Here are the materials:
tribal courts
Tribal Immunity, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, and Separation of Powers
There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).
It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.
Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.
Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.
Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.
Federal Court Remands Contract Breach Claim against Seminole Tribe to State Court
Here are the materials in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (S.D. Fla.):
DCT Order Remanding Case to Fla. Cir. Ct.
Seminole Tribe Motion to Dismiss
Contour Spa Response to Cypress Motion
Contour Spa Response to Tribe Motion
Of note, the court here appeared to assume that the so-called “Dry Creek lodge exception” could apply here, but found that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements (one of which was essentially exhaustion of tribal forums). This is a potentially troubling development (that is, the spread of Dry Creek Lodge to areas outside of the Tenth Circuit).
Third Consecutive Sentencing Decision from Arizona Federal Courts — Alvarez v. Tracey
Here are the materials:
Order on Motion for Partial SJ 03-31-11
An excerpt:
The Court concludes that, for purposes of § 1302(7), two charges are differentoffenses if each “requires proof of a fact which the other does not,” regardless of whetherthey arise from the same transaction. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Applying thisdefinition to Petitioner’s case, § 1302(7) has not been violated by his convictions andpunishment. Petitioner’s own description suggests that each offense required proof of a factthat the others did not. The Court will accept the R&R and deny Petitioner’s motion forpartial summary judgment.
BIA Tribal Court Training Program
Please see the press release for more information on the newly created training program for tribal court judges and officials.
WASHINGTON – Bureau of Indian Affairs Director Michael S. Black today announced that the BIA’s Office of Justice Services (OJS) has created a training program for tribal court judges, prosecutors, clerks and administrators in an effort to improve the administration of justice in Indian Country. The program was developed in collaboration with the University of New Mexico School of Law’s Institute of Public Law (IPL) and Southwest Indian Law Clinic (SILC) and the American Indian Law Center, Inc. (AILC) in Albuquerque, N.M. The 2011 training, which is being held in four sessions over three months, started March 15 at the Bureau’s National Indian Program Training Center in Albuquerque.
Ethical Implications of the Montana Rule and Exceptions
Later today, I will be speaking at UNM’s “Montana v. United States: Pathmarking the Field of Indian Law for Three Decades and Counting” conference (agenda here; conference website here).
As many readers know, the Montana test limits tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers absent two pretty narrow exceptions. It’s fairly clear now (with the benefit of hindsight) that the Supreme Court’s concern over tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is largely based on property rights. The Court repeatedly has implied a concern that nonmembers could somehow be subject to a loss of their private property. The Montana case, involving tribal hunting and fishing regulations aimed at members and nonmembers on privately-owned land, seemed to be about regulatory takings. Later cases, such as National Farmers Union, the case that established a federal common law right (and a cause of action) to be free of tribal court jurisdiction, came to the court amidst fears that tribes would literally confiscate nonmember property without review at all.
Consider Justice Rehnquist’s separate opinion in National Farmers Union issued prior to the granting of certiorari, where he expressly notes his concern that nonmember property could be seized without due process by tribes:
After the issuance of the mandate of the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals, tribal officials, at the behest of respondent Sage, seized 12 computer terminals, other computer equipment, and a truck from the school district. The basis for this seizure was said to be the Tribal Court judgment, and no state process was invoked.
If the Court of Appeals is correct in the conclusions which it drew in its opinion, the state of the law respecting review of jurisdictional excesses on the part of Indian tribal courts is indeed anomalous. The Court of Appeals may well be correct that tribal courts are not constrained by the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]
This excerpt is available on pages 1187-1188 here.
Ironically, very ironically, the Court’s aggressive limitation on tribal court jurisdiction (even where the tribal court provided admirable due process, as in Plains Commerce Bank) under the Montana test, coupled with the Court’s steadfast recognition of tribal immunity, encourages Indian tribes to confiscate tribal property first, and then litigate. Consider the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Miner Electric, where the tribe used a civil forfeiture ordinance to confiscate the property of a nonmember that had likely committed a crime, defend the confiscation in tribal court on the merits, but then raise sovereign immunity in federal courts (successfully). As a direct result of the Court’s very cramped view of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, more and more tribes are resorting to civil offense and civil forfeiture statutes as a solution to their inability to regulate offensive and illegal nonmember conduct.
ICRA Habeas Petition in Robinson Rancheria Disenrollment Cases
Here is the petition in Quitquit v. Robinson Rancheria Citizen Business Council (N.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
Petitioners Luwana Quitiquit, Robert Quitiquit, Karen Ramos, Inez Sands, and Reuben Want (Petitioners) are Native Americans currently residing on the tribal lands of the Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians in Nice (Lake County), California. They reside in homes they contracted to purchase through a federally-funded, low-income Indian housing program when they were enrolled members of the Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians tribe. In late 2008, the officers of the Robinson Rancheria Tribal Business Council (Respondents) passed a Resolution to disenroll Petitioners and extinguish all their rights as tribal members. Subsequently, Respondents established a Tribal Court with jurisdiction to hear only eviction cases brought by Respondents. Respondents retained an attorney to evict Petitioners using the newly-established Tribal Court. These evictions culminated in the issuance of a Judgment by the Tribal Court that, when executed, will effectuate the immediate expulsion of Petitioners from their homes on the reservation and from tribal land under threat of arrest and criminal trespass, effectively banishing them.
Shavanaux Brief in Appeal of Dismissal of Federal Indictment Using Uncounseled Prior Tribal Court Convictions
Important case to watch. The appellant brief and lower court materials are posted here.
The appellee’s brief: Shavanaux Appellee Brief.
My own short article on this question is here.
Briefing in Montana Supreme Court Case re: Jurisdiction over On-Reservation Probate
Here are the materials in the case, In re Estate of Big Spring:
Briefing in Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp.
Here are those materials (so far):
An excerpt from the petitioner’s brief:
This is an appeal from Judgments entered August 31, 2010 and September 10, 2010, in the Circuit Court of Brown County, Donald R. Zuidmulder, Circuit Judge. (R. 38, A. App 1, R. 41, A. App 3.) The Circuit Court held a hearing on August 31, 2010. (R. 54, A. App 4-16.) The Circuit Court granted Defendant-Respondent [*3] Oneida Seven Generations Corporation’s (“OSGC’s”) Motion to Transfer to Tribal Court pursuant to Sec. 801.54, and later denied the Motion to Reconsider of Plaintiff-Appellant John Kroner, concluding as a matter of law that OSGC’s motion provided sufficient evidence and argument to warrant transfer of this case to the Oneida Tribal Judicial System (“Tribal Court”). (R. 38, A. App 1, R. 41, A. App 3, R. 54, A. App 4-16.)
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