Oglala Sioux Tribe Supplemental Brief in Light of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Here is the new pleading in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik (D. S.D.):

OST13(NoticeOfSupplementalAuthority)

 

Justice Alito Partially Grants Adoptive Couple Application to Expedite Mandate

The order is here. Here is SCOTUSblog’s coverage. The mandate remanding back to the South Carolina courts goes into effect July 5 (I think).

Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson on the Baby Veronica Decision

Addie Rolnick and Kim Pearson been posting extensively on the Baby Veronica case at Prawfsblawg. They’re doing a four-parter:

Here is post 1.

Here is Part 2.

Here is Part 3.

Here is Part 4.

And, inexplicably, here is Part 5 (authored solely by Kim).

Adoptive Couple Seeks Immediate SCT Mandate in Baby Vernonica Case

SCOTUS blog has coverage here.

Adoptive Couple’s application is here.

Dusten Brown’s opposition is here.

Alex Pearl on Dusten Brown’s Blood Quantum, which apparently is 3/256

Here. Highly recommended.

An excerpt:

Baby Veronica is, or is eligible for, enrollment as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.  By the way, the Cherokee Nation isn’t like your local public library—not just anyone can join.  It’s like the United States.  Not everyone can join us here—the U.S. has citizenship requirements.  It would be unintelligible to say that someone is 3/256 American, right?  You either are or are not a citizen of a nation.  The usage of blood quantum in this way by the Majority conflates Indian identity and tribal citizenship.

Baby Girl Additional Thoughts — Implications for State Indian Child Welfare Laws

An important question we’ve been asked repeatedly — how does Adoptive Couple affect state laws codifying and supplementing the Indian Child Welfare Act?

State ICWA laws remain intact. This was not a decision on the constitutionality of ICWA, but rather an interpretation of ICWA’s wording. This Supreme Court defers to state law when possible. While state courts may interpret the language the same way, if it’s the same language (which it is in Michigan, for example), it’s not bound to. For example, the legislative history of a state law passed in 2012 is very different than that of the federal law passed in 1978. There may be different policy goals, or other parts of the statute are different enough to indicate a broader, and higher, standard. In addition, state statutes of general applicability, such as those addressing the rights of biological fathers to their children still apply. In some ways this ends up like the marriage equality decisions–where a person lives may determine their rights.

There is going to be more pressure on tribes to have an adoptive placement available for a child earlier. This decision may give state DHS officials the incorrect belief that they do not have to find a proper placement for the child under the law, but that rather a family must make some sort of “formal” application. What is a formal application will also likely be determined by state law, given the Court gave no indication what it meant by that in the opinion. The Court seemed to be making a distinction between a tribal official testifying that there are adoptive families available and an adoptive family being vetting through (in this case) a state court.

We are also curious to find out how will this apply in conjunction with the state removing children at birth from mothers for various reasons–previous terminations, testing positive. How long must a parent have a child for it to be considered “continued” custody? When does legal custody attach? Again, this is likely determined through state law.

California COA (Los Angeles) Reverses Guardianship Case for Violation of ICWA Notice Requirement

Here is the opinion in In re S.E.:

In re S.E.

An excerpt:

A.A.-E. (Father) and S.S. (Mother) appeal from an order of the juvenile court establishing guardianship of their son, S.E. Both parents contend that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and the analogous California statutes governing custody proceedings involving Indian children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) We conclude that the inquiry and notice conducted was not in full compliance with the requisites of the statute. We reverse for the limited purpose of full compliance with ICWA, as explained below.

Also:

Although we are sympathetic to DCFS‟s contention that Mother‟s objection will result in regrettable delay in the proceedings, we cannot say that the failure to thoroughly  investigate the child‟s Indian heritage constitutes harmless error. The information which was omitted here pertained directly to the ancestor Mother and the maternal grandmother affirmatively claimed was Indian. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the omission was harmless and that providing the ancestor‟s name might not have produced different results concerning the child‟s Indian heritage. (Cf. In re Antoinette S., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 1401 [omission of information concerning non-Indian relatives is harmless error if the notice included all known information about the Indian parent and relatives].) Where the information was known, its inclusion was required regardless of the lack of a preprinted line on the Judicial Council form asking for it.

