ICWA

Tribal Comments Needed for Notice for Proposed Model Family Foster Home Licensing Standards

Kate Fort

Here is the link. Comments are due by October 1.

By April 1, 2019, title IV-E agencies, which include all states and 12 tribes, must provide the HHS specific and detailed information about:

○ Whether the state or tribal agency foster family home licensing standards are consistent with the model licensing standards identified by HHS, and if not, the reason; and

○ Whether the state or tribal agency waives non-safety licensing standards for relative foster family homes (pursuant to waiver authority provided by section 471(a)(10)(D) of the Act), and if so, how caseworkers are trained to use the waiver authority and whether the agency has developed a process or provided tools to assist caseworkers in waiving these non-safety standards to quickly place children with relatives.

At this stage, HHS is trying to identify the model by which the state and direct IV-E tribes will be measured against. In this notice, the Children’s Bureau provides what they would like to use as that model: “We are proposing one set of standards for comment to apply to relatives and non-relatives, as well as state and tribal title IV-E agencies.”

The model appears problematic at best and is causing concern among both state and tribal IV-E workers and attorneys. As just one example, “i. A continuous supply of safe drinking water. ii. A properly operating kitchen with a sink, refrigerator, stove, and oven;”. We have families in Michigan that do not have a continuous supply of safe drinking water right now. What does “continuous supply” mean if you have to haul water? What is “properly operating”. There are many, many provisions like this in the model (like a functional literacy requirement), and if your tribe is concerned about getting homes licensed by either state or direct tribe IV-E agencies, this will affect you. I don’t see any comments submitted yet, or cannot access them, but if we receive good models or see ones submitted, I will post them as examples.

NICWA’s website further states: “There is no penalty for states or tribes that use different foster care standards than the national ones, but NICWA has raised concerns about how these will be used in future technical assistance and training with tribes by ACF. In addition, the national standards have not adequately taken into consideration unique cultural issues for AI/AN children and families and issues related to tribal authority to establish foster care standards.”

Rare Published Notice Opinion out of California Court of Appeals

ilpc

In re EH (Fourth District, 1st Div). For reference, so far this year California has had 48 unpublished notice decisions and 19 unpublished inquiry decisions. This is the first published notice case this year.

We agree with Mother that, considering Sally Y.H.’s statement to the Agency that her paternal family had Tohono O’odham Nation heritage, the Agency had a duty to attempt to obtain Sally Y.H.’s father’s identifying information and to provide notice of any such information obtained to the Tohono O’odham Nation. We further conclude that the Agency has not demonstrated that it fulfilled that duty by providing the Tohono O’odham Nation with information pertaining to an individual named Bruno Y. since it is not clear from the record that Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father. Moreover, if Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father, and E.H.’s great-great-grandfather, the Agency failed to properly describe his ancestral relationship to E.H. on the notice provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. Finally, given that Sally Y.H. told the Agency that her paternal family had heritage from the Tohono O’odham Nation, we cannot conclude that the Agency’s errors were harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of having the Agency provide the Tohono O’odham Nation with proper notice of the proceedings in this case, including accurate information pertaining to all known direct lineal ancestors of E.H., in accordance with all applicable law.3

***

FN 3. Mother also contends that the notice that the Agency provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation was deficient for several additional reasons, including that the Agency erred in listing her current address as being “no information available,” and in failing to update the notice when information about her residence became available. In light of our reversal, we need not consider these contentions, but we direct the juvenile court to ensure that the Agency provides Mother’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known.

In addition, Mother contends that the Agency provided the tribe an incorrect address for Sally Y.H. The Agency concedes that the address that it provided for Sally Y.H. contained typographical errors, including listing the city of her residence as ” ‘Alpaso’ ” rather than ” ‘El Paso,’ ” but argues that any errors were harmless. In support of its harmlessness argument, the Agency asks this court to take judicial notice of the fact that “El Paso is a city in the state of Texas and Alpaso is not.” The juvenile court is directed to ensure that the Agency provides Sally Y.H.’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known. We deny the Agency’s request for judicial notice as moot.

