Here are the materials in Cayuga Nation v. Campbell (N.Y. A.D.):
Here is the opinion in Aron Security Inc. v. Unkechaug Indian Nation (N.Y.A.D.):
The plaintiff security company entered into a services contract with the defendant, the Unkechaug Indian Nation. Upon the defendant’s alleged failure to pay sums due under the contract, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract. After obtaining a judgment in its favor and against the defendant, entered May 22, 2014, the plaintiff served an information subpoena on nonparty Michelle Jackson, a signatory to the contract on the defendant’s behalf, in an effort to collect on the judgment. Jackson did not respond and the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to hold Jackson in contempt. The defendant then moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that as an Indian tribe, it possessed sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s motion with leave to renew.
Here is the opinion in Schulz v. State of New York Executive:
The Gaming Act, among other things, provided a statutory framework for regulating casino gambling within the state and effectuated three agreements entered into between the state and the Oneida Indian Nation, the Seneca Nation of Indians and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Indian Nations). Those agreements generally provided that the state would grant the Indian Nations exclusive gaming rights within their respective geographic areas in exchange for a percentage of the gaming revenues and/or support for the then proposed casino gambling referendum, which was passed by the voters at the November 2013 general election.
Here is the opinion in Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Chukchansi Economic Development
Authority (N.Y. A.D.):
Appellants contend that defendants-respondents Nancy Ayala, Karen Wynn, Charles Sargosa, and Tracy Brechbuehl (the Ayala faction or the individual Ayala defendants) do not enjoy sovereign immunity because their actions were illegal and not performed in an official capacity. However, to decide whether the Ayala faction’s actions were illegal, a court would have to determine whether the Ayala faction was the legitimate Tribal Council; this it may not do (see Sac & Fox, 340 F3d at 767).
Here is the opinion in People v. Laughing.
At the time the instant charge was lodged against defendant, and at present, the taxability by New York of Native American manufactured cigarettes under the circumstances at play here lacked clarity. It is undisputed that the Department had a forbearance enforcement policy with respect to Native American manufactured cigarettes that are transported between reservations. Furthermore, defendant asserts that, when faced with decisions regarding the applicability and enforcement of the Tax Law to various situations involving the possession or transportation of Native American manufactured cigarettes, the Division almost uniformly deferred to the expertise of the Department and the primacy of its dealings with the Indian nations. While there can be no question that “it is the prerogative of a District Attorney to prosecute people who commit crimes,” it is equally true that “one of the reforms effected through the years in the procedure to dismiss accusatory instruments in the interest of justice was to remove the power to do so from the offices of District Attorney and Attorney–General and lodge it, instead, in the courts alone” (People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 131  ). To be sure, the policy of the Department and the issues surrounding the Division’s actual enforcement of the Tax Law with respect to Native American manufactured cigarettes may very well be found insufficient to justify dismissal of the indictment in the interest of justice. Yet, we simply cannot say that the testimony sought on those issues “is utterly irrelevant” to the question of whether defendant’s prosecution here would be unjust[.]
Here is the opinion in Sue/Perior Concrete and Paving Co. v. Lewiston Golf Course Corp.:
Other factors, however, including what the Court of Appeals has characterized as the “[m]ore important” financial factors, weigh in favor of a determination that LGCC does not share in the Nation’s sovereign immunity (id.). With respect to whether LGCC’s “purposes are similar to or serve those of the tribal government” (id.), we conclude that this factor supports the denial of sovereign immunity to LGCC. In minutes from its August 2002 meeting approving the creation of SGC, the Council declared that “it is . . . the policy of the Nation to promote the welfare and prosperity of its members and to actively promote, attract, encourage and develop economically sound commerce and industry through governmental action for the purpose of preventing unemployment and economic stagnation,” and that “the Gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of the Nation and the general welfare of its members.” To that end, the Council created SNFGC for the purpose of “developing, financing, operating and conducting the Nation’s gaming operations on its Niagara Falls Territory at the Niagara Falls Gaming Facility.” In creating the LGCC, the Council declared that, “in furtherance of the economic success of the Nation’s gaming operations, [SNFGC] has commenced development of a . . . golf course located in the Town of Lewiston, New York[, which] will be developed and operated as an amenity to . . . SNFGC’s casino operations, . . . the purpose of which amenities is to enhance the overall success and profitability of the casino’s operations” (emphasis added). In that manner, the Council believed that the golf course project “may reasonably be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the Nation” (emphasis added). Thus, the Council’s own statements reflect that the purpose of LGCC – to develop a golf course as an “amenity” to the Nation’s gaming operations – is several steps removed from the purposes of tribal government, e.g., “promoting tribal welfare, alleviating unemployment, [and] providing money for tribal programs” (Gristede’s Foods, Inc., 660 F Supp 2d at 477; cf. Ransom, 86 NY2d at 560).
These common law tests to decide whether a tribal enterprise is under the cloak of tribal immunity are baffling, generating far too many unpredictable results like this one. It’s fairly clear to me that the wide majority of courts would conclude a tribally-owned enterprise chartered under tribal law is immune without looking toward subjective factors such as what the purpose of the corporation is — tribes just aren’t for-profit entities. They’re governments.
Here is the opinion in Hill v. Seneca Nation of Indians.