We posted the cert stage briefs here.
Lower court materials here.
District court materials here.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
Fourth Circuit’s Decision in Moses v. CashCall
Here are the materials:
Amicus Brief — Bankruptcy Attys
Amicus Brief — Chapter 13 Trustees
An excerpt:
This bankruptcy appeal presents the issue of whether two claims, one for declaratory relief and one for money damages, asserted by debtor Oteria Moses in an adversary proceeding, are subject to arbitration. The bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction over the first claim and denied the motion of CashCall, Inc. to compel arbitration. With respect to the second claim, it made recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, likewise to retain jurisdiction over the claim and deny the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal from the bankruptcy court, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration as to the first claim and, itself, denied the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the second claim.On appeal, we hold, for the reasons given by Judge Niemeyer in Parts I, II.A, and III of his opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined, that the district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion to retain in bankruptcy Moses’ first claim for declaratory relief. We also hold, however, that the district court erred in retaining in bankruptcy Moses’ claim for damages under the North Carolina Debt Collection Act and denying CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration of that claim. Judge Gregory and Judge Davis wrote separate opinions concurring in that judgment. Judge Niemeyer wrote a separate opinion on that issue, dissenting.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions to grant CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration on Moses’ second claim for damages.
Western Sky Financial v. Jackson Cert Stage Materials
Here:
Western Sky v Jackson Cert Petition
Questions presented:
I. Whether the validity of an arbitration clause is determined exclusively by the statutory requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), as held by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits – or by a common-law “reasonableness” test, as held by the Seventh Circuit below?
II. Whether a court may apply a state law defense in a manner that disfavors arbitration by voiding an entire arbitration clause merely because the contractually-designated arbitrator is unavailable, notwithstanding the FAA’s express directive to appoint a substitute arbitrator?
III. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously – and in conflict with the Second and Eighth Circuits – required a non-tribal-member’s physical entry onto the relevant Indian reservation in connection with a transaction with a tribal member before ordering tribal court exhaustion of judicial claims arising from the transaction?
Lower court materials here.
CashCall v. Inetianbor Cert Stage Briefs
Here:
Questions presented:
I. Whether there is a non-textual “integrality exception” to the mandatory requirement in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) that a substitute arbitrator “shall” be appointed by the court whenever the parties’ chosen arbitrator is unavailable for “any … reason”? 9 U.S.C. § 5.
Materials in Eleventh Circuit Appeal re: Class Action against Western Sky & Cashcall
Here are the materials in Parnell v. Cashcall Inc.:
Lower court materials here:
18-1 Cashcall Motion re Forum Non Conveniens
19-1 Cashcall Motion to Compel Arbitration
21 Parnell Response to Motion to Compel
22 Parnell Response to Motion re Forum
24 Cashcall Reply re Motion to Compel
Eleventh Circuit Affirms Inetianbor v. Cashcall
Here is the opinion. An excerpt:
This appeal arises out of a disagreement between Abraham Inetianbor, who borrowed money at a high interest rate, and CashCall, Inc., the servicer of Mr. Inetianbor’s loan. Mr. Inetianbor filed a lawsuit against CashCall, which then sought to compel arbitration based on the loan agreement. The District Court ultimately refused to compel arbitration because the arbitration agreement in the loan document contained a forum selection clause that was integral to the agreement, and the specified forum was not available to arbitrate the dispute. CashCall appeals that decision here. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
Briefs here:
Lower court materials here.
Tribal Justice Frank Pommersheim Goes Digital: 25 Years as a Tribal Judge
En Banc Petition in Jackson v. Payday Financial LLC
Seventh Circuit Rules against Western Sky in Jackson v. Payday Financial LLC — A Warning to Indian Country
Here is the opinion:
Based on these findings, we now conclude that the Plaintiffs’ action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. We also cannot accept the Loan Entities’ alternative argument for upholding the district court’s dismissal: that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation. As the Supreme Court has explained, most recently in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. The Loan Entities have not established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal courts is not required. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the district court’s dismissal on this alternative basis.
Primary briefs here. Supplemental briefs here.
As should be expected by this time, payday lending in Indian country is creating bad law for tribal interests. This case involved a privately owned payday lending operation. Tribally-owned operations will be scrambling to distinguish themselves from this case. Particularly troublesome is the holding and (hopefully) dicta from the opinion that suggests tribal courts have no jurisdiction involving off-reservation lending operations, even though the operation is based in Indian country and even though the lending instrument includes a forum selection clause naming a tribal forum.
My initial recommendations to tribal leaders and counsel — shut down on-reservation-based payday lending operations operated privately immediately. My second recommendation is to ensure that tribal regulations of tribally owned payday lending operations are independent and robust. In other words, tribes must be able to withstand the kind of searching inquiry into their regulatory scheme that the federal court did in this case. Can tribal sovereign lenders say that?
Turtle Talk 
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