ICWA

More Comments Needed! Now on Title IV-E/Families First Developments

Kate Fort

Here. DUE JULY 22.

This one is arguably a little more complicated than usual, but also not inherently nefarious. Here’s a very quick overview (with thanks to Jack Trope for his recent presentation up at Grand Traverse Band for all the info).

In somewhat of a surprise development, Congress passed an overhaul to Title IV-E a few months ago. Title IV-E is the reimbursement program for foster care funding. Until this change, called Families First, the funding was triggered both by the removal of the child, and by the family’s income qualification.

Families First does two things–it releases funding for children who are “candidates” for foster care and removes the income qualification for services for those children and families. Allowable pre-removal services include “evidence-based”:

1. Mental health prevention and treatment services
2. Substance abuse prevention and treatment
3. In-home parenting-skill based programs

“Evidence based” Services and programs must be “trauma-informed” and “promising”, “supported”, or “well-supported” practices. HHS is to release practice criteria and pre-approved programs. There are long definitions in the quotes above, but basically:

Promising: one study with a control group
Supported: one study with random control or quasi-experimental
Well-supported: is at least two studies that used a random control or quasi-experimental trial

Finally, HHS must allow programs and services adapted to culture and context of a tribal community. No one really knows how this provision will interact with the evidence based provision above. This call for comments “solicits comments by July 22, 2018 on initial criteria and potential candidate programs and services for review in a Clearinghouse of evidence-based practices in accordance with the Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018.”

The HHS approved list of programs (“Clearinghouse”) will be automatically eligible for the funding. So! If you are provider who knows about such evidence-based practices for tribal youth and families, TELL HHS! Alternatively, if you work for a tribe, you might ask about how tribal consultation will fit into this process.

This may also be a partial game changer for tribes on the fence about doing direct IV-E funding with the federal government. The planning grant for that process should pop up again in the spring.

Judge Byrne’s Essay on Family Separation in Time

Kate Fort

Here.

Judge Byrne has been a leader at NCJFCJ, an ally to tribal judges through NAICJA, and a strong proponent and supporter of ICWA. She’s also a state court judge in Texas.

2018 ICWA Agents for Notice Includes Incorrect Contact Information

Kate Fort2 Comments

ETA: This is NOT limited to California

I have received word that some information in the 2018 Fed Reg ICWA Agents for Notice publication is completely (and wildly) incorrect, even though the information in 2017 was correct (and hadn’t changed): “It was absolutely correct last year. The person listed is not and has never been affiliated with [TRIBE]. The address is completely wrong, including the city.”

Tribes! PLEASE check this document to make sure your ICWA agent for notice information is correct. If you can, let me know if it isn’t. We are trying to get a sense of whether this is limited to California tribes or not.  This is the document we all train on and send people to (I was honestly in the middle of teaching a class on notice when I received this information). Thank you.

2018 Designated Agents for ICWA Service

Kate Fort2 Comments

Here!

Apparently last year I threatened some of you with embarrassment if you didn’t use these, which I’m not doing this year (but seriously, use these. Do not send notice to the tribal newspaper [yes, that has happened]).

 

Washington State Adopts ICWA Pro Hac Rule!

Kate Fort

Order here.

Effective September 1!

ICWA Pro Hac page here.

AFCARS Tribal Comments Needed-June 13 Deadline

Kate Fort

The Administrating is reconsidering the burdens of the Obama Administration’s Final Rule to collect data on American Indian/Alaska Native children in foster care through the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS). Comments are due June 13. Previous posts explaining this call for comments are here and here and here.

If you are interested in reviewing model comments for tribes stating the data elements should remain intact, please email Delia Sharpe (California Tribal Families Coalition)  at delia.sharpe@caltribalfamilies.org or me at fort@law.msu.edu

We will both be at the California ICWA conference today and tomorrow.

Consent to Termination of Parental Rights Decision in Michigan Supreme Court

Kate Fort

Opinion here

The ICWA Appellate Clinic co-represented the tribe in this case.

This case involves a complicated question of state statute interpretation regarding a voluntary consent to a termination of parental right in the face of a state termination petition. In this case, the dad consented to termination before the termination hearing. The children were later placed in a tribal-approved foster placement, and the dad withdrew his consent to termination. The question was whether dad could do that under Michigan statute.

