Here is the opinion in Lummi Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cir.). An excerpt:
[W]e conclude that because neither the Claims Court nor this court previously adjudicated Lummi’s breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of trust claims, the Claims Court erred by dismissing Lummi’s entire case.
Briefs:
Prior posts here.
Here is the petition:
Questions presented:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1491 grant the court of federal claims jurisdiction over an action to recover grant-in-aid funds unlawfully recouped by the United States or is the action one for specific relief which must be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702?
Does the court of federal claims have jurisdiction to enter a judgment on an illegal exaction claim when the United States had previously awarded money to a recipient under a grant-in-aid statute and then unlawfully recouped the funds?
Where a grant-in-aid statute mandates that the United States pay grant funds to a plaintiff, does the court of federal claims have jurisdiction to enter a money judgment for the failure to pay the grant funds even if there are conditions on the use of the grant funds after they are awarded?
Lower court materials here.
UPDATE:
Here are the materials in Lummi Tribe v. United States.
An excerpt from the opinion:
The government seeks review of a September 30, 2015 order of the Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”). See Order, Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, No. 08-848C (Fed. Cl. Sept. 30, 2015), ECF No. 121. In that order, the Claims Court reaffirmed its prior ruling that the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA”) is money mandating, giving the Claims Court jurisdiction over appellees’ claims. Id. On June 9, 2016, this court granted the government’s petition for interlocutory appeal to “ensure that the Court of Federal Claims is the court of proper jurisdiction before requiring it and the parties to undergo extensive unnecessary proceedings.” Order at 3, Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, No. 2016-124 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2016), ECF No. 1-2. For the following reasons, we vacate and instruct the Claims Court to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Here is the opinion in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding the case to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for a hearing, reversed the judgment, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of HUD in a case brought by the Crow Tribal Housing Authority, arising from a dispute involving Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996.
The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that HUD violated Crow Housing’s right to Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996’s notice and reporting requirements under 25 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4165.
Specifically, the panel concluded that HUD did not act under § 4161, and accordingly, could not have violated a hearing requirement under that section. The panel further concluded that HUD’s actions triggered the opportunity for a hearing under § 4165 when it conducted an on-site review of Crow Housing in August 2004. Finally, the panel held that because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under § 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing under the facts of the case.
Briefs and materials are here.
Here are the orders in Navajo Nation v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (D. Colo.):
Here are the updated materials in Nambé Pueblo Housing Authority v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (D. Colo.):
56 Plaintiff Statement of Relief Requested
Here is an excerpt from the order:
the defendants shall restore to Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity all Indian Housing Block Grant funds that it has recaptured for twenty-three units located in housing projects known as NM99B040011 (Project 11) and Project NM99B040013 (Project 13)and one unit located in the housing project known as NM99B040017 (Project 17); the Defendants shall refrain from threatening recapture of funding associated with those units and shall not act upon any threatened recapture; that on or before April 15, 2014, Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity shall submit a proposed form of judgment, specifying the amounts to be paid to it and the asserted sources of the payment; that if Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity claims entitlement to payment for underfunding because HUD excluded those units from its FCAS in a particular year, the proposed form of judgment should include a separate itemization for those amounts, which may be submitted by May 15, 2014. An Appendix may be provided to explain the calculation of the amount owed and the record support for the claim. The Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs will be addressed after entry of judgment, by Judge Richard P. Matsch on 3/7/2014.
Prior post in this case is here.
Here are the updated materials in Lummi Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
57 DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
76 Lummi Motion for Partial Summary J
95 DCT Order Granting US Motion
An excerpt:
This case arises under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA” or “the statute”), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4212 (2006). Plaintiffs sue here to recover grant funds initially paid to them under the statute but later recaptured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD” or “the agency”) when HUD determined that the allocation formula on which the grants had been based had been misapplied. This action is currently before the court on the parties cross-motions for partial summary judgment. By direction of the court, the parties have fully briefed only those arguments addressing the issue of whether 25 U.S.C. § 4152(b)(1), as originally enacted, prohibited HUD from excluding the housing units referenced in the statute from the allocation formula, rendering 24 C.F.R. § 1000.318’s removal of such units contrary to the statute and therefore invalid.
The court heard oral argument on July 30, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as it relates to the alleged invalidity of 24 C.F.R. § 1000.318 is denied and defendant’s cross-motion is granted.
Prior post on this matter here.
Here are the materials in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD (D. Mont.):
An excerpt:
Plaintiff Crow Tribal Housing Authority (“CTHA”) brings this action against Defendant U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging the HUD’s agency action of recouping alleged over-payments of Indian Housing Block Grants (“IHBG”) to CTHA under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA”), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq. Pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Docs. 51 & 60. For the following reasons, the Court concludes this case must be remanded to HUD for a proper hearing.
Here are the materials in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (D. Colo.):
And the materials in Nambé Pueblo Housing Authority v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (D. Colo.):
DCT Order in Nambe Pueblo Case
Earlier materials in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD are here.
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