This is the cert petition from the Arizona Court of Appeals decision applying ICWA to step-parent or third party adoptions, where Dad attempted to terminate Mom’s rights so Step-Mom could adopt children.
Cert petition filed by the Goldwater Institute purportedly on behalf of the children.
Amicus in Support of the Cert Petition filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation
Brief in Opposition filed by the Colorado River Indian Tribes
Here.
This case delves deeply into the qualifications of a qualified expert witness under the 2015 BIA Guidelines. Those requirements were pretty specific, and as the court points out, prioritized cultural knowledge of the child’s tribe.
The 2015 Guidelines don’t govern cases initiated AFTER December 12, 2016, and instead the federal regulation (81 Fed. Reg. 38873; 25 CFR pt. 23.122) provides the definition and context of qualified expert witnesses. That definition (“a qualified expert witness must be qualified to testify regarding whether the child’s continued custody by the parent or or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child and should be qualified to testify as to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian child’s Tribe”) provides far less guidance to the court as to who can be a QEW. The regulation further states a QEW may be designated by the child’s tribe, and may not be the “social worker regularly assigned to” the child. The 2016 Guidelines now argue that specific professional knowledge might be more important than cultural knowledge. That may have been more helpful to the parent’s argument in this case.
Here.
Ultimately the question turned on whether a long term guardianship is a foster care placement or a termination of parental rights (which have differing standards of proof). The court found it was a foster care placement, and required the testimony of a qualified expert witness.
There’s a lot of discussion about what the standards for removal are in an ICWA case at the first (emergency/24/48/72 hour/prelim/shelter care) hearing after a child is removed. This is the question of the Oglala Sioux v. Van Hunnik federal case. The federal regulations state that the standard is the one found in 25 U.S.C. 1922–whether the emergency placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 81 Fed. Reg. at 38872.
The Kansas Court of Appeals agrees (In re D.E.J.):
The ICWA is clear that there are two ways to remove Indian children from their homes. The first method allows removal if two factors are satisfied: (1) the State proves that it engaged in active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and the efforts were unsuccessful; and (2) the court makes a determination supported by clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. Here, the State did not prove active efforts. And the magistrate judge did not use the expert witness’ testimony to support her determination that the children were in need of care. Thus, removal was inappropriate under 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
The second method of removal under the ICWA is emergency removal. Removal is appropriate under this method if the State proves that it is necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1922. While the district court made a finding that the children faced imminent harm at the initial removal, the district court did not find that the children faced imminent harm months later at the adjudication hearing. And the State did not present evidence that the children faced imminent danger at the time of the adjudication hearing. So, removal could not be legally effectuated under 25 U.S.C. § 1922.
***The ICWA is very clear in requiring a finding of imminent physical harm or danger before allowing emergency removal. The ICWA is also clear that the traditional method of removal requires the State to engage in active efforts. The magistrate judge did not find that the State engaged in active efforts or that the children faced imminent physical harm, so she did not make sufficient findings under the ICWA to support continued removal.
(Emphasis in original)
Here.
NICWA, however, adds two additional elements the State must prove before terminating parental rights in cases involving Indian children. In re Interest of Walter W., supra. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that active efforts have been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. See § 43-1505(4); see also In re Interest of Walter W., supra. Second, the State must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. See § 43-1505(6).
***
Although the record indicates that for the first two years this case was pending in the juvenile court, there is some question about whether the Department was doing as much as it “possibly could have been” under an active efforts standard, it is clear that for the last two years this case was pending, the Department was providing Louisa with active efforts toward achieving reunification with her children. Despite the two years of active efforts, Louisa failed to make significant or sustainable progress towards reunification. Moreover, while we recognize that during the beginning stages of the juvenile court case the Department may have failed to provide active efforts, this does not mean that the Department failed to provide any efforts. The record is clear that Louisa has been receiving services from the Department since prior to the petition being filed in this case in November 2011. Despite all of those efforts, coupled with the Department’s recent active efforts, Louisa has not made progress towards reunification with her children. Louisa’s assertion that she has not been given enough time to turn her life around is simply without merit.
