Author: Kate Fort

Another Supreme Court Opinion This Term on Time Limitations for Claims

Kate Fort

Yesterday the Court decided  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger (non-federal-Indian-law case). The Court held that injured parties cannot bring claims against corporations that pollute if the claim falls outside of a state statute of repose, even if the claim would be otherwise preserved by a federal law. Generally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) pre-empts state statutes of limitation, because Congress wanted to preserve injuries from pollution that can sometimes take years to discover. However, North Carolina also has a state statute of repose, which bars claims brought more than 10 years after the last culpable act. Since CERCLA only specifically identifies statutes of limitations and not repose, the Court found the claimants are unable to bring their damages claim against the company (which sold the land in 1987).

In her dissent with Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg would preserve the claim, finding Congress’s intent was to preserve these claims, regardless of the name of the state limitations statute.

Not only will this decision harm the landowners involved in the case, but those injured by contaminated wells at Camp Lejeune (a Marine base also in North Carolina), who currently have claims pending in the 11th Circuit. Article here from right after oral arguments (though it misjudges J. Kagan, who joined the majority in the case).

Fletcher on NY Times Room for Debate: American Indians Seek Control, Not Just Payment

Kate Fort

Here.

America’s moral debts to African-Americans and American Indians are shockingly deep and wide. African Americans point to slavery, Black Codes, Jim Crow, and redlining. And American Indians point to land and resources theft, boarding schools, and cultural and religious persecution. But while African-Americans eye individual payments, Indian tribes seek control over lands and natural resources taken from them by the United States and state governments. The advantage in the tribal strategy is to make Uncle Sam the bad guy. African-American strategists should take note. 

All articles here.

NCJFCJ Disproportionality Report of Children in Foster Care for FY 2012

Kate Fort

Page 9 of the report has Native American Disproportionality Rates by State. 21 states have overrepresentation of Native kids in care, including Michigan (1.3, and 1.9 in entries to care), Wisconsin (4.1), Minnesota (13.9)and Iowa (4.5). Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have worse numbers than 10 years ago (page 3).

Report Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care for Fiscal Year 2012 (pdf). Website here.

As a side note, anytime anyone would like to talk about what they think is happening in Illinois/Chicago (no disproportionality shown, almost no ICWA cases pop up on appeal, but with a large urban Native population), we are all ears.

 

Michigan Court of Appeals Opinion on MIFPA and ICWA Notice

Kate Fort1 Comment

The Michigan COA interpreted In re Morris to require a conditional reversal when the parent asserted that his grandmothers were Native and:

It is unclear from the record exactly how or why the caseworker came to the conclusion, reflected in the case service plans, that the minor child is not an Indian child for purposes of 25 USC 1912(a); some elaboration would have been appropriate given the father’s assertion. There is no indication that an inquiry or investigation was made specifically with respect to the father’s claim made at the preliminary hearing, nor an explanation in regard to why the father’s claim was being discounted, assuming it was evaluated or pondered in the first place, such that the ICWA notice requirement was not triggered. Of special concern to us is that the initial case service plan, in its summarization of the trial court’s preliminary hearing order, made no mention of the court’s command that the caseworker “make necessary inquiry and/or notification as to possible Native American Indian heritage.” Furthermore, there is no clear confirmation by the court itself that its initial concerns of whether the child is an Indian child were alleviated. Moreover, the father’s assertion concerning the Native American heritage of the minor child’s paternal great-grandparents fits within the parameters of the examples given by the Morris Court, quoted above, that would trigger the need to serve notice. Morris, 491 Mich at 108 n 18. Finally, petitioner itself concedes that conditional reversal is necessary in order to determine whether the minor child is an Indian child under the law.

Opinion here.

Michigan Supreme Court Rejects One Parent Doctrine as Unconstitutional

Kate Fort1 Comment

This case will have broad ramifications for child welfare cases. This is a huge victory for parents and families. While not mentioned in this opinion, this case was also an ICWA case.

Opinion, written by Justice McCormack, here.

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine permits a court to interfere with a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and control of the children solely because the other parent is unfit, without any determination that he or she is also unfit. In other words, the one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness.

***

Because the jurisdictional inquiry is focused on the child, once there has been an adjudication, either by trial or by plea, the court has jurisdiction over the child regardless of whether one or both parents have been adjudicated unfit. MCL 712A.2(b). In cases in which jurisdiction has been established by adjudication of only one parent, the one-parent doctrine allows the court to then enter dispositional orders affecting the parental rights of both parents.

***

Because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringes the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, we hold that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Utah Appeals Court Denies Transfer to Tribal Court

Kate Fort

Granted, it’s a strange and short decision about voluntary relinquishment. But we post it as another example of what state courts do when a tribe allows a case to go forward in state court and then moves to transfer at a later date.

After monitoring the case for approximately one year, the Tribe filed a motion to transfer the case to its tribal court. In response to the motion, the juvenile court found that good cause existed not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court due primarily to the fact that the case was in an advanced stage of litigation and all relevant witnesses resided in Utah.

Opinion here.

Alabama Supreme Court Finds Purchasing Dram Shop Insurance Waives Sovereign Immunity

Kate Fort2 Comments

Writ of Mandamus denied without opinion, but the concurring opinion is here.

Because the Poarch Band has structured its
Tribal Code to prevent dram-shop claims from being heard in
the tribal court, its claim of immunity from a state-court
action is accordingly diminished.

***

Because PBCI’s formal covenant to assume financial
responsibility in dram-shop actions constitutes an explicit
waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability for such
actions, I concur in denying PBCI’s petition for a writ of
mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss this action on
the ground of tribal immunity.

Michigan Race Equity Commission Releases Report on Child Welfare

Kate Fort

Here is the news article.

Report here.

• Minority kids were 2.1 times more likely to age out of foster care than white children. Hispanic kids were 1.1 times more likely, American Indian 1.4 times more likely and black children 2.3 times more likely to age out of the system.

Nebraska Court of Appeals: Active Efforts Required When Children Under State Jurisdiction are In Parental Home

Kate Fort

Opinion here.

Case law in this state has clearly established that the active efforts standard in this section requires more than the reason- able efforts standard that applies in cases not involving ICWA. See, In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008); In re Interest of Ramon N., 18 Neb. App. 574, 789 N.W.2d 272 (2010). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(6) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
The question presented to us in this case is whether ICWA’s active efforts standard applies when the State, through DHHS, has legal custody of the children, but the children are placed in the parental home. Nebraska appellate courts have not spe- cifically addressed this question. David argues that case law from other jurisdictions should lead this court to conclude that ICWA’s protections are applicable at all stages of a juvenile court proceeding.

***

In reaching the conclusion that active efforts should be pro- vided during periods that placement of the children is with the parent or parents, we recognize that the active efforts required may certainly be different from those required during a period of removal from the home. As discussed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008), the active efforts standard requires a case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., In re Interest of Louis S. et al., supra (where further rehabilitative efforts would be futile, requirement of active efforts is satisfied); T.F. v. State, Dept. of H & S Services, 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001); People ex rel. D.G., 679 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 2004); In re Cari B., 327 Ill. App. 3d 743, 763 N.E.2d 917, 261 Ill. Dec. 668 (2002) (degree of active efforts required to prevent Indian familial breakup reduced by parent’s incarceration).

South Carolina Gambling Cruise Act Does Not Alter Statewide Ban on Video Gaming

Kate Fort

Opinion in Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina here.

We conclude the Tribe’s action is not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata and reverse this finding by the circuit court. We affirm, however, the circuit court’s determination that the Gambling Cruise Act does not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices.