ICWA

Nebraska Supreme Court ICWA Decision: Active Efforts

Kate Fort

In re Micah H.

This case discusses how private parties (grandparents) can provide active efforts in a guardianship situation. This further develops this state case law in this area, most recently addressed in In re Micah H. (Neb. 2016), In re T.A.W. (Wash. 2016) and In re S.S. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017):

In this case, Tyler was counseled by Linda concerning his drug and alcohol problems. The record shows that Linda suggested
multiple treatment programs in which Tyler could seek rehabilitation for his addiction. However, Linda and Daniel had no control with regard to forcing Tyler to seek treatment.

The record demonstrates that Linda and Daniel discussed proper parenting techniques and interactions with small children. Further, Linda and Daniel assisted with scheduling visitation
and the implementation of a parenting plan. Tyler demonstrated no need for housing, financial support, or transportation
to unite with Micah. Despite Tyler’s numerous criminal convictions involving drugs and alcohol, Tyler maintained that he
does not suffer from drug or alcohol addiction.

With the exception of completing parenting classes while in prison, Tyler has not sought to actively participate in drug and alcohol treatment or support programs. In fact, Tyler has attended only one Alcoholics Anonymous meeting while in prison, at the invitation of another, and suggested to the court
below that his presence at the meeting was for the purpose of supporting others in the program.

Based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we find that Linda and Daniel undertook active efforts to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to unite Tyler and Micah.

Eighth Circuit Asks Defendants for Response to En Banc Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the order:

JUDGE ORDER:A petition for rehearing has been filed by the appellees in the above cases. The court requests a response to the petition. The response is limited to 3900 words and must contain a word count certificate. The response should be filed electronically. Response due on 11/08/2018 by Appellants Mark Vargo, Craig Pfeifle and Lisa Fleming. Hrg Feb 2018 [4720385] [17-1135, 17-1136, 17-1137] (JPP)

The petition is here.

 

Brookings Institute on the Separation of Families

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here

My research has failed to uncover a single example of how removing control, jurisdiction, or authority from tribal governments improves outcomes for the AIAN population. While tribal governments are not perfect by any means, it cannot be shown with any credibility that removal of tribal government authority has improved outcomes for the American Indian population – not in policing, governance, education policy, environmental protection, or civil jurisdiction – and certainly not for child welfare.

Texas v. Zinke (ICWA Challenge) Page Updated

ilpc1 Comment

Court documents, press statements, and news articles all organized here.

Provide Comments on WI Pro Hac Vice for ICWA Attorneys Pending Rule

Kate Fort

Well, since I did the California post yesterday on this, multiple people from Wisconsin reminded me that we all need to submit supportive comments there. Many thanks to NL for spelling it out in an email so I can just cut and paste it here (ie making it easy for me):

Over in Wisconsin, we have a pending ICWA pro hoc vice rule petition that could use some more supporting comments, especially from adjacent states!  You can find the petition here (https://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/1804.htm).

The process for submitting a comment is as follows:

To submit a comment:

I. Submitting a comment to a rules petition
A comment to a pending rule petition shall be submitted in hard copy (include one original and nine copies). The paper copies shall be mailed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 1688, Madison, WI 53701.

A person submitting a comment shall e-mail an electronic copy of the comment in MS Word format MS Word to the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court at clerk@wicourts.gov and carrie.janto@wicourts.gov.

II. Contents of comment
The comment shall identify the rule petition to which it relates.

III. Service of comment on petitioner
A copy of the comment shall be forwarded to the petitioner in a timely manner. See the rule petition for the name and contact information of petitioner.

https://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/1804.htm

 

California Eliminates Pro Hac Vice Barriers for ICWA Cases

Kate Fort

In a celebrate-the-victories post, the state with the most number of ICWA cases has removed major barriers for out of state ICWA attorneys. California notoriously had some of the highest pro hac fees and tightest limitations on the number of appearances an attorney can make. When I was started poking around about the idea of court rule changes, California always rose to the top. Thanks to California Tribal Families Coalition (CTFC) and their ED, Delia Sharpe, California passed both a bill (to eliminate fees) and a court rule (to eliminate association with local counsel). Here is the CTFC press release.

