notice

Arizona Court of Appeals ICWA Notice Case

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

I always find it useful when parts of the transcript make it into the appellate court decision:

During her direct examination at trial, Mother testified as follows:

Q. You advised me earlier that you are affiliated with the Sioux tribe; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And tell us, if you will, what your affiliation is?

A. My mom is Oglala, enrolled in the Oglala Sioux tribe in South Dakota, and my dad is an enrolled member in Spirit Lake in North Dakota.

Q. Okay. And are you an enrolled member?

A. Not yet, but I can be.

Q. You’re eligible for enrollment?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether your daughter would be eligible [for] enrollment?

A. Yes, she would.

So of course DCS notified both the Oglala Sioux and Spirit Lake, oh wait, what was that?

DCS does not argue that Mother’s testimony was insufficient to provide notice that H.N. might be an Indian child under ICWA. Instead, DCS argues that, “by the time Mother testified about her tribal affiliation, there were no [pending] proceedings for the tribe to intervene in.” That argument, however, ignores the fact that Mother’s testimony occurred before the motion to terminate was granted. Accordingly, DCS’ argument regarding the application of ICWA to “post-termination proceedings” is inapplicable. Cf. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t Child Safety, 242 Ariz. 277 (2017) (discussing transfer of matters under ICWA both pre- and posttermination).

¶13 DCS’ argument also does not address case law from other jurisdictions directing that “[n]otice is mandatory, regardless of how late in the proceedings a child’s possible Indian heritage is uncovered” and that the notice requirement in ICWA cannot be waived by a parent. See In re Suzanna L., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 866 (App. 2002) (quoting In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (App. 1991)); accord Gila River Indian Cmty., 242 Ariz. at 292 ¶ 27 (noting “courts have historically been reluctant to imply a waiver of Indian rights under ICWA”).

(emphasis added)

The appellate court remanded the case for proper notice under ICWA.

Doe v. Jesson Case (MN Federal ICWA Case) Dismissed as Moot

Kate Fort

Here is the opinion.

After two years, the Minnesota federal district court dismissed the voluntary adoption case challenging the provisions of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA) allowing for notice and intervention of a child’s tribe in the proceedings. While the court states that the case presented Constitutional questions, the proceedings were moot and did not meet the standard for capable of repetition but evading review to keep the case live. There’s a nice discussion of that standard for practitioners who have been wondering how that might work in a child welfare case.

Plaintiffs have 30 days to file a notice of appeal if they so choose.

This is the last of the summer 2015 batch of federal ICWA challenges filed. All of them were ultimately dismissed. Carter v. Washburn is currently on appeal to the 9th Circuit.

Two ICWA Cases from the Michigan Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

Unreported Notice case (parent challenge, no indication child was eligible for tribal citizenship): In re Applewhiate

Reported case: In re JJW_Opinion

The MSU Indian Law Clinic/ICWA Appellate Project co-authored the Tribe’s brief in In re JJW.

Another (unpublished) Arkansas ICWA Case Lacking Strong Parent Representation

Kate Fort

Here. Another reason for more parent attorney partnerships and training. Matthew noted this happened last September in Arkansas too. From the opinion, it’s not remotely clear the agency notified the Cherokee tribes of dad’s claim here.

In addition to the termination of Daniel’s parental rights, the trial court found ICWA did not apply. His counsel explains that this finding does not provide a meritorious basis for reversal, and we agree. Daniel attempted to establish the applicability of ICWA at the outset of the termination hearing—despite the fact the trial court had earlier determined that ICWA did not apply in the probable-cause order dated July 8, 2015. The only documentation he submitted in support of his assertion was a form application for membership in the Cherokee Nation he filed only a couple of days prior to the hearing. In order to establish the applicability of ICWA, a child who is the subject of a dependency neglect action must be an “Indian child,” which is defined as any unmarried person who is under eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Here, there was no evidence A.B. and D.B. satisfied these requirements. It is undisputed the children are not members of an Indian tribe, and the only evidence submitted was the form application prepared by Daniel two days before the hearing—there was no evidence the application had been accepted or that the children were in any other way eligible for membership, and there was not even any evidence Daniel was their biological father, although he did not dispute that fact. This issue provides no meritorious basis for reversal.

In more than one state, this would provide a meritorious basis for remand at minimum, and maybe reversal. It’s fair that it might not yet be a basis for reversal in Arkansas, but it’s clearly time for someone to bring the argument.

 

(Why yes, I am currently on a four hour flight, and have a backlog of ICWA cases to post . . .)

