Scholarship

Neoshia Roemer on ICWA as Reproductive Justice

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Neoshia Roemer has posted “The Indian Child Welfare Act as Reproductive Justice,” forthcoming in the Boston University Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

After decades of abuse through family regulation, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (“ICWA”) to prevent the breakup of Indian families and promote tribal sovereignty. While ICWA seems like an outlier that addresses one category of children, it is not an outlier. Rather, I argue that ICWA is a tool of reproductive justice. By formulating a legal rights framework for reproductive justice in American jurisprudence, I discuss how the reproductive justice movement is grounded in U.S. law beyond the right to terminate a pregnancy that the Supreme Court abrogated in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. By looking at the history of reproductive rights in American Indian communities, I discuss how family regulation challenges reproductive rights and tribal sovereignty considering Dobbs and Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. Indian child removals exist in the same history, context, and policy that disrupted the reproductive rights of American Indian families and tribal sovereignty in other areas. Before concluding that ICWA is still good law and good policy to disrupt family regulation and protect the reproductive rights of American Indian peoples, I consider where challenges to ICWA in Haaland v. Brackeen fit into this paradigm and the ongoing need for the protection of tribal sovereignty and reproductive rights for American Indian peoples. For nearly 400 years, the disruption of reproductive rights, including family regulation, has been at the heart of federal Indian policy. The current frame of family regulation as “saving” children means that it is often divorced from the notion of reproductive rights. As the history behind and contemporary challenges to ICWA demonstrate, it should not, and cannot, be separated from the other reproductive justice issues facing American Indian communities. To strengthen legal protections for American Indian people that disrupt these government interventions, like ICWA, is to realize reproductive rights more fully in the United States.

Highly recommended!!!

Fletcher and Khalil on ICWA Preemption and Commandeering

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Fletcher and Randall F. Khalil have posted “Preemption, Commandeering, and the Indian Child Welfare Act,” forthcoming in the Wisconsin Law Review, on SSRN. This paper is part of the law review’s symposium on Interpretation in the States.

The abstract:

This year (2022), the Supreme Court agreed to review wide-ranging constitutional challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) brought by the State of Texas and three non-Indian foster families in the October 2022 Term. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that certain provisions of ICWA violated the anticommandeering principle implied in the Tenth Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
We argue that the anticommandeering challenges against ICWA are unfounded because all provisions of ICWA provides a set of legal standards to be applied in state which validly and expressly preempt state law without unlawfully commandeering the States’ executive or legislative branches. Congress’s power to compel state courts to apply federal law is long established and beyond question.
Yet even if some provisions of ICWA did violate the Tenth, we argue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment sufficiently authorizes Congress’s enactment of ICWA so as to defeat the anti-commandeering concerns. Strangely, no party ever invoked Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to assess its constitutionality. ICWA seems like an obvious candidate for analysis under Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5. States routinely discriminated against American Indian families on the basis of their race and ancestry (and their religion and culture), and ICWA is designed to remedy the abuses of state courts and agencies.
We further have no doubt that the state legislatures that adopted ICWA in whole, in part, or as modified also possessed the power to do so, even in the event the Supreme Court holds all or portions of ICWA unconstitutional.

The Wisconsin Law School gargoyle.

Dylan Hedden-Nicely on Castro-Huerta

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Dylan Hedden-Nicely has posted “The Terms of their Deal: Revitalizing the Treaty Right to Limit State Jurisdiction in Indian Country” on SSRN.

The abstract:

For over two hundred years the “whole course of judicial decision” in the United States has recognized that American Indian tribes possess inherent sovereignty to govern their lands and people. Federal recognition of that sovereignty was memorialized in countless treaties, congressionally ratified agreements, and executive orders setting aside reservations throughout the United States. Throughout that same period, and with only minimal exception, the judiciary faithfully applied those treaties to protect tribal property rights, recognize tribal sovereignty, and to bar states from imposing jurisdiction within Indian Country.

The jurisprudence in this arena has shifted, however, over the past few decades. Although the Supreme Court continues to faithfully apply its longstanding treaty analysis to protect tribal property rights, it has moved away from using that same analysis when evaluating tribal sovereignty and the scope of state jurisdiction in Indian Country. Instead, as demonstrated by its recent decision in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, the Court has articulated a preemption test that is determined by judicial balancing of the tribal, federal, and state interests in the subject matter the state seeks to regulate. The approach has long been criticized for allowing courts to usurp the legislative power of Congress to make policy in federal Indian law in order to “reach outcomes consistent with their own notions of how much tribal autonomy there ought to be.” The purpose of this article is to establish that this so-called balancing test has no basis in the foundational principles of federal Indian law. Instead, the broad sweep of the field demonstrates that tribal freedom from state jurisdiction within Indian Country should proceed as a treaty right analysis.

