Here are the materials in Tonkawa Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Scientific Games Corporation (N.D. Ill.):
Here are the materials in Dinger v. Wishenko (N.D. Ill.):
Materials in the related Federal Tort Claims Act case, Dinger v. United States (D. Kan.):
Here is the complaint in Consumer Financial Protection Board v. Golden Valley Lending (N.D. Ill.):
Here are the materials in Native American Arts v. Peter Stone Co. (N.D. Ill.):
In that briefing, the defendant’s primary position was that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from establishing standing. Its secondary position was that plaintiff did not qualify as an Indian arts and crafts organization under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (“IACA”), 25 U.S.C. § 305 IACA. Both arguments were rejected as non-starters. Native Am. Arts, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74187, 2015 WL 3561439, at *5-7. An intemperate opponent might have called them frivolous, but the mere fact that a position is a loser does not make it frivolous.
As for this time, however, it’s worth noting that the defendant was unable to mount a challenge to plaintiff’s standing until six years into this litigation; that tends to further undermine defendant’s position that this was an obvious flaw in the plaintiff’s suit and one that plaintiff should have readily conceded and should have dropped its suit early on. Indeed, if it were such a frivolous suit it would seem that defendant could have put together a successful motion for summary judgment based on the standing issue some time ago, thereby avoiding many of the costs and expenses of which it now complains.
Here are the materials and order in the matter of MCZ Development Corp. et. al. v. Dickinson Wright PLLC et. al.:
Doc. 37- Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Doc. 38- Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Doc. 39- Reply in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Doc. 42- Memorandum Opinion and Order
Complaint and news coverage previously posted here.
Kialegee Casino Developers sued Dickinson Wright PLLC in Illinois District Court for malpractice in 2013. In 2012, The Northern District of Oklahoma issued a preliminary injunction against Plaintiffs to stop a casino being placed 70 miles from the Tribe’s headquarters and the National Indian Gaming Commission issued a letter stating the Tribe didn’t have jurisdiction on the property. The Plaintiffs alleged the law firm misrepresented potential opposition to their casino.
The Illinois court ruled the NIGC claim was premature since its letter didn’t represent a final agency decision and also dismissed the complaint with prejudice because Plaintiffs prevailed when the 10th Circuit reversed the injunction and ordered Oklahoma’s case dismissed.
Memorandum Opinion and Order Here
Taking the facts in the Complaint as true, Defendants actions were far from routine — they were unprecedented. At a minimum, the University’s conduct here was not routine in relation to the other professors who were all appointed summarily and without individual consideration. The Complaint alleges that never before has the Board or University singled out a professor for similar treatment in response to extramural speech on a matter of public concern. The only difference between Dr. Salaita and the other 120 professors who were treated differently appears to be Dr. Salaita’s tweets. This increases the plausibility of Dr. Salaita’s conspiracy claim generally and his specific claim that he was being punished for his speech.
Here is the complaint in Native American Arts Inc. v. Walmart Inc. (N.D. Ill.):
Here are the materials in Kemph v. Reddam (N.D. Ill.):
Plaintiffs’ argument that the loan agreements are unconscionable because JAMS and AAA would never agree to preside over the arbitration is speculative and unconvincing. (See Resp. at 2—3, 13—14; Sur-Reply at 1—3.) Although the arbitration agreements provide that “the arbitrator will apply the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation,” (Agreement at 5), the arbitrator, once chosen, would have the authority to determine whether that choice-of-law provision is valid. See Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (holding that once the court determines the validity of the arbitration provision, the remainder of the contract is left for the arbitrator to decide); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995)(ruling that the arbitrator should decide choice-of-law in the first instance); CNA Reinsurance Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., No. 01 C 1652, 2001 WL 648948, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2001); see also Prostyakov v. Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 725 (7th Cir. 2008)(upholding the arbitrator’s interpretation of the choice-of-law clause because it was not the court’s “place to determine whether [the arbitrator’s] interpretation was correct as a matter of law”). This is particularly true because, as discussed, the loan agreements explicitly provide that the arbitrator can decide “any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of . . . the Arbitration agreement,” which includes  the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause. (Agreement at 4.) Therefore, potential arbitrators need not refuse the dispute in order to comply with internal due process standards. Nor would they be required to violate Illinois public policy by applying tribal law if they chose to accept it. They could instead accept the dispute, find the choice-of-law provision is unenforceable, and determine what default law should apply.