Unpublished ICWA Case from Texas

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here. Probably need to do some training down in Texas:

On September 9, 2016, the [Texas] Department’s attorney sent proper notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The [Texas] Department [of Family and Protective Services] also sent a letter dated March 16, 2017, to the Secretary of the Interior, ICWA, and to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, stating that W.C. testified that his Indian tribe was “maybe Lakota Sioux.” According to the Department’s letter, that tribe is not federally recognized as eligible for services or, more particularly, is not an “Indian tribe” pursuant to the ICWA. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(8) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22).

Emphasis added.

Published Notice Case out of the Colorado Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

In re LL

The Court uses the federal regulations and guidelines to determine each participant’s role in inquiry and notice, and remands for proper notice.

Unfortunately, the Court then goes on to hold that the higher standard of proof for a foster care placement under ICWA does not need to be made at adjudication (interestingly, Colorado is one of the few states that still has jury trials for child welfare proceedings). While the Court is correct that ICWA is “silent” on adjudicatory hearings, it does not make clear when the lower court should make the higher burden of proof finding. This is one of the issues in applying the federal law to individual state proceedings–adjudication with a jury makes the most sense for applying all of the protections of ICWA. Adjudication is where the judge (or jury) decides whether the state has the evidence that “warrants intrusive protective or corrective state intervention into the familial relationship” Id. at 22. While it might not be the point where the child is put into foster care, it is often AFTER the child has been placed in foster care. So if the higher standard for foster care placement isn’t applied at the emergency/24/48/shelter care hearing, and it’s not applied at the adjudicatory hearing, when, exactly, is it applied?

Unpublished Notice Case in California Regarding Alaska Native Villages

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here. The Fourth Appellate District does more research than DPSS (the agency tasked with notice), and put it into the decision:

Respondent argues that there is no federally recognized “Innuit Eskimo” tribe, so notice was not required. It is not quite so simple. The term “Innuit” is a collective term (the plural of Inuk), for a group of culturally similar indigenous peoples inhabiting the Arctic regions of Alaska, Greenland, Canada, and Siberia. (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Inuit.) The Alaskan Innuit comprises the Alutiiq, Yup’ik (or Yupiat) and Inupiat tribes. (http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada-north-american-indigenous-peoples/.) The term “Eskimo,” as it pertains to Alaskan indigenous peoples, has been replaced by “Inuit.” (Ibid.) There are 229 federally recognized Alaskan villages. (http://www.alaskannature.com/inuit.htm; see also, 81 Fed. Reg. 5023-5025, (No. 19, January 29, 2016).) For this reason, one will not find “Eskimo” or “Innuit” in the Federal Register’s list of federally recognized Native Entities.

The Federal Register lists the 229 Alaskan villages. The names, addresses and telephone numbers of approximately 15 Tribal Leaders and BIA Servicing Centers may be found in the BIA Tribal Leaders Directory. (See, http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc002652.pdf.) At the very minimum, the social worker should have provided notice to the Native Alaskan Entities through the BIA, if not to the individual tribal entities.[5]

And, in case you were wondering what that footnote five is all about, it’s worth posting as well:

[5] By way of a letter, DPSS requests that we identify the specific Native American entity to which notice should be provided. We have identified four entities listed in the Federal Register in our opinion, whose names comprise a form of the words “Innuit” or “Inuk.” We also recommended contact with the BIA. However, the duty to identity and locate the appropriate Native American entity is more appropriately borne by the DPSS working with the court.

 

Unpublished ICWA Notice Case out of California (First District)

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

The First District of California seems to be trying a new way to deal with notice violations in ICWA cases by detailing the mistakes in the notice in the opinion. The first time we saw it was in September (here). In this case, a different division in the same District did a similar analysis.

As to the Chippewa Cree tribe, the notice for G.B.-C. was sent to Chippewa Cree Indians, Brenda Gardiner, ICWA Rep, RR1, P.O. Box 544, Box Elder, Montana 59521. According to the Department’s proof of service, the notice for M.B.-C. was sent to the same address. The address specified for the tribe in the Federal Register was Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation of Montana, Christina Trottier, ICWA Director, 31 Agency Square, Box Elder, MT 59521. (79 Fed.Reg. 3225 (January 17, 2014).) Although the city, state and zip code were the same, the addresses were completely different.
The Department asserts the notice was nevertheless adequate because the P.O. Box address it used to provide notice to the Chippewa Cree tribe was the one that was listed on the State Department of Social Services’s (CDSS) website.4The Department relies on In re N.M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at page 268, in which the court held the child welfare agency did not err in using the names and addresses provided by CDSS in notifying the relevant tribes, stating: “The Department should not be hamstrung by limitation to only the names and addresses provided for the tribes in the Federal Register if a more current or accurate listing is available and is reasonably calculated to provide prompt and actual notice to the tribes.
While requiring the Department to adhere to an address listed in the federal register when other, more accurate information is available elsewhere “would exalt form over substance,” (In re N.M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 268), we must still respect the Department of Interior’s primary authority in administering ICWA (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1157 [the federal regulations implementing ICWA “are binding in all federal and state courts by virtue of the supremacy clause”] ). ICWA notice may depart from the addresses listed in the federal register, but only when the alternative address is “more current or accurate.” (In re N.M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.)
Here, there is nothing in the record indicating the CDSS address the Department used was more current or accurate than the address listed in the Federal Register. Thus, while the return receipt received for the notice sent for G.B.-C. shows that someone at the CDSS address received the notice, there is no basis to conclude the notice was received by someone at the Chippewa Cree tribe who was “trained and authorized to make the necessary ICWA determinations, including whether the minors are members or eligible for membership and whether the tribe will elect to participate in the proceedings.” (In re J.T., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.)”

