Here is that opinion:
DCT Order Denying Navajo Motion to Dismiss
This case is on remand from the Ninth Circuit. It involves the validity of the Navajo Preference in Employment statute under Title VII.
Here is that opinion:
DCT Order Denying Navajo Motion to Dismiss
This case is on remand from the Ninth Circuit. It involves the validity of the Navajo Preference in Employment statute under Title VII.
Here is the opinion in Torgersen v. City of Rochester.
The court’s summary:
Employment Discrimination. Summary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for “every action,” and panel decisions to the contrary are unauthorized and should not be followed; there is no “employment discrimination case exception” to the application of summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial; neither of the statements plaintiffs point to in the record were direct evidence of gender or national-origin based discrimination in violation of Title VII; plaintiffs made a prima facie case of discrimination, but the City advanced nondiscriminatory grounds for its hiring decisions, and plaintiffs failed to show the grounds were pretexts for discrimination; fact that plaintiffs and the hired candidates had “relatively similar qualifications” does not create a material issue of fact as to pretext; plaintiff Torgerson alleged he was discriminated against on the basis of national origin, not race, and his Section 1981 claim fails. Judge Colloton, concurring. Smith, with whom Murphy, Bye Melloy and Shepherd join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Of note, the majority held that American Indians do not have discrimination claims based on national origin, but only on the basis of race:
Torgerson contends that his claim is based on Native American status, which may be treated as both a race claim and a national-origin claim. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (a claim of discrimination based on Native-American status may be a claim based on race). But a race claim based on Native-American status must be stated as a race claim, which Torgerson failed to do. Torgerson’s complaint states, “Defendant has discriminated [ ] against Plaintiff in the formation of an employment contract on the basis of his national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981.” (Emphasis added). At no time did he move to amend his complaint to include race discrimination. Torgerson testified in a deposition that he believes he was discriminated against because of his national origin, and until the City’s motion for summary judgment, never referred to race in any court documents. Because Torgerson alleges he was discriminated against based on national origin, not race, his § 1981 claim fails.
Here is the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Conitz v. Teck Alaska and NANA Corp.
Here are the materials:
Here are the materials in Harshe v. Grand Casino Hinckley (D. Minn.):
Here is the unpublished opinion.
The lower court had dismissed the claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Here (reply brief not due yet):
Lower court materials here.
Here is the Peabody Coal petition: Peabody Coal Cert Petition.
The question presented:
Where the EEOC contends that conduct required by a tribal coal mining lease provision mandated by the Secretary of the Interior violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which statute expressly bars the EEOC from suing the Secretary to enforce Title VII, does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 permit the coal mining lessee or the tribal lessor to implead the Secretary as a third-party defendant?
And here is the Navajo cert petition: Navajo Nation Cert Petition
The questions presented:
1. May the sovereign immunity of the United States and of a federally recognized Indian tribe, preserved in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, be abrogated by application of Rules 14 and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
2. May a court use Rule 14 to permit or require a party to implead the Secretary of the Interior in a case where the applicable statute does not confer a right of contribution?
Lower court materials here.
And here is Dr. Ray Austin’s fine history of the tribal law in question. And my paper from 7 years ago on Rule 19 and Indian tribes. [Read my paper and you’ll know how this is going to turn out.]
Here are the materials in Nanomantube v. Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas (opinion here):
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Fox v. Portico Reality Servs. Office (E.D. Va.):
Portico Motion for Reconsideration
The court’s first order holding the same thing (but sua sponte, and apparently without the benefit of any briefs, is here).
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