Finally, Mother states that the Agency was required to list Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers on the notice that it provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. On remand, the juvenile court shall direct the Agency to provide Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers, if known. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2 [specifying that notice sent to a tribe shall include “[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents . . . and great-grandparents . . . as well as their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, and any other identifying information, if known”], italics added; unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)

***

This argument is unpersuasive since the letter from the Tohono O’odham Nation does not indicate the basis upon which the tribe made its determination as to E.H.’s Indian child status. Nor can we agree with the Agency’s suggestion that the fact that the Tohono O’odham Nation did not ask for further information demonstrates that the Agency’s error was harmless. The tribe was not required to ask the Agency to provide information that the record indicates the Agency should have reasonably attempted to obtain and provide to the tribe. Thus, we decline to find the Agency’s error harmless simply because the tribe did not indicate that further information might have altered its determination, particularly given the other noticing errors acknowledged by the Agency.

Montana Supreme Court ICWA Case

Kate Fort

Here.

The Montana Supreme Court continues to apply Baby Girl to absent fathers involved in state initiated proceedings, and not apply ICWA when terminating their rights.

Appellant Brief

Appellee Brief

Appellant Reply

CILS Presentation at Cahuilla on Tribal Homes for Foster Placement, Sept. 11

Kate Fort

Here.

Presentation is by one of the many excellent CILS attorneys–Mica Llerandi.

 

 

AFCARS Data Implementation Rule Delayed and Will be Revised. Again.

Kate Fort1 Comment

From the Administration for Children and Families here.

The rule is delayed until 2020 and the Administration is going to “streamline” the data elements. And then it might just be delayed again based on the “streamlining”:

The Children’s Bureau published in the Federal Register on August 21, 2018 a final rule to delay implementation of the December 2016 AFCARS final rule until October 1, 2020 (83 FR 42225). However, since we plan to revise the AFCARS data points, we will revisit this implementation date to provide a timeframe to allow title IV-E agencies time to comply with the revised AFCARS data points.

CSKT 2018 Indian Child Welfare Legal Summit, September 12-13

Victoria Sweet

Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes’2018 Indian Child Welfare Legal Summit

The Montana Court Improvement Program, in conjuction with CSKT, would like to invite you to this interactive training designed to improve legal knowledge, skills, and practices in relation to Indian Child Welfare. 

After opening with a case law update describing recent Montana opinions, federal court litigation, and note-worthy opinions from sister states, this CLE will provide a quick interactive refresher on the basics of tribal jurisdiction in child custody cases and the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act.

With this foundation in place, participants will explore topics like best practices in child welfare cases, domestic child sex trafficking, tribal code enhancement, and ethics as it relates to Indian child welfare cases.  Participants will have the opportunity to break out into small affinity groups to discuss improving systems and practices across the state in order to better serve AI/AN children and families.

This two-day training is designed for tribal attorneys, tribal judges, parents’ attorneys, GALs, adoption attorneys, and state prosecutors. (Although caseworkers, CASAs, and other child welfare practitioners are welcome to join us, the focus of this training is to improve legal knowledge, skills, and practices.)  Faculty includes local and national experts, practitioners, and scholars from across the country.  An application for CLE credits will be filed.

For agenda, updates and more visit: 

https://cskt-icw-legal-summit.sitey.me/

CTFC Press Release on Dismissal of Goldwater (ICWA) Lawsuit

Kate Fort

FINAL Release – ICWA Again Survives Challenge by Fringe Group

The California Tribal Families Coalition, a coalition of tribes and tribal leaders, this week applauded the recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss an ill-conceived challenge against the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) arising from claims in Arizona by the Goldwater Institute, a conservative fringe anti-ICWA group.

The Aug. 6 dismissal marks the end of the latest in a series of cases brought by the group against ICWA as part of a years-long, systematic and disturbing effort to undermine the 40-year-old federal statute that protects Indian children. To date, the Goldwater Institute has failed in its every attempt to upend ICWA.

Despite the encouraging dismissal, the Sacramento-based California Tribal Families Coalition (CTFC) also warned of additional, pending attacks that seek to unwind ICWA and the decades of critical legal protections it has provided against separating tribal children from their families and tribal communities.

This release is discussing the Goldwater litigation, which was the first major attempt to get ICWA declared unconstitutional. Both Navajo Nation and the Gila River Indian Community intervened in this case involving tribal children.