Unpublished ICWA Notice Case out of California Detailing Mistakes in Notices

Kate Fort3 Comments

Here.

If you see me present in the next year, be warned that at the first question about notice and how long it takes for a tribe to respond, I may just read this opinion out loud. As a reminder, there is a list names and addresses in the Federal Register of Designated Tribal Agents for Service of ICWA Notice for agencies to send notice to when a parent says they are or may be a member of a tribe. The First Circuit does a very nice job of detailing the type of mistakes that are just incredibly common. A note–the Court uses the Federal Register list that was in effect when the notices supposedly went out in 2015. However, a few times the Agency managed to use agents listed in the most recent (March, 2016) register.

According to the Federal Register, the designated agent and address for the Jicarilla Apache Nation was “Olivia Nelson-Lucero, Acting Program Manager, Jicarilla Behavioral Health, P.O. Box 546, Dulce, NM 87528.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72027.)

According to the certified mailing receipt, the Agency sent the notice to the designated address, but directed it to “Director, Mental Health/Social Services” rather than to “Olivia Nelson-Lucero, Acting Program Manager, Jicarilla Behavioral Health.”

Current designated agent: Jicarilla Apache Nation, Sharnen Velarde, ICWA Social Worker, P.O. Box 546, Dulce, NM 87528

The designated agent and address for the Tonto Apache Tribe was “Brian Echols, Social Services Director, T.A.R. #30, Payson, AZ 85541.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72029.) The Agency sent the notice to the designated address, but directed it to “Lyndsie Butler, Social Services Director” rather than to “Brian Echols, Social Services Director.”

Agency used current agent, 81 Fed. Reg. 10909

The designated agent and address for the White Mountain Apache Tribe was “Cora Hinton, ICWA Representative/CPS Supervisor, P.O. Box 1870, Whiteriver, AZ 85941.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72029.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but to “Mariella Dosela, ICWA Representative” rather than to “Cora Hinton, ICWA Representative/CPS Supervisor.”

Agency used current agent, 81 Fed. Reg. 10909

The designated agent and address for the Yavapai Apache Nation was “Linda Fry, Director, Department of Social Services, 2400 West Datsi Street, Camp Verde, AZ 11 86322.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72029.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but omitted Linda Fry’s name and title. In other words, it simply sent the notice to the tribe, rather to any particular person at the tribe.

Current designated agent: Ray DiQuarto, Social Services Director, 2400 West Datsi Street, Camp Verde, AZ 86322

The designated agent and address for the Crow Tribe of the Crow Reservation of Montana was “Melveen Paula Fisher, ICWA Coordinator, P.O. Box 340, Crow Agency, MT 59022.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72026.) The Agency sent notice to the “ICWA Representative” rather than to Fisher as “ICWA Coordinator.” Moreover, the notice was not sent to the address designated in the Federal Register; it was sent to P.O. Box 159 rather than to P.O. Box 340.

Agent is the same in both Registers.

The designated agent and address for the Lower Sioux was “Reanna Jacobs, ICWA Advocate, Darin Prescott, Director, 39568 Reservation Highway 1, Morton, MN 56270.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72021.) The Agency sent notice to “ICWA Representative” rather than to “Reanna Jacobs, ICWA Advocate, Darin Prescott, Director.” Moreover, the notice was not sent to the address designated in the Federal Register

Agent is the same in both Registers.

The designated agent and address for the Oglala Sioux Tribe was “Juanita Sherick, Director ONTRAC, P.O. Box 2080, Pine Ridge, SD 57752.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72020.) Although the Agency sent notice to the designated address, it directed it to the “ICWA Administrator” rather than to “Juanita Sherick, Director ONTRAC.” While sending notice to an ICWA Administrator may well be sufficient in some instances, the record in this case does not explain why it would be sufficient when the designated agent is someone who is instead the Director of “ONTRAC.”

