Federal Indian law is sometimes seen as a purely domestic part of American law, but its origins are in the law of nations. The Marshall Trilogy—Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia, three Supreme Court decisions authored by Chief Justice Marshall that are foundational for American federal Indian law—relied on law-of-nations sources. In particular, The Law of Nations, an eighteenth-century treatise by Emer de Vattel, provided a central influence on Marshall’s opinion in Worcester. In early national American legal thought, Vattel was a leading authority on the law governing the rights and obligations subsisting among nations. Recognizing the important role that the law of nations played in the foundations of federal Indian law under-scores the deep roots of tribal sovereignty in American law and clarifies current doctrinal disputes.
In 1974, Judge George Boldt issued a ruling that affirmed the fishing rights and tribal sovereignty of Native nations in Washington State. The Boldt Decision transformed Indigenous law and resource management across the United States and beyond. Like Brown v. Board of Education, the case also brought about far-reaching societal changes, reinforcing tribal sovereignty and remedying decades of injustice.
Eminent legal historian and tribal advocate Charles Wilkinson tells the dramatic story of the Boldt Decision against the backdrop of salmon’s central place in the cultures and economies of the Pacific Northwest. In the 1960s, Native people reasserted their fishing rights as delineated in nineteenth-century treaties. In response, state officials worked with non-Indian commercial and sport fishing interests to forcefully—and often violently—oppose Native actions. These “fish wars” spurred twenty tribes and the US government to file suit in federal court. Moved by the testimony of tribal leaders and other experts, Boldt pointedly waited until Lincoln’s birthday to hand down a decision recognizing the tribes’ right to half of the state’s fish. The case’s long aftermath led from the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Boldt’s opinion to collaborative management of the harvest of salmon and other marine resources.
Expert and compelling, Treaty Justice weaves personalities and local detail into the definitive account of one of the twentieth century’s most important civil rights cases.
The federal murder trials of two men charged with killing Osage Indians in the early 1920’s will be featured in a seminar and exhibit opening December 7 at the Old U.S. Post Office Building and Courthouse. Presented by the Historical Society of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, “The Osage Reign of Terror: The Untold Legal History” tracksthe murders of wealthy Osage tribal members, the arrival of agents with the Bureau of Investigation who investigated, and the Federal Prosecutors who charged William K. Hale and John Ramsey with a number of the murders. The federal trials that followed resulted in a landmark Supreme Court ruling, charges of witness and juror tampering, and high courtroom drama. The events took place in Fairfax, Pawhuska, Guthrie and Oklahoma City and are featured in a book and movie of the same name, “Killers of the Flower Moon.”
A reception hosted by the Historical Society and featuring a documentary film about the trials as well as Federal Court and Osage dignitaries will be held on December 7 at 4 pm in the Federal Judicial Learning Center and Museum. The event is co-sponsored by the Bank of Oklahoma and The Federal Bar Association – Oklahoma City Chapter. The exhibit is open to the public beginning December 8, 2023, through October 2024.
Email Leigh Dudley, Executive Director at leigh@fjlcm.org or Arvo Mikkanen arvo.mikkanen@usdoj.gov for more information. Contact via text at 405/697-6117 or 405/420-9912.
In the 2022 case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, the Supreme Court departed from one of the foundational cases in federal Indian law, Worcester v. Georgia. Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1832 opinion had dismissed state power over Indian Country. But in Castro-Huerta, the Court took precisely the kind of arguments about state power that Chief Justice Marshall rejected in Worcester and turned them into the law of the land—without any recognition of the arguments’ Indian Removal–era origins.
This Article corrects the Court’s oversight. Relying on rarely utilized archival sources, it provides a historical narrative of the development of what the Article terms the theory of state supremacy, first articulated by the southern state legislatures in the Removal Era to justify state power over Native nations and eradicate Native sovereignty. Even though Worcester rejected this theory, Supreme Court Justices and state litigants have continued to invoke its tenets in Indian law cases from the late nineteenth century to the present. Castro-Huerta, then, is just the latest and most egregious example. And the decision’s use of Removal-era arguments revives the specter of Indian Removal in the present day.
This Article reveals that the continued use of state supremacy arguments defies constitutional law and federal Indian affairs policy, produces an inaccurate history of Native nations and federal Indian law, and perpetuates the racism and violence that characterized the Removal Era. Ultimately, this Article seeks to counter future attacks on tribal sovereignty and combat the broader revival of long-rejected federalism arguments.
The Supreme Court’s decision last Term in Castro-Huerta v. Oklahoma dramatically rewrote the rules of criminal jurisdiction in federal Indian law. For the first time since 1882, the Court judicially expanded the scope of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, finding that states hold jurisdiction over Indian-on-non-Indian crime concurrently with the federal government. In reaching this conclusion, the Court exemplified the subjectivism that scholars have criticized in the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence for decades. The opinion distinguished or cast aside at least six prior decisions where the Court had seemingly reached the opposite conclusion, as well as concluding that the Court had already substantially limited the Court’s foundational holding in Worcester v. Georgia (1833) that Indian country ordinarily lies outside state authority.
Building on these earlier critiques, this Article uses Castro-Huerta to examine a less explored flaw in the Court’s Indian law rulings—what I call the problem of “too much history.” In Indian law, judges and litigants must make sense of over two centuries of jurisdictional debates, recorded largely not in statutes or constitutional provisions but in dozens of shifting Supreme Court decisions. The key question in Castro-Huerta, and the core of the dispute between majority and dissent, was change–how the law on state jurisdiction in Indian country had shifted over time. But the sheer mass of history makes it hard for the Justices to identify legitimate legal change in Indian law.
More Jaune Smith
This conundrum leads to two broad types of judicial use of history in Indian law. “Good” history decisions, epitomized by this Term’s decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, employ specific context to examine narrowly defined legal questions. By contrast, “bad” history opinions, exemplified by Castro-Huerta, turn to the past as an independent source of law, ask broad, unanswerable questions of it, and provide no clear way to assess the inevitable heap of conflicting evidence.
Having laid out this challenge, the Article reexamines the question of the specific historical change at the core at Castro-Huerta. Rather than the majority’s narrative of abandonment and the dissent’s narrative of continuity, I think a more accurate account of what the Court has done with respect to state jurisdiction in Indian country is translation—trying to make sense of older legal principles within a new jurisprudential frame. But this approach makes the Court’s decisions in this area especially prone to misreading and selective citation, as Castro-Huerta underscored.
Turtle Talk 
You must be logged in to post a comment.