Balls and Strikes: “How Elite Lawyers Took Over the Supreme Court’s Docket”

Here.

Donut for the First One to Name the Author of the Embedded SCOTUS Quote in Stacy Leeds’ Post on Men Devaluing Women and POC in the Politics of Justice Breyer’s Replacement

From Indigenously Well, “Asterisk This.”

Justice Breyer’s Indian Law Record (1994 to Now)

As I noted earlier in our announcement of his imminent retirement, Justice Breyer was no tribal sovereignty warrior ala Sotomayor, but he was no Indian fighter, either. He was part of the Rehnquist Court Nine that stayed together more than a decade. And, as such, he was also a part of a Rehnquist Court that showed nothing but contempt for tribal interests in the 1990s and 2000s. Justice Breyer’s voting patters are striking for one reason only — he rarely dissented from the Court’s majority in the Indian law docket. He seems to have gone with the flow.

Let’s start with the overall period of time starting with Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation in 1995 up ’til now. Justice Breyer voted with tribal interests in 19 out of 48 cases I counted (I excluded a few, like South Florida v. Miccosukee, because it wasn’t an Indian law case; Amoco v. Southern Ute, because Breyer recused; Yellen v. Chehalis, because both sides had tribal interests), or 39.6 percent. Tribes won 19 out of those 48 cases (see what I mean about going with the flow?). Breyer was in the majority in 43 out 48 cases, an 89.6 percent clip. Justice Breyer authored five majority (or plurality) opinions, four of them supporting tribal interests. He wrote a pair of short concurrences in cases tribes lost.

Since 2014, when the Court decided Bay Mills Indian Community v. Michigan, Breyer’s voting pattern changed dramatically to favor tribal interests, again, in tune with the direction of the overall Court. Starting with Bay Mills, Breyer voted for tribal interests 9 out of 11 times. The Court, during that same period, was exactly the same for cases with votes (tribes won two cases 4-4 and we don’t know those votes, but it would be fair to say Breyer was very likely to have favored tribes in those cases, and, again, Yellen, which we don’t count).

In Breyer’s early years, he rarely wrote for the Court. His first Indian law majority opinion (or any opinion, for that matter) was Chickasaw v. US, a loss for tribes, and which came 7 years after he joined the Court (which pushes back on the notion that junior justices get assigned the “chickenshit” Indian law cases).

President Barack Obama reads from his book, “Of Thee I Sing: A Letter to My Daughters,” during a visit by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and his family to the Oval Office, March 2, 2011. Joining them, from left, are Justice Breyer’s wife Joanna Breyer, grandson Eli Essiam Breyer and daughter Nell Breyer. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

In the good stuff, Breyer wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Lara, certainly a critically important case supporting the notion that Congress can exercise its plenary Indian affairs power to reaffirm tribal inherent sovereignty as in VAWA 2013. Breyer also wrote majority opinions in Cherokee v. Leavitt, the first ISDEAA contract support costs case, and United States v. Cooley, the first SCOTUS decision affirming tribal inherent powers over nonmembers under the Montana rubric. Breyer also wrote for a three-justice plurality in Washington v. Cougar Den.

Justice Breyer also wrote a critically important concurring opinion in Carcieri v. Salazar that articulated the bones of a conceptual framework later fleshed out by Interior allowing Indian tribes not federally acknowledged in 1934 to show that they might still have been under federal jurisdiction then, and therefore eligible to benefit from the fee-to-trust process. He cited the example of the Grand Traverse Band, which has paid dividends to the tribe.

In the bad stuff — and I do mean BAD — Breyer voted with the 5-4 majority in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, swapping places with Justice Scalia, who dissented in favor of a Cherokee birth father. Breyer’s concurrence tries at least to limit the scope of the majority’s incredibly vicious attack on the Cherokee father, but offers absolutely no reason for the vote. Brackeen and all the attacks on ICWA are happening right now because of that vote. Period.

Justice Breyer was also a legal historian and wrote extensively on the Cherokee cases of the 1830s (see my 2010 commentary here). Here is C-SPAN’s video of Breyer’s Supreme Court Historical Society lecture on the Cherokee cases. The positive takeaway? The Court did the right thing and tried to save the Cherokees, very nearly succeeding. The cynical takeaway? The Court did the right thing, ruined its institutional legitimacy for a long time (forever?), and almost started the Civil War — so don’t try.

Justice Breyer to Retire

The Guardian. They don’t hide behind paywalls . . . much.

Riding bus to A2 but will post on Breyer’s Indian law record in a bit. It’s incomplete since the Court has decided to take many, many cases this Term.

Sneak preview . . . He voted with tribal interests about 40 percent of the time, but up through his abomination of a vote in Baby Girl, he voted favorably for tribal interests only 20 percent of the time. This isn’t going to be pretty.

