Here is the unpublished opinion in S.P. v. Native Village of Minto.
Here are the materials:
Ninth Circuit
Ninth Circuit Affirms Conviction of Former Fort Peck Member as “Indian” under Major Crimes Act
Here is the opinion in United States v. Smith.
An excerpt on blood quantum:
The government presented sufficient evidence of Smith’s Indian blood to satisfy Bruce’s first prong. We have held this requirement satisfied by as little as 1/8 (12.5%) Indian blood. See Maggi, 598 F.3d at 1080; Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223. Here, the government presented evidence that Smith has 25/128 (19.5%) Assiniboine and Sioux blood, well in excess of the 1/8 we approved in Bruce and Maggi. We acknowledge that Smith’s § 2255 motion attached a letter from the Fort Peck Tribes Enrollment Office stating that Smith “does not meet the required blood quantum of 1/8 for Associate Membership [in the Fort Peck tribes], nor 1/4 Full Enrollment.” But this evidence was not presented at trial, and even if it had been, a rational trier of fact could have chosen to credit the more specific, higher figure established by the government’s evidence.
An excerpt on the defendant’s relinquishment of tribal membership:
We recognize that Smith relinquished his tribal enrollment in 1996. This decision does not definitively show, however, that Smith or the tribe ceased to consider Smith an Indian person. See Cruz, 554 F.3d at 850 (holding that Bruce requires an analysis of Indian status from the perspective of the individual as well as from the perspective of the tribe). A tribal investigator, Tom Atkinson, testified he had known Smith for most of his life, that Smith had lived on the reservation that entire time and that, as far as Atkinson knew, Smith held himself out to be an Indian person. A rational jury could have concluded that because Smith was once formally enrolled in the tribe and continued to hold himself out as an Indian even after his enrollment ended, both Smith and the tribe continued to view Smith as an Indian despite his unexplained decision to relinquish his formal enrolled status.
Ninth Circuit Decides “Indian Status” Case under Major Crimes Act
Here is last week’s unpublished opinion in United States v. LaBuff.
Here is an excerpt:
At trial, the government presented the testimony of Helen Butterfly (“Butterfly”), a health records lab technician at the Blackfeet Community Hospital. Butterfly testified that on the basis of LaBuff’s classification as an Indian descendant of a tribal member, he was eligible to receive healthcare services at the hospital, which is operated by the federal government and whose non-emergency services are limited to enrolled tribal members and other non-member Indians. Butterfly further testified that since May 1979, LaBuff received healthcare services from the Blackfeet Community Hospital. Because the evidence showed that LaBuff repeatedly accessed healthcare services “reserved only to Indians,” we conclude that the government sufficiently established the second Bruce factor.
Similarly, we conclude that because LaBff frequently received healthcare services on the basis of his descendent status of an enrolled member, he enjoyed the “benefits” of his tribal affiliation, as required by Bruce’s third factor.
In addition to establishing the second and third Bruce factors, the government also presented evidence that on multiple occasions, LaBuff was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted under the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. As we observed in Bruce, the assumption and exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction is strong evidence of tribal recognition. 394 F.3d at 1227. At the time he was prosecuted, LaBuff did not challenge the authority of tribal authorities to arrest him or the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that, contrary to LaBuff’s contention, the evidence was sufficient for any rational fact-finder to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is an “Indian person.”
Ninth Circuit Reverses Major Crimes Act Conviction for Jury Irregularities
Here is the opinion of the court in United States v. Evanston. Here is a related unpublished opinion on the same conviction.
The crime occurred on the Colorado River Indian Tribes reservation.
Audio of Oral Argument in Miranda v. Braatz (Pascua Yaqui Tribe)
Fake Indians (again): Neal v. Arizona — “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America”
Here are some materials in Neal v. Arizona, a case in which two “members” of this fake tribe (not to be confused with the real Little Shell Tribe) were convicted of driving without a license.
Arizona Brief in Neal v Arizona
Ninth Circuit Roundly Affirms Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Water Wheel Case
Pakootas v. Teck Camino: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of CERCLA Citizen Suit Filed by Colville Members
Here is the opinion.
An excerpt:
As the district court correctly concluded, it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the Pakootas and Michel claims for penalties for the 892 days of noncompliance with the unilateral administrative order, and properly dismissed their claims.
Title VII Claim against Alaskan Native Corporation Rejected
Here is the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Conitz v. Teck Alaska and NANA Corp.
Here are the materials:
Ninth Circuit Decides U.S. v. Tsosie — Vacates Restitution Order in Sentence
Here is the opinion.
An excerpt:
Michael Tsosie entered into a plea agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the District Court sentenced Tsosie to eighteen months of imprisonment, a sentence well below the Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). At the sentencing hearing, the victim’s counsel urged the District Court to order Tsosie to pay $31,994 in restitution to the victim’s mother to cover costs she incurred in making a series of trips between her home and the victim’s boarding school, 150 miles away. The District Court ordered the restitution.
Tsosie appeals the restitution order, arguing (1) that the mother’s travel expenses were not “incurred by the victim” and were therefore not subject to restitution under the applicable statute, and, in the alternative, (2) that the restitution award was issued in violation of the procedural and evidentiary requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3664. We agree with the second but not the first of these arguments. We also hold that Tsosie has not waived his right to appeal the restitution order.
Judge Bea partially dissented, writing:
In Part IV, however, the majority holds the district court erred in awarding restitution based on a detailed spreadsheet from the victim’s mother to which the defendant never objected, save for a vague statement by defense counsel that “sufficient evidence ha[d] [not] been provided.” To this holding, I respectfully dissent.
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