That analysis requires courts to determine whether the treaty at issue preempts state law within the reservation. In making that determination, courts must interpret the treaty consistent with background principles of tribal sovereignty, which necessitates that ambiguities be resolved in favor of the tribe and that any sovereignty not expressly ceded has been retained. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the treaty right to a “permanent home” implicitly included the right for tribes to “govern themselves, free from state interference.” Once established, a treaty right may only be taken away by Congress. Once again, however, there remains a strong presumption against the abrogation of tribal sovereignty. Thus, the Court has consistently required there be “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”

This article seeks to demonstrate that the Court’s treaty-based analysis of tribal sovereignty should be applied by the judiciary moving forward. It is preferable not only because it is more consistent with foundation principles of federal Indian law but also bedrock constitutional principles as well as basic twenty-first century domestic and international norms related to the treatment of indigenous peoples and self-determination.

Highly recommended!

Talton was probably a white guy.

Fletcher and Singel on Lawyering and the Indian Child Welfare Act

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Fletcher and Singel’s paper, “Lawyering the Indian Child Welfare Act,” has been published in the Michigan Law Review. We’re honored to be part of a symposium on civil rights lawyering!

Our abstract:

This Article describes how the statutory structure of child welfare laws enables lawyers and courts to exploit deep-seated stereotypes about American Indian people rooted in systemic racism to undermine the enforcement of the rights of Indian families and tribes. Even when Indian custodians and tribes are able to protect their rights in court, their adversaries use those same advantages on appeal to attack the constitutional validity of the law. The primary goal of this Article is to help expose those structural issues and the ethically troublesome practices of adoption attorneys as the most important Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) case in history, Brackeen v. Haaland, reaches the Supreme Court.

Getches, Wilkinson, Williams, Fletcher, Carpenter, and Singel Federal Indian Law Casebook 2022-23 Update

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

We delighted that Wenona Singel has joined us this year. Guess it’s time to get cracking on the eighth edition. . . .

teacher’s memorandum 2022-2023.pdfDownload

Sherally Munshi on Dispossession and American Property

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Sherally Munshi has published “Dispossession: An American Property Law Tradition” in the Georgetown Law Journal.

The abstract:

Universities and law schools have begun to purge the symbols of conquest and slavery from their crests and campuses, but they have yet to come to terms with their role in reproducing the material and ideological conditions of settler colonialism and racial capitalism. This Article considers the role the property law tradition has played in shaping and legitimizing regimes of racialized dispossession past and present. It intervenes in the traditional presentation of property law by arguing that dis-possession describes an ongoing but disavowed function of property law. As a counter-narrative and critique of property, dispossession is a useful concept for challenging existing property arrangements, often rationalized within liberal and legal discourse.

Interesting. Looks to be expanding on K-Sue Park’s work.

Bobby Wilson

Fletcher on Witt on Pandemics and the State

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Fletcher published a paper as part of a symposium on John Fabian Witt’s book American Contagions: “Pandemics in Indian Country: The Making of the Tribal State.”

New Scholarship in the Alaska Law Review about Native Corporate Endowment Models

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Robert Snigaroff and Craig Richards have posted “Alaska Native Corporation Endowment Models,” published in the Alaska Law Review.

The abstract:

New settlement trust provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 have significant implications for Alaska Native Corporation business longevity and the appropriateness of an operating business model given ANC goals as stated in their missions. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act authorized the creation of for-profit corporations for the benefit of Alaska Native shareholders. But for Alaska Natives, cultural continuation was and continues to be a desired goal. Considering the typical life span of U.S. corporations and the inevitability of eventual failure, the for-profit corporate model is inconsistent with aspects of the ANC mission. Settlement trust amendments to ANCSA facilitate ANC cultural continuation goals solving the problem of business viability risk. We make a normative case that ANCs should consider increasing endowment business activity. We also discuss the Alaska Permanent Fund and lessons that those structuring settlement trusts might learn from literature on sovereign wealth funds and endowments.

Fletcher and Disco Stu at the Bethel Airport.

“Re-Indigenizing Yellowstone” in the Wyoming Law Review

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Kekek Jason Stark, Autumn L. Bernhardt, Monte Mills, and Jason A. Robison have published “Re-Indigenizing Yellowstone” in the Wyoming Law Review. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

Alex Skibine Publishes “Textualism and the Indian Canons of Statutory Construction” . . .

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

. . . in the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (Go Blue). PDF

Here is the abstract:

When interpreting statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation of Indians or construing treaties signed with Indian nations, courts are supposed to apply any of five specific canons of construction relating to Indian Affairs. Through examining the modern line of Supreme Court cases involving statutory or treaty interpretation relating to Indian nations, this Article demonstrates that the Court has generally been faithful in applying canons relating to treaty interpretation or abrogation. The Court has also respected the canon requiring unequivocal expression of congressional intent before finding an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. However, there are two other canons that the Court almost never applies. One, the tribal sovereignty canon, requires clear intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights; the other, the Indian ambiguity canon, requires statutes to be construed liberally with ambiguities resolved to the benefit of Indians. After reviewing the possible reasons why textualist jurists might be opposed to the use of substantive canons, this Article makes two arguments to remedy any reluctance to using the tribal sovereignty and Indian ambiguity canons. First, these canons have constitutional roots, and as such, even textualists on the Court should not be reluctant to use them. Second, the more established canon concerning abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity should also extend to statutes interfering with tribal sovereign rights. There are no normative reasons to treat abrogation of sovereign immunity differently than other statutory interference with tribal sovereignty.