As reported here.
Here is the opinion. And here are the available briefs:
And the previous case.
Reading this morning about the terrible events at the Muckleshoot casino, am reminded about a case I included as a note in American Indian Tribal Law, Barbosa v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 4 Mash.Rep. 269 (2005). The Supreme Court’s decision in Montana and its progeny make it hard for tribal courts to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. What about a case like Barbosa, where the plaintiff — a Foxwoods customer who was beaten savagely by other customers who drunkenly mistook him for Saddam Hussein in the years after 9/11 (you can’t make these facts up) — failed in his suit against Foxwoods, but attackers never showed up to defend themselves in tribal court (they were from New Hampshire).
Absent Montana etc., it would be relatively easy for Barbosa to enforce his judgment in New Hampshire. But the Supreme Court’s concern about nonmember defendants has also undermined the ability of nonmember plaintiffs to seek justice as well. Barbosa can’t really go to Connecticut or New Hampshire courts, and there’s no federal subject matter jurisdiction. So he’s stuck being saddled in the same boat as Indian tribes.
Here is the opinion in John v. Navajo Nation.
An excerpt:
In this case, the Nation has not filed a brief nor otherwise indicated its interest in participating in the appeal. Previously in Navajo Nation v. Morgan, 8 Nav. R. 732 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005), we addressed a similar situation in which the Nation, as here, did not file a brief. In Morgan, we stressed “to the Office of the Prosecutor and the Attorney General the importance of participation in appeals, as their responsibilities to the Navajo people should mandate them to take an interest in each case before this Court.” Id. at 736. The Court takes judicial notice that underlying the dispute resolution process of the Diné, there is this expectation: Diné t’áá hat’íshįį yéego bik’í hojiz’ahgo doo éi t’óó bijilkáa’da doołeeł, háálá bila‘ashdla‘ii éi yíní bíighago dilzin dóó baahasti’; doo éi t’óó naaki nilįigo bił hwiizh dooł’aałda. If one brings forth a serious allegation, the accuser is expected to participate in the resolution of the accusation because the truth of the allegation must be determined out of respect and protection of the individual.
Here are the materials in United States v. Head (D. Minn.):
Christine Zuni Cruz has posted her great paper, “ Shadow War Scholarship, Indigenous Legal Tradition, and Modern Law in Indian Country “, published in the Tribal Law Journal, on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
This article documents the purposes and reasons for the development of the Tribal Law Journal, the University of New Mexico School of Law’s electronic journal created to promote scholarship on tribal law and the Indigenous legal tradition. It discusses the use of the internet for the work of the journal and of the need to increase an understanding and awareness of the law of Indigenous peoples. The diversity of indigenous peoples, in and of itself, requires unique approaches to the discussion of tribal law. The article considers how the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas utilized the internet. The Zapatista’s engagement of the Mexican government has been described as a “shadow war” for its engagement in conflict in “symbolic rather than real terms.” This early exploitation of the internet allowed the Zapatista to get their position across without having to rely on gatekeepers. The article describes how the Journal follows the same strategy in respect to tribal law. The important developments occurring in law at the tribal level require Indigenous Peoples’ awareness of trends among Indigenous peoples in the United States and across the world. Electronic communication has significantly facilitated this. The article concludes with a discussion of the limitations that challenge electronic communication among Indigenous Peoples.
Here is the order:
Here are the materials in United States v. Chase Alone (D. S.D.):
Apparently under the Red Bird case, a tribal lay advocate is not “counsel” under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, so any statements made to the FBI after a tribal criminal defendant is represented by a lay advocate are not required to be suppressed.
Here is the order:
Also available on the Cherokee Nation Judiciary website.
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