Younger abstention doctrine

Federal Court Dismisses Indian Child Welfare-Related Habeas Petition arising from Yakama

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in George v. Superior Court (E.D. Wash.):

35 Fox Motion to Dismiss

39 DCt Order Dismissing Claims

An excerpt:

Here, the three elements for abstention are met. The underlying Superior Court proceedings are ongoing and it is generally recognized that family relations are a traditional area of state concern. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); H.C. ex rel. Gordon, 203 F.3d at 613. The Superior Court had apparent concurrent personal jurisdiction over the parties with the Tribal Court and has jurisdiction to determine the legal affect of the Tribal Court proceedings, its own jurisdiction, and to consider deferring to the Tribal Court if it finds it appropriate. See Wash. Rev.Code 37.12.010; Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 83 Wash.App. 763, 767, 924 P.2d 372 (1996); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Superior Court of Okanogan County, 945 F.2d 1138, 1140, n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that Pub.L. 280 did not divest Tribal Courts of concurrent jurisdiction over child custody matters). The children were residing off-reservation in Spokane County for at least six months consecutive prior to when the custody petitions were filed, and it appears the children may have been domiciled on Yakama Nation land for at least a day when Plaintiff’s custody petition was filed in Tribal Court. Finally, both parties availed themselves of the child custody proceedings held in the respective courts. Defendant participated in the Tribal Court proceedings, and Plaintiff participated in the Superior Court proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate forum in which to assert her federal claims. At this point, extraordinary circumstances do not exist that would require the Court to refrain from abstaining in this matter.

 

Eighth Circuit Refuses to Intervene in North Dakota State Bar Disciplinary Action Involving MHA Nation-Licensed Attorney

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Gillette v. North Dakota Disciplinary Board Counsel.

Lower federal court materials here.

Federal Court Holds that Younger Abstention Doctrine Applies in ICWA Cases

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Yancey v. Thomas (W.D. Okla.):

Thomas Motion to Dismiss

Yancey Opposition

Yancey v Thomas DCT Opinion

Idaho Federal Court Refuses to Dismiss Smokeshop Case

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Lil’ Brown Smoke Shop v. Wasden (D. Idaho) in which the court rejected a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment and Young absention grounds. An excerpt:

Based on the aforementioned cases and standards, and the arguments of the parties with respect to whether the Act regulates on or off reservation activity, the Court disagrees with Defendants and finds that the issue of the state’s jurisdiction is not conclusive. Here, like in Fort Belnap, Sycuan, and Seneca-Cayuga, the question of whether the state law is enforceable against Plaintiff is a federal question in an area, tribal law, where federal interests predominate. Thus, the Court finds that the State of Idaho’s interest in this litigation is not sufficiently important to warrant Younger abstention in light of the predominant federal question regarding the State of Idaho’s jurisdiction to enforce the Act. Thus, as Defendants have failed to prove all requirements for Younger abstention, the Court will deny Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8 ) with respect to Defendants Wasden and Armstrong.

Lil Brown Smoke Shack DCT Order

Idaho Motion to Dismiss

Smoke Shack Opposition

Idaho Reply Brief

Gillette v. Edison — Younger Abstention Doctrine Applied in Disciplinary Action against Indian Lawyer

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

The District of North Dakota dismissed a federal action brought by an attorney seeking an order forcing North Dakota state courts to dismiss a disciplinary action against a tribal lawyer. Interesting case involving an issue about whether state bar disciplinary boards can discipline a lawyer for on-reservation conduct.

dct-order-in-gillette-v-edison

north-dakota-motion-to-dismiss

gillette-motion-for-declaratory-judgment

Yancey v. Bonner — Complicated ICWA Case

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion: dct-order-yancey-v-bonner

An excerpt:

Plaintiff is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation of Oklahoma. He is the father of Baby Boy L., who was born out of wedlock on October 4, 2002. In July 2002, the mother, who is not of Indian descent, decided to place the baby for adoption. Shortly after the birth, the Prospective Adoptive Parents took the child to Missouri, where he has since resided. On October 10, 2002, the mother relinquished her parental rights in Oklahoma County. On December 26, 2002, an adoption petition was filed in Cleveland County. The Plaintiff’s parental rights were terminated and he appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court erred in holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (“the Act”), did not apply. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing the termination of the Plaintiff’s parental rights. The Prospective Adoptive Parents then filed a new application to terminate the Plaintiff’s parental rights. In February 2006, the trial court determined that the Act applied but that there was good cause to avoid the placement preferences of that Act, leaving the child in the custody of the Prospective Adoptive Parents. In January 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the case to Tribal Court. In February 2008, this motion was denied and the trial court terminated the Plaintiff’s parental rights, finding that his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Plaintiff appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in March 2008 and filed the present complaint in May 2008. The adoption proceeding is still pending in Cleveland County District Court. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant failed to follow the mandates of the Indian Child Welfare Act and is thereby depriving him of his rights under that statute and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

And more:

Finally, the Plaintiff has a sufficient opportunity to raise his federal claims within the context of the state court proceeding. This prong requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that state procedural law clearly bars him from raising these claims in the state proceeding. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14; Moore, 442 U.S. at 432. The Plaintiff here has provided no evidence indicating state law bars him from litigating his claims under the Indian Child Welfare Act in state court. On the contrary, the Plaintiff has in fact raised such claims in the past in the state court system and received favorable results. (Dkt. No. 1.) Therefore, the Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his federal claims in the current state court proceedings.