If California (and Washington and Michigan and Minnesota and Nebraska and Oregon) can get this done, so can your state. There’s a whole crew of in-house ICWA attorneys backing you up–send us an email.

 

Oglala Sioux Tribe Files En Banc Petition in South Dakota ICWA Case

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the petition in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Vargo (AKA Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, and FKA Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik):

En Banc Petition

Panel decision here.

Briefs here.

 

Eighth Circuit Dismisses Oglala Sioux v. Fleming Under Abstention Doctrine

Kate Fort3 Comments

Here.

This is the long running (initiated before Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl) case that is attempting to address the due process and ICWA violations against Native families in Pennington Co., South Dakota. Brought by Oglala Sioux, Rosebud Sioux and two individual tribal citizen mothers on behalf of a class of similarly situated parents, this case has highlighted the disturbing practices of the county (which, even more disturbingly, are not that surprising to trial level practitioners in our child welfare system). The District Court had found for the plaintiffs at each stage, and found specifically that abstention/Younger doctrine did not a apply to this case. The Eighth Circuit found differently.

Setting aside the due process claims for the sake of this point, ICWA itself creates a right of action under 25 USC 1914 (a parent, custodian, or tribe may petition a court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate any cases in violation of 1911 [jurisdiction], 1912 [notice/active efforts/burden of proof], or 1913 [voluntary proceedings]). This right, however, has often been limited by federal courts under abstention doctrines, which means the state courts that are causing the abuses of the law are the only places to address the abuses of the law. As the Court states, “Although the plaintiffs complain that state court proceedings do not afford parents an adequate opportunity to raise broad constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause, they have not established that South Dakota courts are unwilling or unable to adjudicate their federal claims.” There are a number of federal cases on ICWA–that is, ones that are attempting to demonstrate a violation of the law–that end up with a hollow 1914. See Yancey v. Bonner, 2008 WL 4279760 (W.D. Okla. 2008), Navajo Nation v. LDS Family Services, 2006 WL 3692662 (D. Utah 2006), Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1987)

I’d also note while the Court said “[t]he relief requested would interfere with the state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to comply with numerous procedural requirements at future 48-hour hearings,” those procedural requirements are ones required by both the Constitution and the Indian Child Welfare Act.

The ICWA Appellate Project filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Navajo Nation, Cherokee Nation, the ICWA Law Center, NICWA and NCAI in this case.

ICWA/MIFPA Case from the Michigan Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

We are wrapping up a training in Montana where every person in the room answered the ICWA pop quiz question: “Do ICWA protections apply to non-Native parents of Indian children?” correctly. Luckily the Michigan Court of Appeals answered it correctly as well. The Court of Appeals also provides an excellent discussion of why Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl did not apply to this, and similarly situated cases. There is a lot of useful language in this case for attorneys who continue to run into these issues in trial court across the country.

In re Beers/LeBeau-Beers

The trial court applied the appropriate heightened standards or
burdens when terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, but it failed to apply them when terminating the parental rights of respondent-father, ostensibly because the Indian heritage of the children is solely through their mother’s bloodline. Respondent-father argues that ICWA and MIFPA standards govern the termination of his parental rights, considering that TB is his biological child and an Indian child, regardless of respondent-father’s personal heritage. We agree and conditionally reverse the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to TB and remand for proceedings consistent with ICWA and MIFPA, as well as MCR 3.977(G).

In addition, however, the Court correctly analyzed whether Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl applied to this case, and raised this issue sua sponte “whether the heightened standards of ICWA, MIFPA, and MCR 3.977(G) should apply to the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights when he never had legal or physical custody rights in regard to TB.”:

Given the equivocal nature of Justice BREYER’s concurrence [in Adoptive Couple], it cannot truly be said that a majority of the United States Supreme Court created an inflexible rule for purposes of “continuing custody” analysis under § 1912(f), as well as the analysis of § 1912(d). And even assuming the contrary, it certainly is not clear whether the Supreme Court would impose the rule based solely on whether a parent had physical custody, in the strictest sense of the term under the law, where a custodial-like environment existed on a practical level absent any technical custodial rights.