Current designated agent is Emily Iron Cloud-Koenen, ICWA Administrator, Oglala Sioux Tribe—ONTRAC, P.O. Box 2080, Pine Ridge, SD 57770

The designated agent and address for the Santee Sioux Nation was “Clarissa LaPlante, ICWA Specialist, Dakota Tiwahe Service Unit, Route 2, Box 5191, Niobrara, NE 68760.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72020.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but directed it to the “ICWA Specialist” rather than to “Clarissa LaPlante, ICWA Specialist.”

Current designated agent is Carla Cheney, ICWA Specialist, Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, Dakota Tiwahe Social Services Program, Route 2, Box 5191, Niobrara, NE

The designated agent and address for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe was “Terrance Yellow Fat, Director, Indian Child Welfare Program, P.O. Box 770, Fort Yates, ND 58538.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72020.) According to the certified mail receipt and return receipt, the Agency sent notice to the designated address, but directed it to “Raquel Franklin” rather than to “Terrance Yellow Fat, Director.”

Agency used current agent, 81 Fed. Reg. 10900.

The designated agent and address for the Hannahville Indian Community of Michigan was “Jessica Brock, ICWA Worker, N15019 Hannahville B1 Road, Wilson, MI 49896.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72021.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but directed it to “ICWA Worker” rather than to “Jessica Brock, ICWA Worker.”

Agent is the same in both Registers.

The designated agent and address of the Prairie Island Indian Community was “Nancy Anderson, Family Service Manager, 5636 Sturgeon Lake Road, Welch, MN 55089.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72021.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but directed it to “ICWA Representative” rather than to “Nancy Anderson, Family Service Manager.” The record does not disclose why the notice would ensure that it would be delivered to the appropriate person

Current designated Agent is Renae Wallace, Family Service Manager, 5636 Sturgeon Lake Road, Welch, MN 55089;

The designated agent and address for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate tribe was “Evelyn Pilcher, ICWA Specialist, P.O. Box 509 Agency Village, SD 57262.” (79 Fed. Reg. 72020.) The Agency sent notice to the designated address, but directed it to “ICWA Director” rather than Pilcher as “ICWA Specialist,” and added “Lake/Traver” to the name of the tribe.

Agent is the same in both Registers.

At least the Agency didn’t send notice to a tribal newspaper (100% true story).

Unpublished ICWA Notice Case from Michigan Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

This is a pretty standard unpublished ICWA notice case (there have been 62 so far this year, 53 out of California, 3 from Michigan, 2 from Texas, and 1 each from Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, and New Jersey). We’re posting it for two (three) reasons. From the opinion:

We also reject the father’s challenges to the notices’ failures to include a copy of the petition in LC No. 13–514918–NA. The father cites only 80 CFR 37, 10146, 1153–1154 (2015). This regulation contains the requirements for Native–American tribal notifications under 25 USC 1912(a). In relevant part, the regulation demands that a notice of a pending child custody proceeding contain “clear and understandable language and include” identifying information concerning the child, the tribes “in which the child … may be eligible for membership,” and “[a] copy of the petition, complaint or other document by which the proceeding was initiated.” 80 CFR 37(B)(6)(a)(1)-(3). But the father fails to identify any authority in support of the proposition that the failure to strictly adhere to the requirement that a tribal notice contain a petition copy demands conditional reversal.

(emphasis added).

1. There is still mass confusion over Guidelines v. Regulations, including which is currently effective, their binding nature, and how to cite them. It appears father’s attorney meant to cite 80 Fed. Reg. 10153-4 (Feb. 25, 2015), which are the 2015 Guidelines, not regulations, and not a CFR. The following quote is from the same source, though I admit I was stumped on where that 37 came from–BUT that’s the number of the applicable Federal Register: Volume 80, No. 37. Page 10153, Section B.6(a). But the Court of Appeals didn’t catch this mis-cite either.

2. Yes, the Guidelines are not binding, but the Court of Appeals apparently considered them regulations for the purposes of the opinion. And yes, the 2016 Regulations are not binding until December. However, that’s also not the court’s reasoning. The Michigan Court of Appeals here says there is no remedy for not following the Regulations. That there must be additional authority beyond that of the language of federal Regulations to justify sending it back to the lower court to do the work required–father (mis)cites only binding federal Regulations. This is a small issue in this case–it appears that notice on the whole was proper. But it also demonstrates the problem with the continued lack of an enforcement mechanism in these cases.

3. For the record, either the attorney or the court could have cited to the current Regulations, 23 CFR sec. 23.11(d)(4)(2005)(“a copy of the petition, complaint, or other document by which the proceeding was initiated”), which are currently binding. The attorney or court could also point to the Regulations which will be binding in December and moved that same requirement to sec. 23.111(d)(5)(“a copy of the petition, complaint, or other document by which the child custody proceeding was initiated . . .”), 81 Fed. Reg. 38864, 38871 (June 14, 2016).