Here:
Lower court materials and links to prior iterations of this case here.
Here are the new materials in Smith v. Parker (D. Neb.):
136 Village of Pender Response
Cross-motions for summary judgment and briefs are here. Prior posts here, here, and here.
I drafted a paper titled “Tribal Justice Systems” for the Allegheny College Undergraduate Conference “Democracy Realized? The Legacies of the Civil Rights Movement” and posted it on SSRN. You can download here.
Here is the abstract:
This short paper is produced for the Allegheny College conference Democracy Realized? The Legacies of the Civil Rights Movement (March 28-29, 2014).
United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan, authored the Court’s opinion in Williams v. Lee, a decision hailed as the opening salvo in the modern era of federal Indian law. The Williams decision was the work of the liberal wing of the Court, with important input by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas. Williams, a ringing endorsement of inherent tribal governance authority, more specifically endorsed tribal justices systems as embodied in tribal courts. Without Williams and similar cases, it is unlikely that tribal governments and Congress would act to develop tribal justice systems. Williams, and the tribal courts that arose as a result, was a powerful civil rights decision that commentators rightfully have linked to Brown v. Board of Education.
This paper will survey several tribal justice systems in an effort to identify commonalities and complexities. There are hundreds of tribal justice systems in the United States; each of them unique in the details, but many of them similar to other tribal, state, and federal courts.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first two parts include a section on adversarial tribal justice systems and a section on non-adversarial tribal justice systems, often called restorative justice systems. The third part involves greater discussion of the complexities of incorporating tribal customary and traditional law into tribal common law.
In case one wonders, “Representing Justice” by Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis influenced the paper.
Bonnie J. Shucha posted her paper, “Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be’: The (Un)Availability of Tribal Law” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This article explores the costs and benefits of publishing tribal law. Part I analyzes why tribal law is not more widely available; part II illustrates the benefits of making tribal law more accessible, and part III describes publication options for tribes. An appendix lists currently available tribal law collections.
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment:
The United States and the State of Nebraska have each filed briefs on the question of whether the Omaha Tribe’s 1854 reservation has been diminished/disestablished, with the federal government supporting the tribe and the state opposing:
Here are the materials in Smith v. Parker (D. Neb.):
DCT Order Granting Nebraska Motion to Intervene
Opposition to Motion to Intervene
Nebraska Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene
Prior posts on this very interesting case are here and here.
Here is the opinion:
Village of Pender v Morris — Omaha Tribal Court
The District of Nebraska previously ordered exhaustion of tribal remedies in this matter, materials here.
And here is the briefing schedule:
News coverage here.
Here is the opinion in Hill v. Seneca Nation of Indians.
My chapter, “Resisting Congress: Free Speech and Tribal Law,” from our book, The Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty.
Here is the abstract:
Congress codified the unsettled tension between American civil rights law and American Indian tribal law, customs, and traditions in American Indian communities by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) in 1968. Concerned that individual rights were receiving short shrift in tribal courts and by tribal governments,Congress chose to apply a modified form of the Bill of Rights on tribal governments. In other words, Congress chose to impose American legal norms on Indian governments in order to protect those under tribal jurisdiction.As it had done previously in statutes such as the Indian Reorganization Act, Congress affirmatively sought to displace tribal law — and all the attendant customs and traditions, as well as Indian values — with American law. Ironically, after the Supreme Court interpreted ICRA in 1978, this law could only be interpreted and enforced by tribal courts. Tribal law and American civil rights law have been at odds in many tribal communities ever since, as tribal voters, legislatures, and courts have struggled with how (and whether) to apply American civil rights law in Indian country.
In this chapter, I explore several questions relating to tribal courts, tribal governments, and the Indian Civil Rights Act. For example, do tribal decision makers (i.e., voters, legislatures, and especially courts) deviate from the state and federal government and court interpretations of the Bill of Rights in applying ICRA; and if so, how much and in what way? Do tribal decision makers apply or incorporate tribal law, customs, and traditions into their decisions relating to civil rights under ICRA (and tribal laws that incorporate ICRA’s provisions); and if so, how? Are tribal decision makers truly bound by the provisions of the ICRA?The last question begs a final question: Does Congress have authority to force tribal decision makers how to decide civil rights disputes?
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