Since 2015, there have been nine federal lawsuits attacking ICWA directly on constitutional groups. There is on-going litigation directly attacking ICWA and tribal court jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit and the Northern District of Texas.

Fifth Circuit Briefs in State of Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Alabama-Coushatta Tribe Brief

Amicus Brief Supporting Tribe

Texas Brief

Lower court materials here.

Montana Supreme Court ICWA Notice Case

ilpc

Here

¶28 In this case, CPS Lebrun’s testimony that an unidentified person orally confirmed that “they are not eligible, just they can only be descendent members” does not satisfy the Department’s ICWA burden. As a direct result of the Department’s failure to satisfy this burden—and likely assuming the Department had, prior to filing its Notice of No ICWA Involvement, followed up with formal inquiry with the Blackfeet Tribe as CPS Lebrun testified he would—the District Court proceeded to termination without conclusive determination from the Tribe. No documentation or testimony of an authorized tribal representative either dispelled or confirmed the District Court’s and Department’s belief that the children were not Indian children as defined by ICWA. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold the District Court erred by proceeding to terminate Mother’s rights to D.E. and A.E. without a conclusive tribal determination of their tribal membership status and eligibility.
¶29 Accordingly, we hold the District Court abused its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights without a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership status and enrollment eligibility. We reverse and remand for an appropriate threshold determination of whether D.E. and A.E. are Indian children based on a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership and eligibility in the Blackfeet Tribe. Further, if D.E. and A.E. are conclusively identified as Indian children subject to the requirements of ICWA, the District Court shall hold further proceedings as may be necessary to meet the evidentiary burdens of ICWA.

AppellantBriefDE
AppelleeBriefDE
ReplyBriefDE

North Carolina “Reason to Know” ICWA Notice Case

ilpc

Here.

*Whether the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing should have caused the trial court to have reason to know an “Indian child” may be involved and trigger the notice requirement is the issue before us. The federal regulations implementing ICWA and promulgated in 2016, clearly the states court has reason to know an “Indian child” is involved if: “Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(2) (2018).

The ICWA proscribes that once the court has reason to know the child could be an “Indian child,” but does not have conclusive evidence, the court should confirm and “work with all of the Tribes … to verify whether the child is in fact a member.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b)(1). Federal law provides: “No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). Further, a court must “[t]reat the child as an Indian child, unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an ‘Indian child.’ ” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b)(2).

Other jurisdictions have recognized that “Indian child” status of the juvenile can only be decided by the tribe itself; therefore, only a suggestion that the child may be of Indian heritage is enough to invoke the notice requirements of the ICWA. In re Antoinette S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1408, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 15, 21 (2002). Additionally, ICWA provides that even after the completion of custody proceedings, if the provisions of ICWA were violated, “any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action.” 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012).

In In re A.R., the Respondent-father claimed that he had “a family connection to a registered Native American group” which consequently qualified his children for the protections under ICWA. In re A.R., 227 N.C. App. 518, 523, 742 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2013). . . . Further, this Court held that “[t]hough from the record before us we believe it unlikely that [the juveniles] are subject to the ICWA, we prefer to err on the side of caution by remanding for the trial court to … ensure that the ICWA notification requirements, if any, are addressed … since failure to comply could later invalidate the court’s actions.” Id.

In the case of In re C.P., the respondent-mother made the bare assertion that she and her children could possibly be eligible for membership with a band of Potawatomi Indians. In re C.P., 181 N.C. App. at 702, 641 S.E.2d at 16. The trial court required the ICWA notice to be sent. Id. When the time required under ICWA had passed without response from the tribe, the trial court allowed two continuances before determining ICWA did not apply and resumed the proceedings. Id. at 703, 641 S.E.2d at 16-17.

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Our Court has required social service agencies to send notice to the claimed tribes rather than risk the trial court’s orders being voided in the future, when claims of Indian heritage arise, even where it may be unlikely the juvenile is an Indian child. See In re A.R., 227 N.C. App. at 524, 742 S.E.2d at 634; In re C.P., 181 N.C. App. at 702, 641 S.E.2d at 16.