Here is the order in Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nason (D.D.C.):
Prior post here.
Here are the materials in Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Hendrickson (D. R.I.):
Here is the complaint Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Federal Highway Administration (D.R.I.):
The Tribe brings this action to challenge the termination of a programmatic agreement(“PA”) entered into pursuant to the regulations of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). The termination of the PA occurred after substantial construction had taken place on the project for which the PA was meant to address and resolve the adverse effects of the project on historic properties to the signatories’ satisfaction. The termination of the PA after substantial work had been performed on the project, and the subsequent final decision of the Federal Highway Association (“FHWA”) was arbitrary and capricious.
Here is the opinion in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe:
Surveying the foregoing, a prior duty panel of this court cleared the underbrush by dismissing as untimely any appeal from the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 14-1106, Order at 1 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2014). That decision obviates the need to decide whether we would have had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the Motion to Dismiss. We do need to decide, though, whether we have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the only order before us: the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) Motion. For the reasons described below, we conclude that the denial of the Tribe’s untimely Rule 59(e) Motion does not qualify as a collateral order that we may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court.