None of the protections in MCL 712B.15, [mirroring ICWA’s main protections in an involuntary proceeding] which are designed for contested and adversarial proceedings, remains relevant once a parent voluntarily releases his or her rights under MCL 712B.13. When the court accepted Williams’s release, and the proceedings went from adversarial to cooperative, the protections of MCL 712B.15 did not apply.

However, the Court also held,

That is, Williams may withdraw his consent, but because he is still subject to MCL 712B.15, DHHS may refile a termination petition. MCL 712B.15. And, under MCL 712B.13(3), a parent who consents during an involuntary termination proceeding is not entitled to “the return of the Indian child” to him or her.

Instead, the child returns to the position the child was in before his or her parent consented to the termination of parental rights. Williams’s children were in foster care when he consented to the termination of his parental rights, his children will remain in foster care, and Williams will be once again subject to the procedures and protections of MCL 712B.15. DHHS may proceed with its termination case if it chooses, and if DHHS can satisfy the heightened requirements of MCL 712B.15, Williams’s parental rights can be terminated.

Briefing on the case is here.

ICWA QEW Opinion in the Minnesota Supreme Court

Kate Fort

Opinion

The question of what Qualified Expert Testimony (QEW) actually is under ICWA comes up all the time. The Minnesota Supreme Court did a pretty deep dive into what it means in terms of termination of parental rights, and concludes,

Read straightforwardly, the statute provides that to terminate parental rights, a district court must determine that “continued custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). This determination must be supported by evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and part of the supporting evidence must be QEW testimony. Id. The statute is unambiguous.

. . .

The parents . .  suggest that the statute requires that the QEW testify specifically that “continued custody . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).  . . . If Congress wanted to impose a requirement that the expert utter a “magic phrase,” it could have done so. But as written, neither ICWA nor MIFPA require a specific QEW opinion that “continued custody . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 6(a). S

…

Accordingly, we conclude that in a termination proceeding governed by ICWA and MIFPA, a court cannot terminate parental rights unless it determines that evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that continued parental custody of the child is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. That determination must be supported by QEW testimony.

Because the QEW admitted on the stand that she focused most of her testimony and affidavits on the mother (who was a tribal member) and not the father (who not an enrolled tribal member in any tribe), the court held her testimony did not support the termination as to father.

I get questions pretty frequently about QEW, QEW training, and whether a person should be a QEW. My answer is almost always the same–a QEW must be comfortable stating that the parental rights should be terminated, or that these children should be put in foster care. That information is what is required by statute, and why the state (or party seeking removal/termination) must put a QEW on the stand. The QEW is ultimately there to testify against the parents, regardless of any other testimony they may proffer.

ICWA Notice Decision in the Colorado Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

Opinion here

This is a fairly standard notice decision, but the instructions on remand are the kind that more courts of appeals need to provide in ICWA cases. As they are nearly four full pages long, I’m not quoting them here, but I am posting the opinion because of them.

Also, by “fairly standard notice decision”, I mean the Department was aware of possible American Indian/Cherokee heritage in May, and no one did any notice till December, a month after the Department filed the TPR. The Court of Appeals sent it back down to fix that.

Student Note on ICWA as a Political Classification Statute

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Allison Krause Elder has published “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act in the Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy. Here is the abstract:

In the summer of 2018, the Ninth Circuit will consider an appeal from the dismissal of a constitutional challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Brought by a conservative think-tank, this case frames the ICWA as race-based legislation, violating equal protection by depriving Indian children of the same procedures as non-Indian children in child custody cases. In reality, the ICWA seeks to protect the interests of tribes, Indian families, and Indian children by establishing special procedures and obligations in Indian child custody cases. On its face, the ICWA is concerned not with the race of children, but with the special status of tribes and their political membership. As discussed in this Paper, a racial understanding of the ICWA is inconsistent with both the statute itself and the historically mixed political-racial status of tribes in the United States. While the Supreme Court created an opening for a race-based view of the ICWA in Baby Veronica, prior precedents embraced a political understanding of “Indian” where Congress intended to support tribal sovereignty. This Paper argues that any fair reading of the ICWA must treat “Indian” as a political rather than racial classification, and that the ICWA cannot be subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection. To do otherwise is to read the tribe out of the Act, which is not just inconsistent with the statute, but dismissive of the unique history of tribes in our nation.