Oklahoma SCT Holds Tax on Video Game Machines Used at Cherokee Casinos is Preempted by Federal Law

Here is the opinion in Video Game Technologies v. Rogers County Board of Tax Roll Corrections.

Here is a related opinion involving machines at the Creek casinos, Video Game Technologies v. Tulsa County Board of Tax Roll Corrections.

Another Update in Fort Sill Apache Dispute with NIGC

Here are the new, new materials in Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. National Indian Gaming Commission (D.D.C.):

115-1 Fort Sill MSJ

118 NIGC Response

122 Fort Sill Reply

[NIGC Reply TK]

Prior posts here.

Ninth Circuit Briefs in Stand Up for California! v. Dept. of Interior [No. 18-16830]

Here:

Opening Brief

North Fork Brief

Federal Brief

Reply

Lower court materials here.

Ninth Circuit Briefs in Club One Casino v. Dept. of Interior [Challenge to IRA Section 5]

Here:

Opening Brief

DOI Answer Brief

Reply

Lower court materials here.

Kevin Washburn on Federal “Deemed Approved” Gaming Compacts

Dean Kevin K. Washburn has posted “Agency Pragmatism in Addressing Law’s Failure: The Curious Case of Federal ‘Deemed Approvals’ of Tribal-State Gaming Compacts,” forthcoming in the Michigan Journal of Law Reform.

Here is the abstract:

In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), Congress imposed a decision-forcing mechanism on the Secretary of the Interior related to tribal-state compacts for Indian gaming. Congress authorized the Secretary to review such compacts and approve or disapprove each compact within forty-five days of submission. Under an unusual provision of law, however, if the Secretary fails to act within forty-five days, the compact is “deemed approved” by operation of law but only to the extent that it is lawful. In a curious development, this regime has been used in a different manner than Congress intended. Since the United States Supreme Court held part of IGRA unconstitutional in 1996, the Secretary declined to issue an affirmative approval or disapproval on more than seventy-five occasions—thus, allowing a compact to become approved by operation of law—but has simultaneously issued a letter setting forth legal objections to aspects of the compact. The Secretary’s creative response to a broken regulatory scheme appears to be unique, and it raises interesting questions about how the executive branch should behave in the face of legal uncertainty. It raises questions of administrative law, such as whether the Secretary’s non-action is reviewable as agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whether the Secretary’s letter is entitled to deference, and if so, what level of deference. It also raises important questions about whether such action constitutes good policy. This Article examines some of those questions.