Stevens Treaties

Douglas Harris on the Boldt Decision in Canada

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Douglas C. Harris posted his paper,The Boldt Decision in Canada: Aboriginal Treaty Rights to Fish on the Pacific, part of THE POWER OF PROMISES: RETHINKING INDIAN TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, Alexandra Harmon, ed., University of Washington Press, 2008. Here is the abstract:

The Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846 established the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary between British and American interests in western North America. After 1846, Aboriginal peoples to the north of the border negotiated with the British Crown the terms of their coexistence with incoming settlers, those to its south with the United States. As a result, while some of the Coast Salish and Kwak’waka’wakw peoples in what would become British Columbia concluded treaties between 1850 and 1854 with the Crown’s representative, James Douglas, the tribes in the United States settled with the governor of the Washington territory, Isaac I. Stevens, in 1854 and 1855.

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Student Note on U.S. v. Washington Culverts Opinion

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

William Fisher has published “The Culverts Opinion and the Need for a Broader Property-Based Construct” in the Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation (Oregon). Here is a copy of the Culverts Opinion. Here is an excerpt:

The question becomes: Do treaties involve an affirmative duty for states to protect fish habitat and ensure quality fish runs? As discussed herein, a federal court has answered this question narrowly, yet affirmatively, failing to employ a property-based construct that encompasses all the rights reserved under the tribal treaties. Therefore, although the courts have recognized the existence of a duty, they have not yet recognized its entire scope.

Many theories have been advanced for how courts should interpret a state’s duties to protect fish habitat. Generally, treaty-invoked duties are analyzed under a contract-law paradigm. This is not erroneous, as treaties are said to be “contract[s] between sovereign nations.” However, when courts look at treaties only as contracts, they are missing one major aspect of tribal treaties: property rights. Not only are tribal treaties contracts between sovereigns, they are also deeds of property. Therefore, the bodies of law that are invoked by the formation of a tribal treaty include both contract law and property law. However, despite the promising answers property law provides for treaty interpretation, many judges have shown discomfort at the idea of applying property-based constructs to interpret states’ and tribes’ duties and rights under such treaties. Some feel that the formalistic rules of property law do not contain enough elasticity to be molded within the Indian law context. For example, when the Ninth Circuit used a property-law analogy to enforce tribes’ rights to take fish from the Columbia River, Judge Kennedy concurred in the holding but objected to the court’s use of this analogy, arguing that it was not an exact fit. What Judge Kennedy failed to recognize was that courts can and should apply the basic models of a property-based construct to analyze treaty rights, even where every jot and tittle may not line up. Refusing to do so is to turn a blind eye to the fact that treaties are deeds of property, and as such, invoke the rules of property law.