Tribal Prosecutor Position at Little River

Here. (pdf)

Position: Prosecutor, Department of Prosecutor’s Office (Full Time – Appointment)

Summary: This position serves as the chief law enforcement officer responsible for the prosecution of violations of the Tribe’s Constitution, criminal laws, conservation laws, ordinances, regulations, and resolutions in Tribal Court. The incumbent acts independently, exercising his/her own prosecutorial discretion.

Employment Qualifications: A qualified candidate offers the following: • J. D. Degree from an ABA accredited law school; and • a minimum of five (5) years of experience in criminal law (prosecution or defense); and • previous litigation experience in a tribal court system; and • a license to practice law (shall obtain Michigan Bar within 6 months of employment, if
applicable).

Working Within the Constraints of Sherrill Laches

The decision in the Mohawk land claims case is an interesting and thoughtful example of a district court judge trying to carve out possible remedies in the face of the new (or Sherrill) laches line of cases (Sherrill, Cayuga, Oneida). We’ve long though that the district court judges who wrote hundreds of pages of opinions and spent years on these cases were not pleased with the relatively dismissive opinions of the Second Circuit, overturning their rulings with the ever changing target of new laches.

Assuming, as they must, that they will be overturned when they let any claim go through, the district court judges in these cases have written opinions that attempt to save portions of the claims. Though other similar decisions have been overturned (Oneida), Judge Kahn here attempts to distinguish between the claims, dismissing parts of the claim subject to Sherrill laches, and saving the parts that are not. He specifically mentions new laches as a “peculiar” application of laches to land claims, listing the inconsistencies which are now case law. At 4-5. The court doesn’t allow Defendants to argue laches as a blanket remedy to all of the claims. FN 7. He also points out that new laches is an exception to the usual rule that the United States is not subject to laches, rather than writing as if this has been the case all along. At 15. The opinion also has important language on judicial notice and Census data (though the comment about the highly paid expert was probably unnecessary, given that the Nation was facing a magistrate who wouldn’t accept their Census data, but would accept the State’s. Hiring an expert makes sense in the face of that kind of skepticism). At 24.

Comparing Onondaga, also written by Judge Kahn, with St. Regis Mohawk, another interesting point is the court is most interested in how the facts of the claims can be distinguished from the Sherrill line, rather than how requests for relief differ (Broadly: Sherrill, jurisdiction; Cayuga, money judgment; Oneida, possessory claim; Onondaga, declaratory judgment.). Attempting to work around the disruptive element of new laches by crafting a request for relief that is not disruptive does not work. The very claim is disruptive if the fact pattern is remotely similar.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Judge Kahn refuses to let new laches be the be all and end all to these claims. He writes:

That the Second Circuit in Cayuga may have in effect expanded the scope of Sherrill laches in no way leads the Court to conclude that laches should operate as a brightline rule that forecloses any possibility of a successful “ancient” Indian land claim. To conclude otherwise, as Defendants appear to urge the Court to do, would be to ascribe a broader and disturbingly anti-democratic meaning to the recent line of laches cases—that remedial causes of action specifically preserved by Congress may be vitiated in the courts by the categorical application of an equitable defense

At 30.

While it would be highly preferable to have is defense eliminated entirely, given the restraints the district court judges are operating under now, this case is a victory in that it at least acknowledges the fundamental inequity of new/Sherrill laches and continues to find ways to avoid its application.

Update on Baby Girl Proceedings

Here.

Baby Veronica’s biological father, stepmother and paternal grandparents have filed court papers in Oklahoma to adopt the 3-year-old girl, a move that dissenting U.S. Supreme Court justices warned could happen and will likely complicate the custody dispute.

Baby Girl Additional Thoughts — Implications for State Indian Child Welfare Laws

An important question we’ve been asked repeatedly — how does Adoptive Couple affect state laws codifying and supplementing the Indian Child Welfare Act?

State ICWA laws remain intact. This was not a decision on the constitutionality of ICWA, but rather an interpretation of ICWA’s wording. This Supreme Court defers to state law when possible. While state courts may interpret the language the same way, if it’s the same language (which it is in Michigan, for example), it’s not bound to. For example, the legislative history of a state law passed in 2012 is very different than that of the federal law passed in 1978. There may be different policy goals, or other parts of the statute are different enough to indicate a broader, and higher, standard. In addition, state statutes of general applicability, such as those addressing the rights of biological fathers to their children still apply. In some ways this ends up like the marriage equality decisions–where a person lives may determine their rights.

There is going to be more pressure on tribes to have an adoptive placement available for a child earlier. This decision may give state DHS officials the incorrect belief that they do not have to find a proper placement for the child under the law, but that rather a family must make some sort of “formal” application. What is a formal application will also likely be determined by state law, given the Court gave no indication what it meant by that in the opinion. The Court seemed to be making a distinction between a tribal official testifying that there are adoptive families available and an adoptive family being vetting through (in this case) a state court.

We are also curious to find out how will this apply in conjunction with the state removing children at birth from mothers for various reasons–previous terminations, testing positive. How long must a parent have a child for it to be considered “continued” custody? When does legal custody attach? Again, this is likely determined through state law.

