Here is the opinion.
Navajo SCT Dismisses Chris Deschene Appeal on Procedural Grounds
Here is the opinion.
Here is the opinion.
Christopher Chavis is a 3L at MSU College of Law, and a member of the Lumbee Nation.
Like many other localities on the North American continent, the Navajo Nation is in the midst of an election year. And like many localities, the Navajo Nation is also faced with the contesting of a candidate’s eligibility to run for office. While most localities see challenges that center on residency or even age, the Navajo are faced with a rather unique challenge, the ability of a candidate to speak their language. Chris Deschene is currently seeking the office of the President of the Navajo Nation and finds himself mired in a fight that will determine the fate of his candidacy. By his own admission and through the findings of the Navajo election board, Deschene does not speak fluent Navajo. The initial challenge made its way to the Supreme Court on September 26th where it was ordered that the election board hold a hearing to test his fluency. On October 3rd, this hearing was held and Deschene found himself disqualified. He has subsequently appealed and on Monday, it will once again be heard by the Navajo Supreme Court. As it prepares to head back for a second time, I would urge the Supreme Court to allow Deschene to run and to invalidate the language requirement in favor of a requirement that will be less restrictive. While the Navajo Nation certainly deserves a leader who can speak the language, there are less restrictive means of accomplishing this goal.
Language is the life blood of any culture. The syntax and words hidden in language contain clues as to our origins and history. The Navajo certainly have a compelling interest for preserving it and even requiring its principal leader to speak it. In the initial decision on this matter, the Court made a valid point when it stated that it is essential for self-determination for the leader of the Navajo Nation to speak the Navajo language[1]. The Court also stated that “[w]hile the right or privilege of placing one’s name in nomination for public elective office is a part of political liberty, thus making it a due process right, that liberty may be restricted by statute. Any such restriction must be reasonable and forward some important governmental interest.[2]” Deschene contends that this requirement discriminates against younger Navajos who may seek to assume leadership positions within the tribe. This argument was rejected the first time around and the Court noted that this statute applies to everyone and that it does not purposely discriminate against young people[3]. This is a valid point, if viewed within a vacuum. On its face, the statute does not discriminate against young people but the effects are often different than the original intent.
Like many Native nations, the Navajo find themselves at a crossroads. Fluency in their language is declining but yet they want to preserve it for future generations. As Indian Country Today noted in a recent article, the United States Census Bureau estimates that 169,000 people spoke Navajo in 2010, a decline from 178,000 in 2010[4]. No distinguishing was made with regards to fluency. As NPR further noted in another recent article, only 30 percent of Navajo first graders display any kind of fluency, this number is a large decline from 90 percent 50 years ago[5]. What this all points to is the fact that fluency in Navajo is declining, particularly among young people. The first graders of fifty years ago are now the tribal leadership of today. What will the pool of candidates look like when the current first graders come of age? It will certainly be much smaller, even smaller than it is now. On its face, the statute is not discriminatory but fluency in the language is not evenly divided amongst age groups within the tribe.
The Court has held that the right to run for office may only be restricted by a reasonable restriction that forwards an important governmental interest. There is no denying that this is an important governmental interest but I would beg to differ on the idea that it is a reasonable restriction. The Court has previously clarified that these restrictions must be reasonable public policy[6]. The underlying idea behind this policy is, as the Court stated in its first hearing on the matter, “to preserve, protect, and promote self-determination, for which language is essential[7].” The idea that language is essential for self-determination is an important one, but is this the only way to further that interest? While I do disagree that is the best way to do it, striking down the language requirement entirely would be a grave mistake. As the Court has previously noted in this case, they do also consider ancient law, which requires that the language not be forgotten[8]. As the court notes and as I stated earlier, language is culture and contains hints and clues as to the origins of people and where they have been.