Public Radio Spots on Baby Veronica Case

Minnesota (with Colette Routel)babyveronica

and New Mexico (with Fletcher)

and Michigan (with Fort)

NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)

Collection of Reactions on Baby Girl Case

Casey Family Programs

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (video)

NCAI

NICWA Initial Statement (pdf)

NICWA Legal Analysis (pdf) (Includes an excellent point about state laws, and one we’ve been considering here as well)

Terry Cross Statement

NARF

The Atlantic, Andrew Cohen

Minnesota Public Radio (with Colette Routel)

NPR (with Marcia Zug and Mary Jo Hunter)

Washington Post

Will add more as they come up.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl First Impressions

In a split 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, with a strong dissent from Justice Sotomayor, the Court limited ICWA, but did not eliminate it. The Court is unwilling to go so far as Justice Thomas would like, and find the statute unconstitutional. *12 (Thomas, J. concurring). Instead, the decision turns on dictionary definitions of “continued” *8, and “breakup” *12, finding that 1912(f) (involuntary termination) does not apply to the father, as he did not have physical custody of Baby Girl, nor legal custody under state law. *11. In addition, 1912(d) (active efforts) does not apply to Baby Girl’s adoption. *13. The Court reads the statute to apply to “intact” Indian families. *9. While not an endorsement of the judicially created existing Indian family exception, this opinion will not provide assistance in pushing back against it, at least in the context of non-custodial fathers. The decision is a set back, and a devastating blow to the family, but it’s also not the end of ICWA. Figuring out how the ultimate custody decision will turn out is difficult, not the least of which because under the Court’s own definition, there is NOW an “intact” Indian family.

The Court’s reading of 1912(a), the active efforts provision, is troubling. While quick to note that active efforts are a “sensible requirement when applied to state social workers,” *14 the Court finds it would be “unusual” to apply it to these facts. As anticipated, the Court’s concern for adoptive parents trumped that of the rights of children or biological parents. The question of how to apply 1912(a) comes up often in the context of guardianships and adoptions. This decision will make it harder to argue when states and agencies don’t want to apply 1912(a) to guardianships as well.

The placement preference provisions of 1915(a) for adoptions remains intact. A family within the preferences must “formally” seek to adopt the child for the preferences to be applicable. How this will apply in practice will depend on the court, I imagine. When does the adoptive family have to be known? How far in advance? Justice Sotomayor points out that if Baby Girl’s grandparents want to adopt her, under this decision the South Carolina court must consider them under the placement preferences. *25 (Sotomayor J. dissenting).

The Court remains suspicious of tribal citizenship, talking about remote ancestors *16 and listing Baby Girl’s blood quantum in the first sentence of the opinion. *1. The Court calls it the father’s “ICWA trump card.” *16. Finally, it is not often the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families is called “mischief.” *9 (“mischief” that continues, see the disproportionality reports out recently).

In dissent, Justice Scalia writes that the opinion “needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood.” *1. Justice Sotomayor, however, writes  explicitly that the Court’s decision is based on policy differences with Congress, *2, *8 (Sotomayor, dissenting). She also disagrees with the United States in its amicus brief, FN5, as part of her reading of the statute as a whole, rather than discrete parts. *3.

Her scathing footnote 8, which ends with her requesting examples of women who go through the trouble of giving birth via sperm donors giving the child up for adoption, injects the common sense anger and frustration this case has caused among those who have followed it closely. She addresses head on the Court’s references to blood quantum, wondering why it is needed if there are no constitutional concerns. *23-4. And finally, her, yes, empathetic paragraph of what can befall a family and that ICWA’s protections should apply to them provides a perspective missing from the majority opinion on down to many state courts. *23. ICWA does not only apply to the child removed improperly by the “culturally insensitive” social worker from an “intact” Indian family. It applies beyond that, to the families most in need of the law, ensuring the protection and health of the child, her contact with her family, her extended family, and her tribe. This narrow version of ICWA endorsed by the Court today, and evidenced regularly in family courts, does not help that child.