Washington Law Review Indian Law Restatement Symposium

Issue: Volume 97, Number 3 (2022)

Table of Contents

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Table of Contents

Front Matter

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Masthead

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Foreword
Eric D. Eberhard

Lake Michigan from Milwaukee — kinda the same, kinda different than Puget Sound.

Articles

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Bringing Congress and Indians Back into Federal Indian Law: The Restatement of the Law of American Indians
Kirsten Matoy Carlson

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Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Efficiency Versus the Courts
Robert J. Miller

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Off-Reservation Treaty Hunting Rights, the Restatement, and the Stevens Treaties
Ann E. Tweedy

Symposia

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Reflections on the Restatement of the Law of American Indians
Matthew L.M. Fletcher

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Protection for Indian Sacred Sites
William A. Fletcher

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Why Our Stories Matter: A Perspective on the Restatement from the State Bench
Raquel Montoya-Lewis

Greg Ablavsky’s Further Thoughts on the Indian Affairs Powers of Congress

Gregory Ablavsky has posted “Further Thoughts on the Constitutional History of Federal Power Over Indian Affairs” on SSRN.

The abstract:

This short piece builds on my earlier response to Robert Natelson’s purported “cite check” of my 2015 Yale Law Journal article by addressing some of the arguments in his new Federalist Society Review article. It argues 1) that Natelson misinterprets Federalist 42, 2) that colonial-era regulations of Indian trade support a quite broad scope for the law merchant, and 3) that Natelson mischaracterized my methodology while making some odd methodological choices of his own. It also briefly offers some new evidence on the historical scope of federal authority in Indian affairs that further supports an interpretation of the meaning of “commerce with the Indian tribes” that encompasses intercourse.

Ann Estin on Equal Protection and the Indian Child Welfare Act

Ann Estin has posted “Equal Protection and the Indian Child Welfare Act: States, Tribal Nations, and Family Law,” forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Congress has long exercised plenary power to set the boundaries of federal, state and tribal jurisdiction, and Supreme Court precedents have required that such legislation be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation to Indian tribes. Exercising this power, Congress set parameters for state and tribal jurisdiction in child welfare and adoption cases with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). In response to the recent Equal Protection challenge to ICWA by a small number of states in Haaland v. Brackeen, many more states have argued in support of the legislation, which addressed longstanding problems in the states’ treatment of Indian children and provided an important framework for cross-border cooperation in child welfare cases. Looking beyond ICWA, this article points to unresolved jurisdictional and conflict of laws challenges in other types of family litigation that crosses borders between states and Indian country. Arguing that citizens of tribal nations should have the same right to bring family disputes to courts in their communities that other Americans enjoy, the article argues for greater cooperation and comity between states and tribes across the spectrum of family law.

American Indian Law Review Tributes to Rennard Strickland and Steven Hager

Two Giants of Indian Law: Remembering Rennard Strickland and C. Steven Hager

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Front Pages

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Introductory Letter of the Editorial Boards

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OUNALSA Remembers Professors Strickland and Hager
Ryan Sailors

Part One: Rennard Strickland

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Biography: Rennard Strickland

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Reprint: American Indian Law and the Spirit World
Rennard Strickland

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Rennard Leaves Us Words of Thunder
Bill Piatt

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A Legacy That Sustains – Dean and Professor Rennard Strickland
Carole Goldberg

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Rennard Strickland: Legal Historian and Leader
Charles Wilkinson

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Rennard Strickland Helped Shape a Young Law School
Sheila Simon

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Rennard Strickland – A Remembrance
Lawrence K. Hellman

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Strickland and the Fred Jones Jr. Museum of Art
Hadley Jerman, PhD

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Rennard Strickland: A Legacy of Generosity
Darla W. Jackson

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Professor Strickland
Joseph Harroz, Jr.

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Rennard Strickland: Living Without Notes
Katheleen Guzman

Part Two: C. Steven Hager

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Biography: C. Steven Hager

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Reprint: The Rule of Law: McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Recognition of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation
C. Steven Hager

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Tributes to Steve Hager
Kace Rodwell, Michael Colbert Smith, and Stephanie Hudson

Carter and Rotman on Surface Mining Regulation After McGirt

Sam Carter and Robin Rotman have posted “Resurfacing Sovereignty: Who Regulates Surface Mining In Indian Country After McGirt?,” forthcoming in the Montana Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Following the decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), there has been a surge of litigation from the State of Oklahoma seeking to clarify the scope of the McGirt holding. While the Supreme Court of the United States was clear that the holding in McGirt was limited to criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, it has sparked subsequent litigation regarding the scope of tribal authority. The pending case of State of Oklahoma v. United States Department of the Interior, which concerns surface mining regulation in Indian Country in Oklahoma, will test the application of McGirt outside of the criminal context. To this end, our article makes three recommendations: (1) in litigation concerning tribal lands, tribes should be a necessary party for litigation to proceed; (2) Congress should invest in pathways for tribes to build the capacity to create and manage their own programs, and (3) when tribal self-determination is encouraged and jurisdictional boundaries are clear, tribes can retain agency over their energy future and are less susceptible to the social harms that have been associated with the development of energy projects.

Greg Ablavsky Responds to Rob Natelson’s “Cite Check” of Ablavsky’s “Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause”

Gregory Ablavsky’s “Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause: Robert Natelson’s Problematic ‘Cite-Check’” is at the Stanford Law School blog, Legal Aggregate.

