status. Indians’ exclusion from the political process reflected profound racism as pernicious and pervasive as the discrimination facing blacks in the South and Latinos in the Southwest. But it also involved complex constitutional and conceptual issues unique to Indians, who were excluded from citizenship, even after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and who remained subject to distinct treatment even after citizenship was conferred. Part II then turns to the relatively recent vote dilution litigation that forms the heart of McDonald’s book. Indian voting rights cases have followed a clear path blazed by earlier cases involving blacks and Latinos. Nevertheless, themes related to Indians’ distinctive political status crop up within the litigation at various points. Finally, Part III looks beyond Indians’ claims under the Voting Rights Act to discuss issues related to internal tribal elections. Like other elections, these contests involve fundamental questions about enfranchisement and electoral design. Tribal answers to these questions sometimes depart dramatically from the rules governing federal, state, and local elections. I talk about two such departures, one related to voting by non-residents and the other related to nonequipopulous voting districts, to show how they that tie into ongoing debates extending far beyond Indian law.
Here.
| Written by Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley [View as PDF] | |
118 Yale L.J. 1022 (2009).
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At noon today, Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley will present their paper “In Defense of Property,” forthcoming from the Yale Law Journal. This presentation is sponsored by MSU College of Law.
Here is the abstract:
This Article advances a comprehensive theory to explain and defend the emergence of indigenous cultural property claims. In doing so, it offers a vigorous response to an emerging view, in scholarship and popular society, that it is normatively undesirable to employ property law as a means of protecting indigenous culture and ideas. In our view, cultural property critiques arise largely because of the absence of a comprehensive and countervailing theory of indigenous cultural property. To remedy this absence, this Article articulates a robust theory of indigenous property that challenges the individual rights paradigm animating current property law. Specifically, this piece makes two broad contributions to existing property theory. First, it draws on but departs significantly from Margaret Jane Radin’s groundbreaking work linking property and ‘personhood,’ and defends cultural property claims, in contrast, within a paradigm of ‘peoplehood.’ Second, this piece posits that, whereas individual rights are overwhelmingly advanced by property law’s dominant ownership model, the interests of peoples, particularly indigenous peoples, are more appropriately and powerfully effectuated through a theory of property characterized most aptly by stewardship.