Here is the opinion in Treat v. Stitt.
Petitioner’s Reply Brief
Petitioners, the Honorable Greg Treat, Senate President Pro Tempore, and the Honorable Charles McCall, Speaker of the House, request the Court to assume original jurisdiction to declare that the new tribal gaming compacts between the State and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and between the State and the Kialegee Tribal Town are invalid under Oklahoma law. The Court assumes original jurisdiction. Okla. Const. art. VII, § 4. The Court invokes its publici juris doctrine to assume original jurisdiction here as Petitioners have presented this Court with an issue of public interest in urgent need of judicial determination. Fent v. Contingency Review Bd., 2007 OK 27, ¶ 11, 163 P.3d 512, 521. The Court grants the declaratory relief sought by Petitioners, as the Executive branch did not validly enter into the new tribal gaming compacts with the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and the Kialegee Tribal Town. Ethics Comm’n of State of Okla. v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶ 4, 850 P.2d 1069, 1072.
Here is the order in Sipp v. Buffalo Thunder Inc.:
36924 and 38636 Certification Order (FINAL)
The question certified:
[W]hether the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2018), permits tribes and states to contract in Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compacts to shift jurisdiction over certain matters to state courts.
Dean Kevin K. Washburn has posted “Agency Pragmatism in Addressing Law’s Failure: The Curious Case of Federal ‘Deemed Approvals’ of Tribal-State Gaming Compacts,” forthcoming in the Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
Here is the abstract:
In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), Congress imposed a decision-forcing mechanism on the Secretary of the Interior related to tribal-state compacts for Indian gaming. Congress authorized the Secretary to review such compacts and approve or disapprove each compact within forty-five days of submission. Under an unusual provision of law, however, if the Secretary fails to act within forty-five days, the compact is “deemed approved” by operation of law but only to the extent that it is lawful. In a curious development, this regime has been used in a different manner than Congress intended. Since the United States Supreme Court held part of IGRA unconstitutional in 1996, the Secretary declined to issue an affirmative approval or disapproval on more than seventy-five occasions—thus, allowing a compact to become approved by operation of law—but has simultaneously issued a letter setting forth legal objections to aspects of the compact. The Secretary’s creative response to a broken regulatory scheme appears to be unique, and it raises interesting questions about how the executive branch should behave in the face of legal uncertainty. It raises questions of administrative law, such as whether the Secretary’s non-action is reviewable as agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whether the Secretary’s letter is entitled to deference, and if so, what level of deference. It also raises important questions about whether such action constitutes good policy. This Article examines some of those questions.