Update in Baby Veronica Case: S. Carolina SCT Denies Reconsideration

South Carolina Supreme Court Denies Rights to Baby Veronica;
National Native Organizations to Advance Civil Rights Lawsuit
 
Washington, DC – The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled today to deny the appeal filed by Dusten Brown and the Cherokee Nation of the Court’s July 17 order to expedite the transfer of custody of Veronica Brown to the South Carolina-based adoptive couple. One year ago, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that denying the adoption and awarding custody to Dusten Brown was in Veronica’s best interests. Today, that same Court summarily reversed that decision based on a two-year-old record and without providing a hearing for Veronica. Jacqueline Pata, executive director of the National Congress of American Indians issued the following statement in response to today’s ruling:
 
“The South Carolina Supreme Court has utterly failed to evaluate Veronica’s current best interests in this case and confirmed our worst fears – when it comes to Veronica Brown, standard adoption procedures do not apply. Apparently, the Court believes that there is no need to require the family court to hold a formal and thoughtful hearing to determine what is in Veronica Brown’s best interest. Like thousands of Native American children before her, Veronica now faces the prospect of being removed from her Cherokee family, without a formal consideration of her needs, her culture and her well-being. This is an alarming failure of the judicial system, and it represents a grave threat to all children in adoption proceedings, but most notably Native American children, who deserve all the legal protections, afforded any child in this nation.”  
 
“The National Congress of American Indians refuses to stand by as the rights of this child are violated.  Together with the Native American Rights Fund and the National Indian Child Welfare Association we are preparing to file litigation in order to protect Veronica’s civil rights.  On behalf of all Native American children, we will pursue every legal option available to us to ensure that standard adoption procedures are upheld in this case.” 
 
“Let me add that I believe the South Carolina Supreme Court has shown willful disregard for the facts when it claims Dusten Brown has not been involved in the life of his daughter. On the contrary, Dusten Brown has gone to extensive lengths to maintain his family and to care for Veronica. The Court’s willingness to ignore these facts and rush a resolution in this matter is deeply troubling. “

Cherokee Nation Tribal Court Grants Custody to Father’s Wife and Father’s Parents in Baby Veronica Matter

Tulsa World article here.

Split South Carolina SCT Order Immediate Transfer of Custody of Baby Veronica

Here (South Carolina SCt Opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl PDF).

Cherokee Nation release.

News coverage here.

SCOTUSblog coverage here.

NPR coverage here.

Slate coverage here.

Adoptive Couple Seeks Immediate SCT Mandate in Baby Vernonica Case

SCOTUS blog has coverage here.

Adoptive Couple’s application is here.

Dusten Brown’s opposition is here.

Alex Pearl on Dusten Brown’s Blood Quantum, which apparently is 3/256

Here. Highly recommended.

An excerpt:

Baby Veronica is, or is eligible for, enrollment as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.  By the way, the Cherokee Nation isn’t like your local public library—not just anyone can join.  It’s like the United States.  Not everyone can join us here—the U.S. has citizenship requirements.  It would be unintelligible to say that someone is 3/256 American, right?  You either are or are not a citizen of a nation.  The usage of blood quantum in this way by the Majority conflates Indian identity and tribal citizenship.

Collection of Reactions on Baby Girl Case

Casey Family Programs

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (video)

NCAI

NICWA Initial Statement (pdf)

NICWA Legal Analysis (pdf) (Includes an excellent point about state laws, and one we’ve been considering here as well)

Terry Cross Statement

NARF

The Atlantic, Andrew Cohen

Minnesota Public Radio (with Colette Routel)

NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)

Washington Post

Will add more as they come up.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl First Impressions

In a split 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, with a strong dissent from Justice Sotomayor, the Court limited ICWA, but did not eliminate it. The Court is unwilling to go so far as Justice Thomas would like, and find the statute unconstitutional. *12 (Thomas, J. concurring). Instead, the decision turns on dictionary definitions of “continued” *8, and “breakup” *12, finding that 1912(f) (involuntary termination) does not apply to the father, as he did not have physical custody of Baby Girl, nor legal custody under state law. *11. In addition, 1912(d) (active efforts) does not apply to Baby Girl’s adoption. *13. The Court reads the statute to apply to “intact” Indian families. *9. While not an endorsement of the judicially created existing Indian family exception, this opinion will not provide assistance in pushing back against it, at least in the context of non-custodial fathers. The decision is a set back, and a devastating blow to the family, but it’s also not the end of ICWA. Figuring out how the ultimate custody decision will turn out is difficult, not the least of which because under the Court’s own definition, there is NOW an “intact” Indian family.