An excerpt:

Here’s that context: In 2007, Mr. Natelson wrote a law review article on the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas later cited Mr. Natelson’s article in a 2013 concurrence questioning Congress’s authority to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In 2015, while a graduate student finishing my J.D./Ph.D. in American Legal History at Penn, I published Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause in the YLJ, which revisited original understandings of the sources of federal power over Indian affairs. In the article, I argued that the Founders thought that the federal government’s authority rested not just on the Indian Commerce Clause but on the interplay between multipleconstitutional provisions, including the Treaty Clause, the Territory Clause, the war powers, the law of nations, and the Constitution’s limits on state authority. The article also challenged Justice Thomas’s and Mr. Natelson’s conclusions in what Mr. Natelson later conceded was a “generally respectful” tone. Since the article, a number of subsequent articles by other scholars, some right-of-center and others disagreeing with my conclusions, have similarly challenged Mr. Natelson’s views.

Recommended reading. Professor Ablavsky is the leading legal historian of federal Indian law right now and filed a compelling amicus brief in Brackeen (here).

Tamera Begay and Fletcher [in trickster forms] on Tribal Economic Development

Tamera Begay and Matthew Fletcher have posted “Ma’ii and Nanaboozhoo Fistfight in Heaven,” forthcoming in the Southwestern Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract (more of a blurb, really):

The Navajo trickster Ma’ii and the Anishinaabe trickster Nanaboozhoo debate the future of tribal economic development [ostensibly reviewing Ezra Rosser’s new book].

Miigwetch, DALL-E, for another weird piece of fake art.

Dylan Hedden-Nicely on the Continued Vitality of Worcester v. Georgia

Dylan Hedden-Nicely has posted “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: The Continued Vitality of Worcester v. Georgia,” forthcoming in the Southwestern Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Rumors abound among the academy, practitioners, and the judiciary about the death of Worcester v. Georgia since the Court’s recent decision in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. The misunderstanding is compounded by those that fail to take the time necessary to appreciate the rich nuance of Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision or in the subtle ways the Court has since modified its holding from Worcester. However, the importance of this case, which is integral to our entire system of federal Indian law, to major components of our constitutional system, as well as to our claim to leader in the human rights arena, mandates we proceed with caution and demand precision in its treatment. We cannot presume the abrogation of such a significant case based on veiled rhetoric that stitches together dicta built upon dicta. Instead, we should proceed by acknowledging the broad scope of Worcester’s original holding and carefully examining where and how the Supreme Court has since circumscribed its breadth.

In furtherance of that call, this paper focusses on the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence around the middle of the twentieth century to provide a clearer picture of how the Court has treated Worcester in the modern era and the ways in which it has been limited. That analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that although the Court has abandoned Worcester’s categorical prohibition on state jurisdiction in Indian country, “the broad principles of that decision came to be accepted as law.” Accordingly, until such time as the Court “openly avow[s]” its intent to overrule Worcester, we must remain faithful to its narrow authorization of state power in Indian country, as well as its broad recognition of tribal sovereignty and federal primacy over the relationship with tribal nations.

Grant Christensen on the Extradition Clause and Indian Country

Grand Christensen has posted “The Extradition Clause and Indian Country,” forthcoming in the North Dakota Law Review, on SSRN.

The abstract:

This article looks at the enforceability of the Extradition Clause in the federal courts of the United States. In 1861 the Supreme Court held in Dennison that the federal courts could not be used to enforce a request made by one state governor to another state governor for the extradition of a suspected criminal under Article IV Section 1. In 1987 the Supreme Court reversed the Dennison decision and for the first time since the Civil War held that the federal judicial power includes the power to enforce the Extradition Clause. This article takes the position that federal judicial power is limited to cases where the state governor has both territorial and personal jurisdiction over the accused. When an individual is on an Indian reservation, even Article IV does not authorize the governor of a state to enter the reservation and return the accused subject to an extradition request. Article IV’s Extradition Clause provides a constitutional duty for the executive of one state to remit to the power of a sister state someone located within its borders and subject to its jurisdiction. Critical to the exercise of this power is the dual understanding that the individual sought must be both within the state territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Indian country lies outside the general jurisdictional power of the states. States may not enter Indian country and remove persons found there absent cooperation with or permission from the Tribe. Doing so infringes upon the Tribe’s right to make its own laws and be governed by them.

Grant Christensen on Using Consent to Expand Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

Grand Christensen has posted “Using Consent to Expand Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction,” forthcoming in the California Law Review, on SSRN.

Navajo police officer photographed by Edward Curtis

Here is the abstract:

In June of 2022 the Supreme Court reversed two-hundred years of precedent and held in a 5-4 opinion that states have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. In conducting the preemption analysis Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion reasoned that while states have a strong interest in prosecuting crimes in Indian country in order to keep the community safe, tribes had functionally no interest because they generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The court then reasoned that the lack of a tribal interest could not preempt the state interest. This article suggests, despite the general prohibition on tribes asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians that was discovered by the Supreme Court in 1978’s Oliphant opinion, tribes can assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who consent to the jurisdiction in tribal court. The argument extends to both affirmative and implied consent and draws its authority from both pre-Oliphant scholarship and precedent as well as from recent development by the Court, Congress, and dicta from the Ninth Circuit. If tribes are able to regularly assert some criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, then when lower courts apply Castro-Huerta in the future there will be a strong tribal interest to preempt state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.

Highly recommended.