attorney fees – Page 5

North Dakota SCT Awards Attorney Fees to Defendants in Indian Country Tort Claim Brought in State Court

February 17, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in Tillich v. Bruce.

An excerpt:

Don Bruce, Vinier Davis, and Linda Davis (“Defendants”) appeal from a judgment granting their motion to dismiss and denying their request for attorney fees. We reverse the district court’s denial of the Defendants’ request for attorney fees under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) and remand for calculation of attorney fees based upon accepted factors and order the district court award attorney fees to the Defendants.

Briefs:

1.	Tillich v. Bruce – Appellee Brief
	*Abstract:* Argument date: Oct. 2016. Topic: Torts (Negligence, Liab., Nuis.). Judge: Hon. M. Richard Geiger.

2.	Tillich v. Bruce – Appellant Brief
	*Abstract:* Argument date: Oct. 2016. Topic: Torts (Negligence, Liab., Nuis.). Judge: Hon. M. Richard Geiger.

3.	Tillich v. Bruce – Reply Brief
	*Abstract:* Argument date: Oct. 2016. Topic: Torts (Negligence, Liab., Nuis.). Judge: Hon. M. Richard Geiger.

First Circuit Rejects Narragansett Interlocutory Appeal in Sovereign Immunity Matter (Waited Too Long to Appeal Denial of Motion for Reconsideration)

June 1, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe:

CA1 Opinion

An excerpt:

Surveying the foregoing, a prior duty panel of this court cleared the underbrush by dismissing as untimely any appeal from the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 14-1106, Order at 1 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2014). That decision obviates the need to decide whether we would have had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the Motion to Dismiss. We do need to decide, though, whether we have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the only order before us: the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) Motion. For the reasons described below, we conclude that the denial of the Tribe’s untimely Rule 59(e) Motion does not qualify as a collateral order that we may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court.

Briefs here.

First Circuit Briefs in Luckerman v. Narragansett Tribe

March 27, 2015April 14, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Narrangansett Brief

Luckerman Brief

Narragansett Reply

Lower court materials here.

Another Fight over Attorneys Fees in Cobell Settlement

February 6, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Boyd v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton (D. D.C.):

1-1 D.C. Court Complaint

7 Gingold Motion to Dismiss

11 Kilpatrick Townsend Motion to Dismiss

13 Boyd Motion to Remand

21 Boyd Opposition to Gingold Motion

22 Boyd Opposition to Kilpatrick Motion

25 Gingold Opposition to Motion for Remand

26 Kilpatrick Reply

27 Kilpatrick Opposition to Motion for Remand

28 Gingold Reply

30 Boyd Reply to Gingold Opposition

31 Boyd Reply to Kilpatrick Opposition

32 DCT Order Remanding Case to D.C. Court

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Boyd, president of the National Black Farmers Association, fought for more than two decades to remedy discrimination against minority farmers. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10 [Dkt. #1], The facts of this particular case stem from his lobbying efforts on behalf of Native American class members in their discrimination suit against the federal government, Cobell v. Salazar, Civil Action No. 1:96-cv-01285-TFH (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2009) (“Cobell“). See Compl. ¶ 25. The class members in Cobell were represented by, among others, defendants Gingold and Kilpatrick. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. In March 2010, plaintiff was asked by John Loving, a government relationship advisor at defendant Kilpatrick, to lobby in support of legislative funding for the Cobell settlement. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff agreed and continued his lobbying efforts. See Compl. ¶ 31. Later that same month, the House of Representatives passed the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (“CRA”), an appropriations bill that, if enacted, would provide settlement funds for Cobell class members. Compl. ¶ 30. In June 2010, plaintiff informed defendant Gingold “that he expected to be paid for his efforts to secure funding.” Compl. [3] ¶ 43. Defendant Gingold promised that “Mr. Boyd would be compensated,” but did not specify “how much and when” plaintiff would be paid. Compl. ¶ 43. The CRA became law in December 2010. Compl. ¶ 4.

On May 6, 2014, plaintiff, a Virginia resident, filed suit against defendants in the D.C. Superior Court alleging unjust enrichment, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and quantum meruit. See generally Compl. On May 27, 2014, defendant Gingold, a Maryland resident, removed the action to this Court, claiming that defendant Kilpatrick, a Virginia resident, had been fraudulently joined to destroy diversity jurisdiction. See generally Notice of Removal [Dkt. #1]

Attorney Fee Order in Velie & Velie v. United Keetoowah Band

August 27, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

2013-08-21 AttyFeeOrder

Prior post here.

Lannan Foundation v. Gingold et al. — Fight over Cobell Settlement Attorney Fees

July 17, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the news coverage from BLT, which includes this link to the complaint.

Colorado Order Granting Summary Judgment Against Butch Webb Reinstated

May 24, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Amended Order Reinstating the Courts April 15, 2013 Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Prior post here.

Denver District Court Rejects Western Sky Financial’s Assertion of Tribal Immunity (and Issues Sanctions for Asserting It)

April 17, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in State ex rel. Suthers v. Western Sky Financial LLC:

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

An excerpt:

Accordingly, because Defendants’ business activities are conducted off-reservation and because Defendants solicit and advertise their business in Colorado and have, in fact, entered into loan agreements with Colorado citizens, Defendants are not entitled to tribal immunity or federal preemption. Rather, based on the undisputed facts before the Court, the Court concludes that Defendants are subject to the Code’s previsions and are thereby liable for any violation thereof. Specifically, because Western Sky is not, and has never been, licensed as a supervised lender, and because unlicensed lenders are not authorized to charge a finance charge on supervised loans, Defendants’ liability for restitution to consumers of all finance charges, including penalties, on all unlicensed loans made or collected with respect to Colorado citizens, is established as a matter of law.

And, on the sanctions:

Accordingly, because Defendants tribal immunity and federal preemption arguments lack substantial justification, the State is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees expended in replying to Defendants Response insofar as the State can establish the reasonable fees incurred in addressing Defendants’ tribal immunity and preemption arguments.