Not sure we’re buying it. . .
Not sure they are, either.

SCOTUS Denies More Oklahoma Petitions, Still Holding on Brackeen, Yakama, and Standing Rock Petitions

Order list here. Prior post detailing the other petitions here.

Suquamish Indians waiting . . .

Here are the materials in Oklahoma v. Davis, a petition in which Oklahoma only asked to overrule McGirt:

Oklahoma v Davis Petition

Davis BIO

MCN Amicus Brief

Reply

There are a bunch more denials of Oklahoma’s brilliant papering strategy (we’ll post materials later, cuz we have lives and Tribal Law won’t teach itself  . . . or will it?):

Oh and because we can’t have nice things, the Court granted the Harvard affirmative action case, too.

SCOTUS Grants Oklahoma Petition to Consider Whether the State Can Prosecute Non-Indian – on – Indian Crime in Indian Country

Here is today’s order.

The grant is limited to question 1 — here are the questions presented:

  1. Whether a State has authority to prosecute non- Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country.
  2. Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), should be overruled.

Cert stage materials in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta:

Lower court materials:

SCOTUS Holds Brackeen, Oklahoma’s Deranged McGirt Stuff, and now the Yakama Reservation Petition

Here is today’s order list. See prior post here.

The Court denied cert in two McGirt-related petitions filed by prisoners:

Bentley v. Oklahoma: Bentley Petition

White v. Oklahoma: White Petition

Getting a little bored.

“Muskrat Textualism” Now Published in the Northwestern U. Law Review

Here.

The asbtract:

The Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, confirming the boundaries of the Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, was a truly rare case in which the Court turned back arguments by federal and state governments in favor of American Indian and tribal interests. For more than a century, Oklahomans had assumed that the reservation had been terminated and acted accordingly. But only Congress can terminate an Indian reservation, and it simply had never done so in the case of the Creek Reservation. Both the majority and dissenting opinions attempted to claim the mantle of textualism, but their respective analyses led to polar opposite outcomes.

Until McGirt, a “faint-hearted” form of textualism had dominated the Court’s federal Indian law jurisprudence. This methodology enables the Court to seek outcomes consistent with the Justices’ views on how Indian law “ought to be.” This Article labels this thinking Canary Textualism, named after the dominant metaphor used for decades to describe Indian law, the miner’s canary—a caged bird used to warn of toxic gases in a mine. Canary textualists treat Indians and tribes as powerless and passive subjects of federal law and policy dictated by Congress and the Supreme Court. Canary Textualism relies on confusion in the doctrinal landscape and fear of tribal powers to justify departures from settled law. The 1978 decision Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in which the Supreme Court stripped Indian tribes of critical law enforcement powers by judicial fiat, is the prototypical Canary Textualism case. Oliphant’s hallmark is the Court’s legal acknowledgment that Indian tribes are dependent on the federal government in light of centuries of precedents that presumed the racial inferiority of Indian people. This allowed the Court to quietly assume that tribal governments are inferior as well.

Scholars long have decried the Court’s Canary Textualism but have rarely offered a better theory. This Article attempts to fill that gap and to provide more certainty in federal Indian law textualist doctrine that will help preclude Canary textualist activism. A far better metaphor than the miner’s canary is that of the muskrat—the hero of the Anishinaabe origin story of the great flood, a lowly, humble animal that nevertheless took courageous and thoughtful action to save creation. Indians and tribes are no longer caged birds. Tribal governments are active participants in reservation governance. They are innovative and forward-thinking. Luckily, the McGirt decision exemplifies a new form of textualism, Muskrat Textualism, that acknowledges and respects tribal actions and advancement. Muskrat textualists accept tribal governments as full partners in the American polity. Muskrat textualists accept the relevant interpretative rules that govern federal Indian law where texts are ambiguous and where texts are absent or not controlling. As a result, Muskrat Textualism is also a superior form of textualism more generally, illustrating the proper role of the judiciary in constitutional law and statutory interpretation and ensuring more predictable and just Indian law adjudication.

This Article argues that McGirt—and its embrace of Muskrat Textualism—is a sea change in federal Indian law, and rightfully so. If that is the case, then cases like Oliphant should be reconsidered and tossed into the dustbin of history.

TICA/Ariz. State Bar — Lunch In Indian Country CLE: Supreme Court Update [Feb. 23]

Here. Register.

Mmmm . . . lunch.

SCOTUS Holds Brackeen and Oklahoma’s McGirt Petitions, Other Petitions Denied

Today’s order list.

The petitions in Haggerty, Stand Up, GRE Six Nations, and Tanner were all denied (see prior post).

The court also denied three McGirt-related petitions from Oklahoma prisoners:

Parish Petition/Amicus/BIO/Reply

Davis Petition

Compelleebee Petition

We’ll just keep waiting.