Interesting series of cases about a litigious dude (news coverage):
District of Montana
Federal Court Refuses to Order BIA to Declare Wind River Reservation Dirt Road a “Public Road”
Here is that opinion, captioned Pine Bar Ranch LLC v. Acting Director, BIA (D. Mont.):
DCT Order Dismissing Pine Bar Ranch Complaint
An excerpt:
Indeed, a contrary result could run afoul of tribal sovereignty. “The power to exercise tribal civil authority over non-Indians derives not only from the tribe’s inherent powers necessary to self-government and territorial management, but also from the power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land.” Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141–44, 102 S.Ct. 894, 903–05, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982). Furthermore, it is well settled that a tribe may “place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct …, [and] nonmember[s] who [enter] the jurisdiction of the tribe [remain] “subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise [this] sovereign power.” Merrion at 144–45 (footnote omitted).
On January 12, 2011, the Tribes passed Tribal Resolution Number 2010–10277 reaffirming the non-public status of the road and stating that “the unpaved portion of Surrell Creek Road is not a public road or otherwise accessible to any member of the public without the permission of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes.” Doc. No, 20–7.
Especially in view of tribal sovereignty, the BIA had no direct statutory mandate to declare Surrell Creek Road public. Therefore, under the APA, there is no required agency action for this Court to “compel” or “hold unlawful and set aside.” Consequently, the Court is without jurisdiction, no material issue of fact remains and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Federal Court Dismisses Action to Enjoin Tribal Court Action for Failure to Exhaust Tribal Remedies
Here are the materials in City of Wolf Point v. Mail (D. Mont.):
City Motion for Default Judgment
DCT Order Dismissing City Complaint
From the opinion:
This action, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, was brought by the City of Wolf Point, Mayor DeWayne Jager, Wolf Point Police Commissioners, Wolf Point City Council, Police Chief Jeff Harada, and Troy Melum (collectively “City”) against Julianne Mail (“Mail”) and Alyssa Eagle Boy (“Eagle Boy”). It was filed on the heels of commencement of suit by Mail and Eagle Boy in Fort Peck Tribal Court against the Plaintiffs here, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, legal fees, and costs for claims under tribal law arising from an alleged altercation between Mail, Eagle Boy, and Troy Melum, who is characterized as a City of Wolf Point Animal Control Officer. Plaintiffs seek a judgment of dismissal of the pending tribal court case on subject matter jurisdiction grounds.
Morrison v. Spang — Civil Rights Suit against N. Cheyenne Officials Dismissed by Federal Court
Challenge to Crow Tribal Court Jurisdiction Dismissed on Exhaustion Grounds
Federal Court Enforces Tribal Court Order re: Foreclosure of Indian Property
Here are the materials in Citizens Bank v. Wellman (D. Mont.):
Wellman Motion for Summary Judgment
Citizens Motion for Summary Judgment
Interesting procedural history, though not pretty:
On March 9, 2000, Citizens instituted a mortgage foreclosure proceeding against Wellman in the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs on December 31, 2001. Sale of the mortgaged property, War Bonnet Inn, was ordered. Wellman appeal. On March 16, 2005, the Blackfeet Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and ordered foreclosure sale to proceed without further delay. Sale was carried out on May 31, 2005. Citizens purchased the property.
Civil Rights Claim by Crow Indians against FBI Dismissed
Mostly. One claim against an FBI officer remains.
The case is Cole v. FBI (D. Mont.): DCT Order Dismissing Cole Plaintiffs
The complaint is here: Cole Complaint.
Excerpts from news coverage here, via Pechanga:
Cebull agreed that the Coles and Springfield lacked standing to assert rights as individuals because they did not allege they had been the subject of discriminatory law enforcement. The link between injuries alleged by the plaintiffs and the alleged misconduct of the government employees was too weak to meet requirements for bringing a case, he said.
The court, however, held that the plaintiffs had standing to assert an equal-protection claim against Oravec and did not dismiss that claim.
Cebull agreed with Ostby that factual allegations “create an inference’’ that Oravec was “motivated by racial animus when conducting his investigation into the deaths of Steven Bearcrane and Robert Springfield.”
The plaintiffs alleged that Oravec had been heard to say that female American Indian victims of sexual assault “were asking for assault or words to that effect.” And, they claimed, Oravec tried to hinder crime investigations and that when the Coles visited the FBI offices to ask about the investigation into their son’s death, he attempted to intimidate Cletus Cole by taking him out of camera range and showing him his gun.
Morrison v. Spang — Tribal Court Exhaustion in ICRA Habeas Proceeding
Here are the materials from the District court in Montana:
Federal Court Dismisses Medical Claims against Northern Cheyenne Officials
Here is the opinion in Wallace v. N. Cheyenne Corrections Officers (D. Mont.) — Wallace v Northern Cheyenne Corrections Officers
An excerpt:
Frequently, prisoners bring denial of medical care claims in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983. But Wallace cannot establish that the tribal entities and officers acted “under color of state law,” as is required to state a claim under § 1983. “[N]o action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.” RJ Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983).
No ICRA Habeas Right in Tribal Criminal Contempt Fine
Here is the magistrate’s report in Boyd v. Fort Peck Tribes, adopted by the judge a few days ago — Boyd v Fort Peck Tribes R&R
An excerpt:
On September 10, 2009, Petitioner Roberta Boyd filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Petitioner is proceeding pro se.
The Fort Peck Tribal Court ordered Petitioner to pay a $500.00 fine for criminal contempt. Pet. (doc. 1) at 2 ¶¶ 3-4. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 “to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” The phrase “detention” has the same meaning as “custody” under28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. Imposition of a fine does not constitute custody or detention. Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791-92 (9th Cir.2001). The writ of habeas corpus is not available. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this action. It should be dismissed.
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