How do we reconcile these needs? We can look to United States courts and how they approach issues like this. When dealing with fundamental rights, United States courts often apply a strict scrutiny analysis. If we agree that the ability to run for office is a fundamental right then we can apply the analysis in this instance. A strict scrutiny analysis requires that a statute be sufficiently narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. We have agreed that there is a compelling interest at play here, the right of the Navajo Nation to preserve its cultural identity and honor its ancient laws by requiring that its leader be a fluent Navajo speaker. In light of a declining number of fluent speakers however, a blanket ban seems to not be narrowly tailored at all. The Navajo Court itself has stated that any restrictions on running must be reasonable public policy. The current trajectory of this policy will result in thousands of people being unable to run Navajo Nation President in the coming years. The result will be a diluted pool of candidates who may not represent the most qualified. It is because of that that the policy must be amended to allow candidates who are not fluent in the language to run, with the caveat that they must agree upon election to immediately begin taking classes that will enhance their knowledge of the language.
In regards to any concerns about the cultural authenticity of the candidate, the Court has previously dealt with that by placing ample faith in the voter. In a previous case, they stated “[i]f the People are concerned that candidates unfamiliar with Navajo life run in elections, they are free not to vote for that candidate. The candidate’s ignorance of the Navajo experience will be immediately apparent when the candidate campaigns and discusses the issues with the People[9].” The Court used this as its justification for striking down the residency requirement. The same logic can also apply here. Voters will quickly figure out that a candidate does not have the Navajo Nation’s best interests at heart and will vote against the candidate accordingly.
It is my conclusion that the Navajo Supreme Court should apply its own analysis to find that the current restriction does not represent reasonable public policy and is not a reasonable restriction on what it has held to be a fundamental right. The statute also fails when one subjects it to the scrutiny often applied by the United States courts. In light of a declining number of fluent speakers, the Court must order that the restriction be worded in a manner that takes this into account. Requiring a Navajo Nation President to actively work on improving his fluency while in office may not be ideal but it is a solution that will ensure that qualified candidates are not excluded from serving in the future. The Navajo Nation deserves competent leadership, something that becomes less likely with a smaller pool.
[1] Tsosie v. Deschenie, No. SC-CV-58-14 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2014) at 10
[2] Id. at 8 (citing Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 6 Nav. R. 319,325 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1990)
[3] Id. at 8-9
[4] http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/10/02/native-language-fluency-center-navajo-nation-crossroads-157152
[5] http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/10/16/356627850/navajo-presidential-race-shaken-by-language-gap
[6] In re Lee, 6 Am. Tribal Law 788 (2006) (citing Rough Rock, 7 Nav. R. at 172–73.)
[7] Tsosie v. Deschenie, No. SC-CV-58-14 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2014) at 10
[8] Id. at 11
[9] In re Lee, 6 Am. Tribal Law 788, 793 (2006)
Here is the opening brief in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians:
Here are some excerpts:
Because Indian tribes are sovereigns preexisting the United States and its Constitution, they may be sued only where the tribe or Congress unequivocally expresses consent to suit. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 58-59 (1978). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has admonished that the federal courts may not “carv[e] out exceptions” to the broad protections sovereign immunity provides federally recognized tribal governments. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014). In this case, the district court did precisely that. . . . [T]he court reasoned that, because the Tribe could have chosen to raise its tribal sovereign immunity defense in state court, the Tribe’s choice to raise the defense in federal court waived it. Specifically, the court concluded the Tribe had “no principled reason” to remove the federal claims filed against it to federal court, and that, by virtue of the removal, the Tribe lost its right to assert its sovereign immunity to the lawsuit, at all. . . . No law authorized the district court to imply a waiver on this basis, and in fact, the very notion that a Tribe can waive its immunity by implication contradicts well established principles of federal Indian law governing sovereign immunity. It also contradicts the only federal appellate court decision to address the issue of whether an Indian tribe’s removal of a case to federal court waives the Tribe’s immunity to suit. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal specifically held it does not. Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2012).