***

We hold that under the particular facts of the instant case, which are entirely dissimilar to those in Adoptive Couple where the father effectively abandoned the child from birth and even in
utero, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights, although he never had legal or physical custody rights, as those terms are legally employed. When DHHS’s petition was filed in August 2015 and for a period thereafter, respondent-father, respondent-mother, and TB lived together as a familial unit wherein respondent-father was providing some care and custody for TB. And petitioner was providing
reunification services. The family unit dissolved only when TB was removed by court order, although respondents remained together. The removal of TB discontinued the custodial arrangement that had existed with respect to both respondents and TB, if not in law, in practice.

Rare Published Notice Opinion out of California Court of Appeals

ilpc

In re EH (Fourth District, 1st Div). For reference, so far this year California has had 48 unpublished notice decisions and 19 unpublished inquiry decisions. This is the first published notice case this year.

We agree with Mother that, considering Sally Y.H.’s statement to the Agency that her paternal family had Tohono O’odham Nation heritage, the Agency had a duty to attempt to obtain Sally Y.H.’s father’s identifying information and to provide notice of any such information obtained to the Tohono O’odham Nation. We further conclude that the Agency has not demonstrated that it fulfilled that duty by providing the Tohono O’odham Nation with information pertaining to an individual named Bruno Y. since it is not clear from the record that Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father. Moreover, if Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father, and E.H.’s great-great-grandfather, the Agency failed to properly describe his ancestral relationship to E.H. on the notice provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. Finally, given that Sally Y.H. told the Agency that her paternal family had heritage from the Tohono O’odham Nation, we cannot conclude that the Agency’s errors were harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of having the Agency provide the Tohono O’odham Nation with proper notice of the proceedings in this case, including accurate information pertaining to all known direct lineal ancestors of E.H., in accordance with all applicable law.3

***

FN 3. Mother also contends that the notice that the Agency provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation was deficient for several additional reasons, including that the Agency erred in listing her current address as being “no information available,” and in failing to update the notice when information about her residence became available. In light of our reversal, we need not consider these contentions, but we direct the juvenile court to ensure that the Agency provides Mother’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known.

In addition, Mother contends that the Agency provided the tribe an incorrect address for Sally Y.H. The Agency concedes that the address that it provided for Sally Y.H. contained typographical errors, including listing the city of her residence as ” ‘Alpaso’ ” rather than ” ‘El Paso,’ ” but argues that any errors were harmless. In support of its harmlessness argument, the Agency asks this court to take judicial notice of the fact that “El Paso is a city in the state of Texas and Alpaso is not.” The juvenile court is directed to ensure that the Agency provides Sally Y.H.’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known. We deny the Agency’s request for judicial notice as moot.

Finally, Mother states that the Agency was required to list Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers on the notice that it provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. On remand, the juvenile court shall direct the Agency to provide Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers, if known. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2 [specifying that notice sent to a tribe shall include “[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents . . . and great-grandparents . . . as well as their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, and any other identifying information, if known”], italics added; unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)

***

This argument is unpersuasive since the letter from the Tohono O’odham Nation does not indicate the basis upon which the tribe made its determination as to E.H.’s Indian child status. Nor can we agree with the Agency’s suggestion that the fact that the Tohono O’odham Nation did not ask for further information demonstrates that the Agency’s error was harmless. The tribe was not required to ask the Agency to provide information that the record indicates the Agency should have reasonably attempted to obtain and provide to the tribe. Thus, we decline to find the Agency’s error harmless simply because the tribe did not indicate that further information might have altered its determination, particularly given the other noticing errors acknowledged by the Agency.