New Student Scholarship on “Indigenous Cultural Secrecy”

Audrey Mense, a recent Chicago-Kent law grad, has published her student note titled “We Could Tell You, But Then We’d Have to Kill You: How Indigenous Cultural Secrecy Impedes the Protection of Natural Cultural Heritage in the United States” in the Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law.

Regardless of the merits of this paper, I have to say this might be the first time I’ve ever heard “Indigenous cultural secre[ts]” likened to military secrets. I don’t think I like it.

Frankly, it is usually the other way around –“Give us your secrets or we’ll kill you.” Or something like that.

Arizona IPLP 10 Year Reunion Program

Details here. Agenda here:

Morning Session: What the Academy can offer the Practicing Bench and Bar
8:00-8:30 Breakfast and registration (sponsored by The Native Peoples Technical Assistance Program)
8:30-8:45 Setting the stage (Melissa Tatum, Research Professor of Law & Director, IPLP Graduate Programs, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law)
8:45-10:00 Roundtable:
What the Academy can offer the Practicing Bench and Bar
Rountable Participants:
Professor Matthew Fletcher, Michigan State University
Professor Angela Riley, UCLA
Lawrence Baca, U.S. Dept. of Justice (retired)
Christopher Chaney, Deputy Director, Office of Tribal Justice
Ray Austin, IPLP Distinguished Jurist in Residence
Nicole Friederichs, Practitioner in Residence, Suffolk Law
10:00-10:15 Break (sponsored by The Native Peoples Technical Assistance Program)
10:15-11:30 Roundtable Continued: What the Practicing Bench and Bar can offer the Academy
11:30-11:45 Break
11:45-12:15 Concluding thoughts and comments (Robert A. Williams, Jr., E. Thomas Sullivan Prof. of Law and American Indian Studies & Director, IPLP Program)
12:30-2:00 Lunch program
Keynote speaker: S. James Anaya, Regents’ and James J. Lenoir Professor of Human Rights Law and Policy & U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Afternoon Session: Working with Indigenous Peoples Law in the Academy, the Government, Human Rights Work, and Private Practice
2:15-3:15
Careers in Academia and Government
Professor Keith Richotte, University of North Dakota
Professor Mark McMillan, Melbourne Law School (Australia)
Sarah Morales, University of Ottawa
Lenny Alvarado, University of Arizona
Wizipan Garriott, Consultant (formerly of Dept of Interior)
Wenona Benally Baldenegro (candidate for U.S. House of Representatives)
3:15-3:30 Break (sponsored by Faegre & Benson)
3:30-4:30
Careers in human rights and private practice
Leah Sixkiller, Faegre & Benson
Kirstin Eidenbach, Perkins Coie
Moira Gracey, Carranza, LLP
Seánna Howard, IPLP Staff Attorney
Maia Campbell, Senior Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur and Coordinator of the Support Project/Adjunct Professor
4:30-5:00 Closing remarks
5:00-6:00 Closing Reception sponsored by Perkins Coie

Sunday, October 9, 2011
11:30 – 2:00
Picnic lunch (BBQ) at the law school for alumni and families (children welcome).
Live music, free photo booth, raffle tickets for chances to win cool prizes and much more.

New Scholarship on PL 280 Exemption and Retrocession

Shane Day and Sarabeth Anderson have posted their working paper, “Determinants of Successful American Indian Resistance to the Establishment of State Government Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280: A Comparative Case Study of the Processes of Exemption and Retrocession” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Public Law 280 is a federal law passed in 1953 that grants state governments criminal and some civil jurisdiction over American Indian reservations. In doing so, PL 280 violated the nation-to-nation relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government and opened the door to greater state interventionism on tribal lands. However, implementation of the law has been quite uneven, resulting in a complex matrix of inter-jurisdictional relationships and conflict. For instance, six states were initially granted “mandatory” PL 280 authority over tribes, with additional states able to apply for jurisdiction under PL 280 through an appeal to Congress. However, in both “mandatory” and “optional” states, certain tribes have been exempted from state jurisdiction. Certain tribal authorities, such as the Red Lake and Warm Springs Reservations, were granted initial exemptions during the initial implementation of the law. Amendments to PL 280 in 1968 also opened up an avenue for tribes to apply for a repeal of state authority, a process known as retrocession. While there is an ample amount of published scholarship examining the history and effects of PL 280, very little work has been conducted in examining cases in which state jurisdiction under PL 280 was initially denied to the states nor cases in which it was subsequently retroceded. This paper presents a typology of state-tribal relationships under PL 280, and seeks to answer the questions of why certain tribes were successful in receiving initial exemptions under PL 280, and why certain tribes, but not others, have been successful in attaining subsequent retrocessions. The paper also outlines a proposed case-based research design and process tracing methodology designed to delve deeper into the various processes and situations identified in our typology.

