Minnesota (with Colette Routel)
and New Mexico (with Fletcher)
and Michigan (with Fort)
NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)
Minnesota (with Colette Routel)
and New Mexico (with Fletcher)
and Michigan (with Fort)
NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (video)
NICWA Initial Statement (pdf)
NICWA Legal Analysis (pdf) (Includes an excellent point about state laws, and one we’ve been considering here as well)
Minnesota Public Radio (with Colette Routel)
NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)
Will add more as they come up.
In a split 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, with a strong dissent from Justice Sotomayor, the Court limited ICWA, but did not eliminate it. The Court is unwilling to go so far as Justice Thomas would like, and find the statute unconstitutional. *12 (Thomas, J. concurring). Instead, the decision turns on dictionary definitions of “continued” *8, and “breakup” *12, finding that 1912(f) (involuntary termination) does not apply to the father, as he did not have physical custody of Baby Girl, nor legal custody under state law. *11. In addition, 1912(d) (active efforts) does not apply to Baby Girl’s adoption. *13. The Court reads the statute to apply to “intact” Indian families. *9. While not an endorsement of the judicially created existing Indian family exception, this opinion will not provide assistance in pushing back against it, at least in the context of non-custodial fathers. The decision is a set back, and a devastating blow to the family, but it’s also not the end of ICWA. Figuring out how the ultimate custody decision will turn out is difficult, not the least of which because under the Court’s own definition, there is NOW an “intact” Indian family.
The Court’s reading of 1912(a), the active efforts provision, is troubling. While quick to note that active efforts are a “sensible requirement when applied to state social workers,” *14 the Court finds it would be “unusual” to apply it to these facts. As anticipated, the Court’s concern for adoptive parents trumped that of the rights of children or biological parents. The question of how to apply 1912(a) comes up often in the context of guardianships and adoptions. This decision will make it harder to argue when states and agencies don’t want to apply 1912(a) to guardianships as well.
The placement preference provisions of 1915(a) for adoptions remains intact. A family within the preferences must “formally” seek to adopt the child for the preferences to be applicable. How this will apply in practice will depend on the court, I imagine. When does the adoptive family have to be known? How far in advance? Justice Sotomayor points out that if Baby Girl’s grandparents want to adopt her, under this decision the South Carolina court must consider them under the placement preferences. *25 (Sotomayor J. dissenting).
The Court remains suspicious of tribal citizenship, talking about remote ancestors *16 and listing Baby Girl’s blood quantum in the first sentence of the opinion. *1. The Court calls it the father’s “ICWA trump card.” *16. Finally, it is not often the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families is called “mischief.” *9 (“mischief” that continues, see the disproportionality reports out recently).
In dissent, Justice Scalia writes that the opinion “needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood.” *1. Justice Sotomayor, however, writes explicitly that the Court’s decision is based on policy differences with Congress, *2, *8 (Sotomayor, dissenting). She also disagrees with the United States in its amicus brief, FN5, as part of her reading of the statute as a whole, rather than discrete parts. *3.
Her scathing footnote 8, which ends with her requesting examples of women who go through the trouble of giving birth via sperm donors giving the child up for adoption, injects the common sense anger and frustration this case has caused among those who have followed it closely. She addresses head on the Court’s references to blood quantum, wondering why it is needed if there are no constitutional concerns. *23-4. And finally, her, yes, empathetic paragraph of what can befall a family and that ICWA’s protections should apply to them provides a perspective missing from the majority opinion on down to many state courts. *23. ICWA does not only apply to the child removed improperly by the “culturally insensitive” social worker from an “intact” Indian family. It applies beyond that, to the families most in need of the law, ensuring the protection and health of the child, her contact with her family, her extended family, and her tribe. This narrow version of ICWA endorsed by the Court today, and evidenced regularly in family courts, does not help that child.
Take a look at Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Last paragraph:
Third, other statutory provisions not now before us may nonetheless prove relevant in cases of this kind. Section 1915(a) grants an adoptive “preference” to “(1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families . . . . in the absence of good cause to the contrary.” Further, §1915(c) allows the “Indian child’s tribe” to “establish a different order of preference by resolution.” Could these provisions allow an absentee father to re-enter the special statutory order of preference with support from the tribe, and subject to a court’s consideration of “good cause?” I raise, but do not here try to answer, the question.
Presumably, the litigation will continue on remand to the South Carolina courts below.
Opinion here. Written by Justice Alito.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and BREY- ER, J., filed concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KA- GAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.
***
This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classi- fied as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her biological father, who had attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who had no prior contact with the child. The provisions of the federal statute at issue here do not demand this result.
Contrary to the State Supreme Court’s ruling, we hold that 25 U. S. C. §1912(f )—which bars involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s “continued custody” of the child— does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody of the child. We further hold that §1912(d)— which conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the “breakup of the Indian family”—is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we clarify that §1915(a), which provides placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child. We accordingly reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Previous coverage here.
Commentary to follow.
Here.
Ugh, the suspense . . . .
SCOTUS will be releasing more opinions on Thursday.
Previous coverage here.
Here and here. Excellent articles.
From Part 3:
In 2010, after Brown had been served notice of termination and adoption, his original lawyer, Lesley Sasser, asked a Charleston, South Carolina–based family court attorney named Shannon Jones to join Brown’s legal team. Although Jones is an expert in interstate custody disputes under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, she did not expect to become involved in an adoption struggle over an Indian child from Oklahoma.
“Lesley came to my office one day and said, ‘I’ve got this case that’s coming up for trial, and it could be kind of complex,’ ” said Jones, laughing at the understatement. “She said it involved the Indian Child Welfare Act. Honestly, at first I didn’t even know what it was. I’d never heard of it.”
***
Judge Deborah Malphrus, who heard arguments in South Carolina’s Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, issued a verbal courtroom ruling in favor of Brown on November 25, 2011. Soon, according to multiple sources in South Carolina, she was “inappropriately contacted” by numerous parties who asked her outright to change her written ruling in favor of the Capobiancos. Far from listening to their requests, Malphrus subsequently issued a 25-page ruling that reiterated the family court findings and transferred custody to Brown.
Read more at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/06/04/fight-baby-veronica-part-3-149704
Here.
Another article in this excellent series.
Here.
“The birth mother knew I was Cherokee, she knew I was a tribal member, she knew my birth date and she knew how to spell my name,” said Brown matter-of-factly. “Look, we’ve known each other since we were 16. We were engaged. She absolutely knew all of my vital information. And she gave [the attorney and the tribe] the wrong information [hoping to keep the adoption secret].”
You must be logged in to post a comment.