MIFPA
Grand Traverse Band Defeats Preliminary Injunction in Fifth Federal ICWA-Related Case Challenging Michigan’s ICWA Law
After initially granting a TRO based on an ex parte motion, the Western District of Michigan denied the requested preliminary injunction. The underlying complaint arguing the transfer provisions of the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (Michigan’s ICWA law) are unconstitutional. We are collecting documents in this case here.
Unpublished Michigan ICWA Notice Case
Here. From Kalamazoo County.
Of note: There are six tribes in Michigan alone that should be noticed if a parent family in a “Chippewa tribe,” and DHHS noticed one of them. MIFPA requires the notice of the tribe in the county where the case arises, though the Pokagon Band service area does not include Kzoo county, while the other two (unnoticed) Potawatomi tribes do cover the county. Finally, it’s not clear from the opinion why Cherokee was noticed at all.
There is no question that the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements were triggered early in these proceedings when father indicated at an April 2013 preliminary hearing that he might have some family membership—specifically, through his brother—in the “Chippewa tribe.” There is some indication in the record that respondent-mother also claimed potential Indian heritage, although it is unclear what tribes, if any, she identified. Because “sufficiently reliable information” of possible Indian heritage was provided, the trial court had “reason to know” that an Indian child could be involved, thus triggering the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. 25 USC 1912(a); MCL 712B.9(1); In re Morris, 491 Mich at 109.
The record indicates that DHS sent notifications to several different tribes, including the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee, the Cherokee Nation, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. DHS also sent a notification to the Midwest Bureau of Indian Affairs. On June 18, 2013, both the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians responded and indicated that the child was not eligible for membership. The Cherokee Nation also responded with a request for more family information, although there is no indication that further information was thereafter provided. There is also no indication that the remaining tribes or the Bureau of Indian Affairs responded. Based on the responses that had been received, the trial court indicated at a November 2013 review hearing that the ICWA/MIFPA inquiry was “at an end.”
We conclude that the record sufficiently evidences DHS’s compliance with the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. DHS sent notifications to several tribes, as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On appeal, father does not identify any other tribes that should have been notified. Moreover, while father takes issue with the fact that DHS apparently never provided further information to the Cherokee Nation, he does not identify what further information could have been provided, nor does he argue that he provided the information requested to DHS but that DHS failed to forward it to the Cherokee Nation. Moreover, we note that DHS does not have an affirmative responsibility “to conduct independent research to obtain a parent’s detailed genealogical information.” In re Morris (On Remand), 300 Mich App 95, 105; 832 NW2d 419 (2013). Finally, despite father’s argument to the contrary, the trial court did in fact make a conclusive determination that the child was not an Indian child by noting that the issue was “at an end” and by leaving unchecked, in its subsequent orders, the box indicating that the proceedings involved an Indian child. There was no plain error affecting substantial rights.
Here is DHHS’s map of tribal service areas in Michigan.
Qualified Expert Witness ICWA Case out of Michigan Court of Appeals
Here.
In this case, the trial court explicitly recognized that Hillert, the only expert witness at the termination hearing, did not support termination and specifically testified that returning AP andDP to Stenman’s care would not likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to either child. Nonetheless, considering the other evidence presented, the trial court determined that returning AP and DP to Stenman’s care would result in such damage beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, the trial court essentially disregarded Hillert’s testimony, contrary to the plain language of 25 USC 1912(f), MCL 712B.15(4), and MCR 3.977(G)(2). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of ICWA and its Michigan counterparts, and remand for further proceedings with respect to AP and DP.
The testimony of a qualified expert witness under ICWA is part of the necessary proof to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that return of the child to her mother will cause serious emotional or physical damage. Without that testimony, the state has not met its burden to terminate parental rights. If the state cannot provide a QEW that agrees with termination, the court cannot terminate parental rights. In situations like this, where the QEW not only testifies that he does not agree with the termination in this case, nor in termination generally as a tribe, this ought to force the state to look to other long term permanency solutions that don’t require the termination of parental rights, like Michigan’s long term juvenile guardianships, or at ways other states have addressed this issue (like California).
