Here are materials in United States v. Dehose (D. Ariz.):
Here are the materials in United States v. Chase Alone (D. S.D.):
Apparently under the Red Bird case, a tribal lay advocate is not “counsel” under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, so any statements made to the FBI after a tribal criminal defendant is represented by a lay advocate are not required to be suppressed.
Here is yet another case holding that the appointment of tribal lay advocates/counsel to defend an Indian in tribal court does not trigger Sixth Amendment protections under Miranda.
Here is an important footnote in the R&R (n. 4):
There is a split of authority among the circuits as to whether, in cases involving an allegation of a Sixth Amendment violation, the Texas v. Cobb decision incorporates the full panoply of double jeopardy analysis–specifically the dual sovereign analysis–or whether only the Blockburger test applies. This would be of significance where, for example, state and federal officials charged a defendant with offenses having identical elements. If the defendant had already appeared in state court and asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and federal officials subsequently interrogated the defendant before the institution of federal charges with the same essential elements as the state charges, courts disagree on whether this would constitute a Sixth Amendment violation. See United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit does not apply the dual sovereign analysis to allegations of Sixth Amendment violations. United States v. Mills, 412 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit is in accord with this approach at least where the other sovereign is an Indian tribe. See Red Bird, 287 F.3d at 715. The First and Fifth Circuits apply the dual sovereign analysis to Sixth Amendment violations. See Coker, 433 F.3d at 43; United States v. Avants, 278 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here is the district court’s order on a motion to suppress statements made by a Ute Indian during a murder investigation.