We hold that Ex parte Young applies to the plaintiffs’ fishing-rights claims against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) officials— but not against the DEC itself—because the plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation of federal law and seek prospective relief against state officials. We also hold that the plaintiffs have Article III standing to seek prospective relief and that Younger abstention no longer bars Silva from seeking prospective relief because his criminal proceedings have ended. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the DEC officials on the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the discrimination claims because there is no evidence in the record that would permit an inference of discriminatory intent.
1. In view of Sherrill, whether New York tribes exercise “concurrent” jurisdiction over fee lands within the plenary taxing and regulatory authority of the state and local governments, thereby enabling those tribes to engage in gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), and cause the same or greater disruptions of settled expectations condemned by this Court in Sherrill.
2. Whether fee lands under plenary state and local taxation and regulation (per Sherrill) constitute “Indian lands” under IGRA because those lands are located within the Cayugas’ historic reservation.
3. Whether the Cayuga Nation’s ancient reservation was disestablished.
1. Whether Connecticut impermissibly regulates or controls conduct beyond the boundaries of the State in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause when, as a condition of allowing a manufacturer’s products to be sold in the state, Connecticut forces the manufacturer to obtain and provide private sales and shipping information possessed by non-Connecticut distributors doing no business in Connecticut and having no nexus with Connecticut.
2. Whether Connecticut violates Due Process protections when it bans a manufacturer’s products from being sold in the state, if the manufacturer fails to obtain and provide to Connecticut private sales and shipping information possessed by non-Connecticut distributors relating to their distribution of products in jurisdictions other than Connecticut.
3. Whether Connecticut violates the Supremacy Clause when, as a condition of allowing a manufacturer’s products to be sold in the state, Connecticut forces the manufacturer to obtain and provide private sales and shipping information possessed by non-Connecticut distributors who conduct no business in Connecticut nor distribute the manufacturer’s products to, or in, Connecticut.
This Court is presented with a question of first impression, as to the taxability of income derived from the sale of sand and gravel, mined from treatyprotected land by an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation of Indians (“Seneca Nation”). Upon the granting of certiorari, the Court will examine the language in two federal treaties, promising not to disturb the “free use and enjoyment” of lands by the Seneca Nation and “their Indian friends residing thereon and united with them,” and protecting these lands “from all taxes” for any purpose. Treaty with the Six Nations (“Canandaigua Treaty”), art. III, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 45; Treaty with the Senecas (“1842 Treaty”), art. 9th, May 20, 1842, 7 Stat. 590. Congress has explicitly stated the Internal Revenue Code “shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 894 (a)(1)(West).
The question presented is whether the United States Court of Appeals and the United States Tax Court have given “due regards” to the treaty obligations of the United States by finding these treaties had no textual support for an exemption from federal income tax applicable to an enrolled Seneca member whose income is derived from the lands of the Seneca Nation. Perkins v. Comm’r, 970 F.3d 148, 162-67 (2d. Cir. 2020).