Student Comment on H.R.I. v. E.P.A.

 

The Denver University Law Review has published Tribal Sovereignty and Resource Destiny: Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA by law student Andrew Brooks.

 

New Scholarship on Conducting Research with Tribal Communities

Anna Harding of Oregon State University, Barbara Harper of Oregon State University, Dave Stone of Oregon State University, Catherine O’Neill of Seattle University School of Law, Patricia Berger of the Department of Information Technology, Stuart Harris of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation – Department of Science and Engineering, and Jamie Donatuto of the Indian Tribal Community Office have posted their paper, “Conducting Research with Tribal Communities: Sovereignty, Ethics and Data-Sharing Issues” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Background: When conducting research with American Indian tribes, informed consent beyond conventional Institutional Review Board (IRB) review is needed because there may be potential for adverse consequences at a community or governmental level that are unrecognized by academic researchers.

Objectives: This paper reviews sovereignty, research ethics, and data-sharing considerations when doing community-based participatory health-related or natural resource-related research with American Indian nations and presents a model material and data-sharing agreement that meets tribal and university requirements.

Discussion: Only tribal nations themselves can identify potential adverse outcomes, and they can do this only if they understand the assumptions and methods of the proposed research. Tribes much be truly equal partners in study design, data collection, interpretation, and publication. Advances in protection of intellectual property rights are also applicable to IRB reviews, as are principles of sovereignty and indigenous rights, all of which affect data ownership and control.

Conclusions: Academic researchers engaged in tribal projects should become familiar with all three areas: sovereignty, ethics and informed consent, and intellectual property rights (IPR). We recommend developing an agreement with tribal partners that reflects both health-related IRB and natural resource-related IPR considerations.

Recommended Scholarship — Sanderson’s Response to Waldron on Ancient Indian Claims

Given the Supreme Court’s apparent denial of the federal and Oneida cert petitions relating to Indian land claims, we want to highlight important recent scholarship on “ancient” Indian claims. We previously posted it here, but it is worth another look.

Douglas Sanderson has posted his response to Jeremy Waldon’s papers suggesting that the claims of Indigenous peoples should be dismissed generally, or superceded. Professor Sanderson’s paper is titled, Against Supersession. It is forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 2011.

Here is the Abstract:

The availability of redress for historic wrongs committed against Indigenous people turns on a number of morally complex and politically charged issues. From the standpoint of moral theory, the problems of redress have been given articulate voice in the work of Jeremy Waldron whose writings have come to take the shape of conventional wisdom. Waldron’s arguments are three-fold: 1) counterfactuals are impossible to verify, and so it is impossible to know how we are to put injured parties into the position they would have been had there been no injustice; 2) entitlements fade over time, and so whatever right to redress may have once existed, the basis for those entitlements is now eroded; and 3) injustices can be overtaken by circumstances, such that what was once unjust become just. In this article I argue that each of these objections to redressing of historic wrongs fails of their own accord, and they fail in part because of Waldron’s failure to recognize that the injustices are not only historic, they are also contemporary and on-going wrongs committed against modern-day Indigenous people. There is no denying that circumstances have changed, but that does not eliminate the need to face up to the problems of injustice in the circumstances in which they occur: the present day, and we must face these challenges despite the fact that they present difficult choices and the probability of sacrifice.

