Here.
In determining whether the duty to consult was fulfilled, courts must consider whether the Crown met its duty to act honourably and provide a meaningful process of consultation, not whether the Crown and the First Nation reached agreement. As McLachlin C.J.C. instructed in Haida Nation at para. 63, the focus is not on the outcome, but on the process of consultation and accommodation. Accordingly I must decide whether the consultation process that took place fulfilled the Crown’s duty to provide a meaningful mid-range consultation.
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As much as the Minister’s office was entitled to review and inform itself from and to a degree rely upon the engagement record, the Haida Nation duty to consult ultimately rested with the Province. It is only the Crown in right of the Province who had the ability to provide sufficient remedies to achieve meaningful consultation and accommodation: Rio Tinto at paras. 59-60. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal made clear in Neskonlith Indian Band at para. 68, local governments lack the authority to engage in a nuanced and complex constitutional process.
In my view the Province failed to ensure that the parties to the consultation understood the differences between the two types of consultation processes required. This confusion led to frustration, particularly on the part of the Nations, as the parties with the responsibility and authority were not at the table until the matter reached the Minister’s office in December 2012. The Province was obliged to make the s. 35 consultation process “as transparent as possible” and clearly articulate what roles the municipality and the Province were playing in carrying out the consultation: Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),2008 BCSC 1505 (CanLII), 2008 BCSC 1505 at para. 147.
Once the Ministry received Whistler’s engagement record, I am of the view that the consultation process engaged in by the Province relied almost exclusively on Whistler’s engagement record. The Province made little attempt to engage in its own consultation: it held no face to face meetings with representatives of the Nations; it made no attempt to involve any other Ministry with whom the Nations dealt in other ongoing negotiations; and it denied requests for further consultation because of time constraints imposed by the upcoming election.Although the Province had no obligation to agree with or accept the Nation’s position, the position of the Province, from beginning to the end of the short consultation period remained intransigent. While appearing to listen the Crown was, in my view, in fact locked into its position from the beginning and ultimately closed the door to further discussions, advising the Nations the OCP had to be approved before the election writ dropped, thus foreclosing any further consultation.
Documentary available online here.
In Incident at Restigouche, filmmaker Alanis Obomsawin delves into the history behind the Quebec Provincial Police (QPP) raids on the Restigouche Reserve on June 11 and 20, 1981. The Quebec government had decided to restrict fishing, resulting in anger among the Micmac Indians as salmon was traditionally an important source of food and income. Using a combination of documents, news clips, photographs and interviews, this powerful film provides an in-depth investigation into the history-making raids that put justice on trial.
via @Mimiges
Yesterday the Court decided CTS Corp. v. Waldburger (non-federal-Indian-law case). The Court held that injured parties cannot bring claims against corporations that pollute if the claim falls outside of a state statute of repose, even if the claim would be otherwise preserved by a federal law. Generally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) pre-empts state statutes of limitation, because Congress wanted to preserve injuries from pollution that can sometimes take years to discover. However, North Carolina also has a state statute of repose, which bars claims brought more than 10 years after the last culpable act. Since CERCLA only specifically identifies statutes of limitations and not repose, the Court found the claimants are unable to bring their damages claim against the company (which sold the land in 1987).
In her dissent with Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg would preserve the claim, finding Congress’s intent was to preserve these claims, regardless of the name of the state limitations statute.
Not only will this decision harm the landowners involved in the case, but those injured by contaminated wells at Camp Lejeune (a Marine base also in North Carolina), who currently have claims pending in the 11th Circuit. Article here from right after oral arguments (though it misjudges J. Kagan, who joined the majority in the case).
America’s moral debts to African-Americans and American Indians are shockingly deep and wide. African Americans point to slavery, Black Codes, Jim Crow, and redlining. And American Indians point to land and resources theft, boarding schools, and cultural and religious persecution. But while African-Americans eye individual payments, Indian tribes seek control over lands and natural resources taken from them by the United States and state governments. The advantage in the tribal strategy is to make Uncle Sam the bad guy. African-American strategists should take note.
All articles here.
Page 9 of the report has Native American Disproportionality Rates by State. 21 states have overrepresentation of Native kids in care, including Michigan (1.3, and 1.9 in entries to care), Wisconsin (4.1), Minnesota (13.9)and Iowa (4.5). Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have worse numbers than 10 years ago (page 3).
Report Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care for Fiscal Year 2012 (pdf). Website here.
As a side note, anytime anyone would like to talk about what they think is happening in Illinois/Chicago (no disproportionality shown, almost no ICWA cases pop up on appeal, but with a large urban Native population), we are all ears.
The Michigan COA interpreted In re Morris to require a conditional reversal when the parent asserted that his grandmothers were Native and:
It is unclear from the record exactly how or why the caseworker came to the conclusion, reflected in the case service plans, that the minor child is not an Indian child for purposes of 25 USC 1912(a); some elaboration would have been appropriate given the father’s assertion. There is no indication that an inquiry or investigation was made specifically with respect to the father’s claim made at the preliminary hearing, nor an explanation in regard to why the father’s claim was being discounted, assuming it was evaluated or pondered in the first place, such that the ICWA notice requirement was not triggered. Of special concern to us is that the initial case service plan, in its summarization of the trial court’s preliminary hearing order, made no mention of the court’s command that the caseworker “make necessary inquiry and/or notification as to possible Native American Indian heritage.” Furthermore, there is no clear confirmation by the court itself that its initial concerns of whether the child is an Indian child were alleviated. Moreover, the father’s assertion concerning the Native American heritage of the minor child’s paternal great-grandparents fits within the parameters of the examples given by the Morris Court, quoted above, that would trigger the need to serve notice. Morris, 491 Mich at 108 n 18. Finally, petitioner itself concedes that conditional reversal is necessary in order to determine whether the minor child is an Indian child under the law.
Opinion here.
This case will have broad ramifications for child welfare cases. This is a huge victory for parents and families. While not mentioned in this opinion, this case was also an ICWA case.
Opinion, written by Justice McCormack, here.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine permits a court to interfere with a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and control of the children solely because the other parent is unfit, without any determination that he or she is also unfit. In other words, the one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness.
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Because the jurisdictional inquiry is focused on the child, once there has been an adjudication, either by trial or by plea, the court has jurisdiction over the child regardless of whether one or both parents have been adjudicated unfit. MCL 712A.2(b). In cases in which jurisdiction has been established by adjudication of only one parent, the one-parent doctrine allows the court to then enter dispositional orders affecting the parental rights of both parents.
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Because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringes the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, we hold that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Granted, it’s a strange and short decision about voluntary relinquishment. But we post it as another example of what state courts do when a tribe allows a case to go forward in state court and then moves to transfer at a later date.
After monitoring the case for approximately one year, the Tribe filed a motion to transfer the case to its tribal court. In response to the motion, the juvenile court found that good cause existed not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court due primarily to the fact that the case was in an advanced stage of litigation and all relevant witnesses resided in Utah.
Opinion here.
Turtle Talk 
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