Michigan Supreme Court Denies Review in ICWA Transfer Case
Unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals ICWA/MIFPA Notice Case
While it looks like the State gave notice to Cherokee Nation and Blackfeet Tribe with all the information on the record, and it’s also good the State noticed local Michigan tribes (State is required to contact a tribe in the county where the child is located under 712B.9(3)), the original notice to *all* of the tribes should be in the record. And noticing UKB when a parent claims Cherokee is not something above and beyond, but what the State is supposed to do (along with CNO and Eastern Band):
In addition to the above notifications, the lower court record contains evidence of additional efforts made by DHS to ascertain whether RI and KI had Indian heritage. Specifically, the record contains a response from the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma indicating that neither RI nor KI were members, although the lower court record does not contain the original notification sent to that tribe. Additionally, the record contains responses from the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan indicating that neither RI nor KI were members or eligible for membership, although the lower court record again does not contain the original notifications sent to that tribe. Finally, the record contains copies of both the notifications to, and a response from, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi Indians; membership in that tribe was also denied. In addition to the above record evidence, DHS reports indicate that notifications were sent to a plethora of other tribes, and that membership in those tribes was denied.
Michigan COA Published Opinion on MIFPA/ICWA and Transfer to Tribal Court
Here.
Appellant, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (the “tribe”), appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order denying its request to transfer adoption proceedings to the tribal court pursuant to section 7 of Michigan’s Indian Family Preservation Act (the “MIFPA”), MCL 712B.1 et seq. We conclude that the circuit court committed error warranting reversal in denying the tribe’s request to transfer these proceedings to the tribal court under MCL 712B.7(5). The statute only permits the circuit court to deny a transfer request in two instances, and the circuit court improperly construed the statute to give it greater authority to deny a transfer. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The long analysis of, and comparison with, the Guidelines is already outdated, as the updated Guidelines (and proposed rule) are more inline with the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act on when a request for transfer to tribal court can be made and when it can can occur. Ultimately, the COA decided this on a plain language analysis. MIFPA allows denial of transfer in exactly two situations–no tribal court, and undue hardship to present evidence. Given the tribal court in this case was about 5 miles from the state court, the denial of transfer–based on a best interests analysis–just didn’t comply with state law.
Michigan COA Opinion On ICWA, MIFPA and Adoptive Couple
Here.
Big case out of Michigan’s Court of Appeals on an adoption with a very complicated fact pattern. The case was argued by MSU Law/ILPC alum Karrie Wichtman. The case held that MIFPA’s placement preferences in an adoption hold, even while ICWA’s failed under Adoptive Couple. It should also be noted that this was the analysis Jack Trope & Addie Smith followed in their article on Adoptive Couple and state ICWA laws.
MIFPA differs from ICWA in that it does not give a preference to eligible parties over ineligible parties. Rather, MIFPA requires that, absent good cause, the adoptive placement must be either with a member of the child’s extended family, a member of the Indian child’s tribe, or an Indian family, in that “order of preference.” MCL 712B.23(2). The record demonstrates that the Arbutantes have no familial connection to KMN; they are not connected to the Tribe, and they are not an Indian family. Therefore, absent a good cause finding, MIFPA precluded the trial court from placing KMN with the Arbutantes.
Unfortunately, the COA did not reinstate the abuse and neglect petition that started the case in the first place, leaving the child in legal limbo.
ICWA and MIFPA Training in Macomb County
MIFPA/ICWA Expert Witness and Active Efforts Case out of Michigan COA
Here.
The court conditionally reversed the trial court because of a lack of proper expert witness testimony (citing ICWA, MIFPA and the Guidelines). It also finds that the agency made active efforts–even if there was no testimony for each element in the MIFPA definition of active efforts.
Interestingly, this case also addresses what child protective orders may be appealed (or not) in Michigan, and advises the Michigan Supreme Court to revise the Michigan Court Rules to allow for an appeal of right of a removal of a child:
We also suggest that the Supreme Court consider modifying MCR 3.993 in order to permit a parental appeal of right, at least under some circumstances, from removal order when a child is removed from his or her parents at a stage prior to adjudication. Where a parent’s action or neglect threatens a child’s safety sufficient to justify removal at the outset of a child protective proceeding, it is neither surprising nor objectionable that such removal would correlate with a higher likelihood of termination. However, as several recent cases have shown, the decision to remove a child can substantially affect the balance of the child protective proceedings even where the initial concerns are eventually determined to have been overstated.
In such cases, the parent may find his or her parental rights terminated not because of neglect or abuse, but because of (1) a failure to adequately comply with the Department’s directives and programs and (2) a loss of bonding due to a lack of parental visitation.


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