Douglas Sanderson on Commercial Law and Indigenous Sovereignty

Douglas Sanderson has posted “Commercial Law and Indigenous Sovereignty” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Despite the ubiquitous nature of commercial law, discussions about Indigenous sovereignty tend to focus on the big picture themes of lands, resources and economic development without any real thought about the commercial law framework within which these transactions will take place. In this paper, I argue that commercial law is a crucial, though overlooked, aspect of Indigenous sovereignty. I propose that through the development and implementation of a commercial Code and Tribunal, Indigenous communities stand to capture greater economic efficiencies, promote political independence, and advance down a path towards developing institutions that are both modern and based in traditional knowledge bases and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Jeffrey Fisher on A Supreme Court Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar

Jeffrey Fisher has posted his paper, “A Supreme Court Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar” on SSRN. His clinic at Stanford had assisted the Navajo Nation and other tribes in filing a cert petition in Navajo Nation v. USFS, the San Francisco Peaks case.

“Tribal Consent” Draft Now Available

My paper, “Tribal Consent,” is available for download on SSRN. It’s a draft, perhaps even messier than my usual drafts. Constructive criticism welcome to my regular email address.

Here is the abstract:

Tribal consent to federal statutes, regulations, and cases that decide matters critical to American Indian people and Indian tribes long has been lacking. The nineteenth and twentieth century Supreme Court cases are replete with efforts by Indians and tribes to avoid the dictates of many of these laws and regulations that directly injured tribal interests, almost always to no avail. Congress legislated, the Executive branch acted, and the Supreme Court either walked away or upheld the law and its enforcement. Conversely, tribal governance has been dramatically altered in recent decades in part by the notion that non-Indians and non-tribal entities have not consented to assertions of tribal government authority over them. This lack of consent is meaningful because Indian tribes are not beholden to the dictates of the American Constitution (nor could they be), and so the nonmembers could be subject to governmental authority unfettered by individual constitutional rights.

The first part of this paper is a short history of the incorporation of Indian tribes into the American policy, largely without the consent of Indian tribes and Indian people. The second part moves beyond the discussion of the lack of tribal consent to federal and state governance, and how that lack of consent actually generated the legal and political justification for Congressional (and federal) plenary power over Indian affairs. The third part describes how express and literal consent has come to dominate federal common law on tribal authority over nonmembers. This part explores the irony of introducing nonmembers in vast numbers into Indian country without tribal consent, and then forcing tribal governments to acquire literal consent from those nonmembers in order to govern them. The fourth, and last, part argues for a theory of tribal consent. Unlike the vague and even fictional consent espoused by thinkers such as Justice Kennedy, and denigrated by critics who bemoan its limitations, tribal consent theory should be explored and integrated in federal Indian law. In fact, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires that states acquired the free and informed consent of Indigenous governments and people before taking action detrimental to those peoples, giving rise to a kind of literal consent theory and practice desperately needed in American Indian affairs.

Chi-miigwetch to the Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties offering a home to this paper.

Douglas Sanderson’s “Against Supercession”

Douglas Sanderson has posted his response to Jeremy Waldon’s papers suggesting that the claims of Indigenous peoples should be dismissed generally, or superceded. Professor Sanderson’s paper is titled, Against Supersession. It is forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 2011.

Here is the Abstract:

The availability of redress for historic wrongs committed against Indigenous people turns on a number of morally complex and politically charged issues. From the standpoint of moral theory, the problems of redress have been given articulate voice in the work of Jeremy Waldron whose writings have come to take the shape of conventional wisdom. Waldron’s arguments are three-fold: 1) counterfactuals are impossible to verify, and so it is impossible to know how we are to put injured parties into the position they would have been had there been no injustice; 2) entitlements fade over time, and so whatever right to redress may have once existed, the basis for those entitlements is now eroded; and 3) injustices can be overtaken by circumstances, such that what was once unjust become just. In this article I argue that each of these objections to redressing of historic wrongs fails of their own accord, and they fail in part because of Waldron’s failure to recognize that the injustices are not only historic, they are also contemporary and on-going wrongs committed against modern-day Indigenous people. There is no denying that circumstances have changed, but that does not eliminate the need to face up to the problems of injustice in the circumstances in which they occur: the present day, and we must face these challenges despite the fact that they present difficult choices and the probability of sacrifice.