An excerpt: “The tribes in states with vendor-based sales taxes should be alert to this impending problem should the Court deny a review of the case. To be forewarned is to be forearmed.”
From global challenges such as climate change and mass extinction, to local challenges such as toxic spills and undrinkable water, environmental degradation and the impairment of Earth systems are well documented. Yet, despite this reality, the U.S. federal government has done little in the last thirty years to provide a comprehensive solution to these profound environmental challenges; likewise, significant state action is lacking. In this vacuum, environmental legal advocates are looking for innovative environmental solutions to these challenges. Against this backdrop, rights of nature have increasingly gained traction as a possible legal tool to help protect the natural environment from the harms perpetrated by humans. Rights of nature laws generally have two elements: (1) legal personhood for natural entities, such that nature has standing in court, and (2) substantive rights for natural entities. This Article explores the scope and origins of rights of nature and examines how they are being implemented both within the United States and abroad. It highlights the work being done by Tribes and Indigenous Peoples in this space and argues that, particularly in the United States, state and local governments should learn from this work. Specifically, the work of Tribes in this space can serve as alternative ethical paradigms and laws for non-Native communities looking for an alternative to the status quo. In the United States, Tribes can serve as “laboratories” for environmental change given their tribal sovereignty and environmental ethics. In addition, Tribes exist within a different legal framework from U.S. states and municipalities. By comparing rights of nature-related litigation in Florida and in the White Earth Nation of Ojibwe, it becomes clear that rights of nature provisions adopted by Tribes stand a greater chance of withstanding legal challenge than provisions adopted by municipalities. Accordingly, environmental reform can benefit from the collaboration and experimentation of Tribes.
In addition to its stunning internal flaws, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta exemplifies Indian law’s broader flaws as a jurisprudence. Castro-Huerta holds that states have concurrent criminal jurisdiction with federal and tribal governments over crimes by non-Indians against Indians on reservation lands. Justice Gorsuch deftly addresses many of the glaring internal flaws in Kavanaugh’s majority opinion, but not all. He does not dissect the hollow assertion that reservations are part of the surrounding state both geographically and politically. This cannot go unaddressed, particularly given its weak analysis, misguided use of precedent, and broader consequences.
Castro-Huerta’s holding affects the precise kind of “jurisdictional overlap” at the root of the slow erosion of tribal sovereignty over time, as first explained in a prior article. The Founders believed two governments generally cannot co-exist, i.e. overlap. They had a firm idea of what happens when jurisdictional overlap occurs: one government slowly subsumes the other over time until nothing meaningful is left, here labeled “competitive sovereign erosion.” The Founding Fathers believed this proposition so much and feared it so deeply that it played a central role in how the Constitution was written, specifically the categorical division of authority between the federal and state governments. Tribal sovereignty will continue to be vulnerable to competitive sovereign erosion until a solution is reached that results in either a respect for tribal borders, or a qualitative division of governmental authority between tribal governments, the federal government, and the states. Anything less will continue the long-term war of sovereign attrition historically experienced by tribes.
Analyzing Indian law as a competitive sovereign erosion problem of the sort contemplated by the Framers and discussing it in terms of United States federalism has additional jurisprudential and advocacy advantages. Doing so disconnects Indian law from the tortured logic exemplified by Castro used to reach anti-Indian results, and reconnects it to the intuitively fair, commonly accepted, and historically effective answers used when White cultures have had the same kinds of problems. From an advocacy perspective, competitive erosion adopts a conceptual framework and lexicon that resonates with conservatives commonly opposed to tribal sovereignty. Using competitive erosion can present tribal sovereignty in a way that persuadable conservatives can embrace.
Tribes wanting to maintain their separate existence need to overturn the assertion that reservations are part of the state, oppose practices that give the appearance of being part of state government, and push congress for legislation that will eliminate jurisdictional overlap between tribes, states, and the federal government.
While we wait for Brackeen, I wanted to highlight this story from Colorado, where the Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel has been doing great work on ICWA cases. In this case, they have collected incredibly useful data on what happens to a child protection case when foster parents intervene. This article is not ICWA specific, but the last two cases the MSU Indian Law Clinic has had on appeal are a direct result of the attempt at foster parents to intervene. In both cases, the court and agency agreed with the tribes and followed ICWA. In both cases, the foster parents sought to intervene and appealed the case. As we look past Brackeen, addressing this issue of foster parent intervention generally is vital.
According to data provided by the ORPC foster parent intervention has increased in Colorado in the past decade. In 2020, 10% of Dependency and Neglect cases had Intervenors. When foster parents intervene, the chance of reunification decreases from 62% to 22% for the birth parents.
emphasis added
According to the ORPC, the average Dependency and Neglect Case costs $3,500 to litigate, but when foster parents intervene the average court cost goes up to $7,500.
Thousands of Indigenous women and girls have gone missing or have been found murdered across the United States and Canada; these disappearances and killings are so frequent and widespread that they have become known as the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women Crisis (MMIW Crisis). Indigenous communities in both countries often lack the jurisdiction to prosecute violent crimes committed by non-Indigenous offenders against Indigenous victims on Indigenous land. Extractive industries—businesses that establish natural resource extraction projects—aggravate the problem by establishing temporary housing for large numbers of non-Indigenous, primarily male workers on or around Indigenous land (“man camps”). Violent crimes against Indigenous communities around extractive industry projects have in- creased with the establishment of man camps while the current legal systems leave Indigenous communities vulnerable against this clear threat. Both the United States and Canada have endorsed international declarations of Indigenous rights, agreeing to protect Indigenous communities from violence, yet the MMIW Crisis in both countries con- tinues. This Note first argues that both the United States and Canada can best further their commitments to international Indigenous rights while also combatting the MMIW Crisis by allowing Indigenous communities to exercise full criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous assailants of Indigenous victims on Indigenous lands. This Note then argues that, until full criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous offenders is realized, the United States and Canada can help further Indigenous international rights by providing extractive industries with financial incentives to address their role in enabling the MMIW Crisis.
We don’t post many of these post-McGirt prisoner cases, but this is exemplary of the numerous rejected habeas petitions filed by prisoners claiming to be Indian and convicted of crimes inside of Indian country. This person was convicted of a crime in 2001. This was his fifth habeas petition, filed in 2023, and the first raising McGirt-related claims. This footnote is as close as these late habeas petitioners get to relief:
We note that another Oklahoma prisoner also successfully made the same argument as Mr. McGirt, which the Supreme Court recognized in its decision. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460 (“While Oklahoma state courts have rejected any suggestion that the lands in question remain a reservation, the Tenth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion.” (citing Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 907-09, 966 (10th Cir. 2017)). In Murphy, we issued a writ of habeas corpus after agreeing with the petitioner that he should not have been tried in state court but instead “should have been tried in federal court because he is an Indian and the offense occurred in Indian country.” 875 F.3d at 903.
It’s not much, eh? Remember Oklahoma in 2017-18?
Oklahoma’s cert petition in Royal v. Murphy (later Sharp v. Murphy).
Maybe yes (maybe?) on the pending prosecutions, but not so much the existing convictions, eh? Hmmmm.
Turtle Talk 
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