***
Apart from the dissonance between a rule that finds waiver of immunity from a tribe’s removal of a suit in which it is an involuntary participant, while preserving immunity where the tribe itself voluntarily files suit, the district court’s rule would incentivize litigation, unduly burdening both Indian tribes and federal courts alike. Under the district court’s rule, an Indian tribe with any reason (even remotely) to anticipate suit on a federal claim would be incentivized to file preemptive suit in federal court, hoping to beat the prospective state court plaintiff to the courthouse. This would result in a groundswell of preemptive federal court litigation by Indian tribes, requiring federal courts, in many instances, to expend their limited judicial resources issuing declarations on matters that would not have otherwise coalesced into litigation. There is certainly no “principled reason” to impose this burden on Indian tribes and federal courts by manufacturing an arbitrary distinction between cases Indian tribes file in federal court seeking a declaration as to their sovereign rights, on one hand, and cases Indian tribes remove to federal court to assert a sovereign immunity defense, on the other.
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District (C.D. Cal.):
82-1 CVWD Motion for Summary J
84-1 Desert Valley Water Dist. Motion for Summary J
Here is the opinion in Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Reservation.
Briefs are here.
Lower court materials here.
Here:
25 Duluth Motion for Summary J
26 US Cross Motion for Summary J
27-1 Fond du Lac Proposed Amicus Bref
The materials on the federal government’s motion to dismiss are here.
Complaint is here.
Alyosha Goldstein has posted “Possessive Investment: Indian Removals and the Affective Entitlements of Whiteness,” published in the American Quarterly, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In 2013 the US Supreme Court effectively granted custody of an almost four-year-old child to adoptive white parents over the opposition of her Cherokee birth father and the Cherokee Nation in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (the “Baby Veronica” case). This essay examines the Court ruling, and the protracted custody and jurisdictional struggles in its wake, in order to show how whiteness in the US has been historically constituted not only as a form of property but also as the capacity to possess. Against the perspective that colonialism persists in the US only insofar as indigeneity remains legible as racial difference, this essay focuses on how Adoptive Couple served as a means of reasserting white heteronormative rights to possess and to deny culpability for the ongoing conditions and consequences of colonization and multiple forms of racial violence in the present.
Dr. Rebecca M. Webster has completed her dissertation “Common Boundaries: Moving Toward Coordinated and Sustainable Planning on the Oneida Reservation” (PDF). Here is the abstract:
Comprehensive planning can help communities engage in purposeful and sustainable land use development. Previous research has indicated that Indian reservations in the United States often face unique roadblocks to these planning efforts: checkerboard patterns of tribal and nontribal ownership, and the presence of both tribal and local governments exercising land use authority within the same shared space. These roadblocks can lead to uncooperative, uncoordinated, or unsustainable development. Despite these noted problems, there remains an important gap in the current literature regarding solutions to overcome these roadblocks. The purpose of this study was to address that gap. Guided by Forester’s critical planning theory to critically examine the social and historical roots of planning within a particular community, this qualitative case study examined government records and conducted 18 interviews of tribal and local government officials. Data analysis consisted of coding data to reveal emergent themes relating to cooperative land use planning in the future. These themes included: (a) approaching planning with a regional philosophy in mind, (b) strengthening interpersonal relationships, (c) finding ways to fairly compensate each other for government services, (d) continuing to acknowledge each government’s ability to govern within this shared space, and (e) refraining from asserting authority over a neighboring government. This research is an important contribution to the existing literature and enhances social change initiatives by providing guidance for tribal and local government officials to increase cooperative land use planning.
For anyone who has followed the legal and political battles between the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin and the Village of Hobart, this is a must-read.
Here is the order:
An excerpt:
The pivotal question before the board at hearing was whether CTGW, LLC is an arm of the tribe such that it might be per se exempt from assessment and taxation on “un-attached business personal property located at Great Wolf Lodge.” See Galanda Decl. Exhibit H -01 (Quotation from February 11, 2014 letter from Thurston County Treasurer Shawn· Myers to David Burnett, President, CTGW, LLC). As explained below, the Board finds that CTGW, LLC is exempt from all assessments and taxes on the un-attached business personal property used exclusively on tribal trust land and that the taxable assessment for each year subject to a petition must be reduced to zero.
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