Religious Freedom Restoration Act – Page 2

This action seeks to protect the traditional religious rights and freedoms of the Tribe and its members. Those rights include the limited taking of an eagle for traditional religious purposes of the Tribe. For two and a half years, Defendants failed or refused to issue a federal permit to allow the taking of an eagle by members of the Northern Arapaho Tribe for traditional Native American religious purposes. The denial placed members of the Tribe at risk of criminal prosecution for the taking of an eagle pursuant to their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), other federal laws, and the laws of the Tribe.

Northern Arapaho Code Title 13 Freedom of Religion can be found here.

As of last week, the Wyoming Game and Fish Department was reviewing whether or not the Northern Arapaho Tribe would require state permission under the permit. That article is here.

Ninth Circuit Rejects RFRA Money Claims in Hawaii-Based Native American Church Case Involving Marijuana

April 9, 2012Matthew L.M. Fletcher10 Comments

Here are the materials in today’s opinion in Oklevueha Native American Church v. Holder:

Oklevueha Opening Brief

US Appellee Brief

Oklevueha Reply Brief

CA9 Opinion

Lower court materials here.

Tenth Circuit Reinstates Conviction of Non-Indian for Violation of Eagle Act

March 29, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is today’s decision in United States v. Wilgus.

The conclusion:

We are sensitive to the sincerity of Wilgus’ religious beliefs, and we do not question either the authenticity or the weight of his religious experience among Native Americans. We recognize that this litigation has now been pending for more than a decade, and that both sides have put forward many meritorious arguments and reams of evidence. The district court performed yeoman’s service in sorting through that evidence in an attempt to determine whether the Eagle Act permitting requirements are the least restrictive means of forwarding the government’s dual compelling interests. The district court concluded in the negative, and we respect the work that went into it, but we cannot agree. We are convinced that, in light of the options before the federal government, the regulations at issue are the least restrictive means available to advance its compelling interests. We therefore REVERSE the conclusion of the district court to the contrary and hold that Wilgus’ conviction did not violate RFRA.

Here are the briefs.