Collection of Reactions on Baby Girl Case

Casey Family Programs

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (video)

NCAI

NICWA Initial Statement (pdf)

NICWA Legal Analysis (pdf) (Includes an excellent point about state laws, and one we’ve been considering here as well)

Terry Cross Statement

NARF

The Atlantic, Andrew Cohen

Minnesota Public Radio (with Colette Routel)

NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)

Washington Post

Will add more as they come up.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl First Impressions

In a split 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, with a strong dissent from Justice Sotomayor, the Court limited ICWA, but did not eliminate it. The Court is unwilling to go so far as Justice Thomas would like, and find the statute unconstitutional. *12 (Thomas, J. concurring). Instead, the decision turns on dictionary definitions of “continued” *8, and “breakup” *12, finding that 1912(f) (involuntary termination) does not apply to the father, as he did not have physical custody of Baby Girl, nor legal custody under state law. *11. In addition, 1912(d) (active efforts) does not apply to Baby Girl’s adoption. *13. The Court reads the statute to apply to “intact” Indian families. *9. While not an endorsement of the judicially created existing Indian family exception, this opinion will not provide assistance in pushing back against it, at least in the context of non-custodial fathers. The decision is a set back, and a devastating blow to the family, but it’s also not the end of ICWA. Figuring out how the ultimate custody decision will turn out is difficult, not the least of which because under the Court’s own definition, there is NOW an “intact” Indian family.

The Court’s reading of 1912(a), the active efforts provision, is troubling. While quick to note that active efforts are a “sensible requirement when applied to state social workers,” *14 the Court finds it would be “unusual” to apply it to these facts. As anticipated, the Court’s concern for adoptive parents trumped that of the rights of children or biological parents. The question of how to apply 1912(a) comes up often in the context of guardianships and adoptions. This decision will make it harder to argue when states and agencies don’t want to apply 1912(a) to guardianships as well.

The placement preference provisions of 1915(a) for adoptions remains intact. A family within the preferences must “formally” seek to adopt the child for the preferences to be applicable. How this will apply in practice will depend on the court, I imagine. When does the adoptive family have to be known? How far in advance? Justice Sotomayor points out that if Baby Girl’s grandparents want to adopt her, under this decision the South Carolina court must consider them under the placement preferences. *25 (Sotomayor J. dissenting).

The Court remains suspicious of tribal citizenship, talking about remote ancestors *16 and listing Baby Girl’s blood quantum in the first sentence of the opinion. *1. The Court calls it the father’s “ICWA trump card.” *16. Finally, it is not often the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families is called “mischief.” *9 (“mischief” that continues, see the disproportionality reports out recently).

In dissent, Justice Scalia writes that the opinion “needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood.” *1. Justice Sotomayor, however, writes  explicitly that the Court’s decision is based on policy differences with Congress, *2, *8 (Sotomayor, dissenting). She also disagrees with the United States in its amicus brief, FN5, as part of her reading of the statute as a whole, rather than discrete parts. *3.

Her scathing footnote 8, which ends with her requesting examples of women who go through the trouble of giving birth via sperm donors giving the child up for adoption, injects the common sense anger and frustration this case has caused among those who have followed it closely. She addresses head on the Court’s references to blood quantum, wondering why it is needed if there are no constitutional concerns. *23-4. And finally, her, yes, empathetic paragraph of what can befall a family and that ICWA’s protections should apply to them provides a perspective missing from the majority opinion on down to many state courts. *23. ICWA does not only apply to the child removed improperly by the “culturally insensitive” social worker from an “intact” Indian family. It applies beyond that, to the families most in need of the law, ensuring the protection and health of the child, her contact with her family, her extended family, and her tribe. This narrow version of ICWA endorsed by the Court today, and evidenced regularly in family courts, does not help that child.

Supreme Court Reverses and Remands South Carolina Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Opinion here. Written by Justice Alito.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and BREY- ER, J., filed concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KA- GAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.

***

This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classi- fied as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her biological father, who had attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who had no prior contact with the child. The provisions of the federal statute at issue here do not demand this result.
Contrary to the State Supreme Court’s ruling, we hold that 25 U. S. C. §1912(f )—which bars involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s “continued custody” of the child— does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody of the child. We further hold that §1912(d)— which conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the “breakup of the Indian family”—is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we clarify that §1915(a), which provides placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child. We accordingly reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Previous coverage here.

Commentary to follow.

Stipulation for Entry of Judgment in Olin v. Chukchansi Economic Development Authority

Here, settling a complaint against CEDA for breach of contract and wrongful termination.
Thanks to Marc Benjamin at the Fresno Bee.

Commentary from MF: This is a till-tap case, where a state court orders a sheriff to collect on a judgment by literally taking money from the till. Does anyone know if there has been a case like this involving tribes before?

Court of Claims Decision in Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States

Here.

III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has demonstrated that, during the period from February 22, 1974, to September 30, 1992, defendant breached its fiduciary duties to the Nation by mismanaging the Nation’s trust assets and other funds. Plaintiff has established all the traditional elements for recovery of damages on those breach claims. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that, for the period in question, plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $21,017,491.99 – $21,015,651.45 on its underinvestment claim and $1,840.54 for its deposit lag claim. Plaintiff is entitled to recover nothing on its negative interest claim, which claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On or before June 17, 2013, the parties shall file a joint status report indicating how this case should proceed. Said report shall also discuss whether any form of additional relief is currently required under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).63
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court Grants Cert in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

Order list here.

Our previous coverage here.

Relevant documents:

Michigan v Bay Mills Cert Petition w Appendices

Bay Mills Cert Opp

Michigan Cert Stage Reply

OSG Brief (Recommending Denial)