The Court’s reading of 1912(a), the active efforts provision, is troubling. While quick to note that active efforts are a “sensible requirement when applied to state social workers,” *14 the Court finds it would be “unusual” to apply it to these facts. As anticipated, the Court’s concern for adoptive parents trumped that of the rights of children or biological parents. The question of how to apply 1912(a) comes up often in the context of guardianships and adoptions. This decision will make it harder to argue when states and agencies don’t want to apply 1912(a) to guardianships as well.

The placement preference provisions of 1915(a) for adoptions remains intact. A family within the preferences must “formally” seek to adopt the child for the preferences to be applicable. How this will apply in practice will depend on the court, I imagine. When does the adoptive family have to be known? How far in advance? Justice Sotomayor points out that if Baby Girl’s grandparents want to adopt her, under this decision the South Carolina court must consider them under the placement preferences. *25 (Sotomayor J. dissenting).

The Court remains suspicious of tribal citizenship, talking about remote ancestors *16 and listing Baby Girl’s blood quantum in the first sentence of the opinion. *1. The Court calls it the father’s “ICWA trump card.” *16. Finally, it is not often the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families is called “mischief.” *9 (“mischief” that continues, see the disproportionality reports out recently).

In dissent, Justice Scalia writes that the opinion “needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood.” *1. Justice Sotomayor, however, writes  explicitly that the Court’s decision is based on policy differences with Congress, *2, *8 (Sotomayor, dissenting). She also disagrees with the United States in its amicus brief, FN5, as part of her reading of the statute as a whole, rather than discrete parts. *3.

Her scathing footnote 8, which ends with her requesting examples of women who go through the trouble of giving birth via sperm donors giving the child up for adoption, injects the common sense anger and frustration this case has caused among those who have followed it closely. She addresses head on the Court’s references to blood quantum, wondering why it is needed if there are no constitutional concerns. *23-4. And finally, her, yes, empathetic paragraph of what can befall a family and that ICWA’s protections should apply to them provides a perspective missing from the majority opinion on down to many state courts. *23. ICWA does not only apply to the child removed improperly by the “culturally insensitive” social worker from an “intact” Indian family. It applies beyond that, to the families most in need of the law, ensuring the protection and health of the child, her contact with her family, her extended family, and her tribe. This narrow version of ICWA endorsed by the Court today, and evidenced regularly in family courts, does not help that child.

Supreme Court Reverses and Remands South Carolina Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Opinion here. Written by Justice Alito.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and BREY- ER, J., filed concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KA- GAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.

***

This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classi- fied as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her biological father, who had attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who had no prior contact with the child. The provisions of the federal statute at issue here do not demand this result.
Contrary to the State Supreme Court’s ruling, we hold that 25 U. S. C. §1912(f )—which bars involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s “continued custody” of the child— does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody of the child. We further hold that §1912(d)— which conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the “breakup of the Indian family”—is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we clarify that §1915(a), which provides placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child. We accordingly reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Previous coverage here.

Commentary to follow.

ICT’s Baby Veronica Series, Part II

Another article in this excellent series.

Here.

“The birth mother knew I was Cherokee, she knew I was a tribal member, she knew my birth date and she knew how to spell my name,” said Brown matter-of-factly. “Look, we’ve known each other since we were 16. We were engaged. She absolutely knew all of my vital information. And she gave [the attorney and the tribe] the wrong information [hoping to keep the adoption secret].”

ICT’s Baby Veronica Coverage: The Brown Family Perspective

Here.

This much is clear: If one did not know that this small family was at the center of one of the most important Indian law cases in the last 30 years, the Browns would seem like any other family at 6 o’clock in America. Two tired parents, a three-year-old with endless energy, dinner on the stove, dogs yapping, geese squawking and a house in the middle of remodeling. In military-speak, they are squared away.