Here.
This is a tough case of intergenerational removal. The Nebraska Supreme Court finds that both ICWA and NICWA apply to non-Indian parents of Indian children as defined by the statutes. The Court also found that NICWA’s different language in its active efforts provision, which requires active efforts not just to prevent the break up of the family, but to unite the parent with the Indian child, means the Baby Girl holding does not apply to that provision of state law. However, where NICWA’s language is the same as ICWA’s regarding “continued custody” in the termination of parental rights section, the Baby Girl holding does apply, and there is no need to find the continued custody of the child will result in serious physical or emotional damage, where the parent hasn’t had custody of the child.
While the new federal Regulations, which go into effect next week, are useful for tribes and Native families, state ICWA laws continue to hold the most promise for enforcement of the law in the courts. If your state is contemplating drafting one (either through a tribal-state workgroup, Court Improvement Program, or other mechanism), there are resources and people available to provide research and assistance.
In only the third Washington Supreme Court case to directly interpret ICWA and the first to interpret WICWA, the Court holds In re Crews (the case that established EIF in Washington) is overturned.
Under our above interpretation of ICWA and WICWA, if a case (1) meets the definition of a “child custody proceeding” and (2) involves an Indian child, both acts shall apply. ICWA and WICWA recognize only two exceptions to coverage–delinquency
proceedings and custody disputes following divorce where one parent retains custody of the Indian child. Our interpretation therefore overrules Crews to the extent that it embraced the existing Indian family exception because it recognizes no additional exceptions to coverage outside of the two expressly stated in ICWA and WICWA.
ICWA and WICWA also apply based on the child’s membership, not the parent’s:
For these reasons, we hold that whether the parent whose rights are being terminated is non-Indian is immaterial to a finding that ICWA and WICWA apply. If the child at issue is an Indian child and that child is involved in a child custody proceeding, ICWA and WICWA shall apply.
Craig Dorsay represented the tribal amicus brief (including oral arguments), and NARF and Indian Law Clinic at MSU Law provided strategy and research support in this case. Previous coverage here.
Here.
The Court held this court rule to be invalid:
The rule provides: “If after notice has been provided as required by federal and state law a tribe responds indicating that the child is eligible for membership if certain steps are followed, the court must proceed as if the child is an Indian child and direct the appropriate individual or agency to provide active efforts under rule 5.484(c) to secure tribal membership for the child.” (Rule 5.482(c), italics added.) We conclude the rule is invalid as a matter of state law.
But this rule to be valid:
Rule 5.484(c)(2) provides: “In addition to any other required findings to place an Indian child with someone other than a parent or Indian custodian, or to terminate parental rights, the court must find that active efforts have been made . . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and must find that these efforts were unsuccessful. [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Efforts to provide services must include pursuit of any steps necessary to secure tribal membership for a child if the child is eligible for membership in a given tribe, as well as attempts to use the available resources of extended family members, the tribe, tribal and other Indian social service agencies, and individual Indian caregivers.”
Here. (original unpublished opinion we posted last week). Appellants requested this opinion be published, so the published opinion is here.
We’d like to point out that the fact that mother was a minor and a dependent of the court meant that the state should have been treating MOTHER’S own case as an ICWA case, which does not seem to have happened (and if you’re keeping track, yes, I’ve now used italics, allcaps, AND red ink on this one).
In this case, BOTH the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa AND the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe responded to the Department’s notice. Both Bands stated the children were eligible for enrollment, and Red Cliff asked for more information. Mother was a minor and a runaway from her placement. But instead of sending the information, or following up to assist in getting the children enrolled, or provide active efforts, the Department requested the juvenile court find that ICWA did not apply. Which the juvenile court did. Specifically:
Our record discloses no further action after November 2013, until an interim review report, dated April 22, 2014, stated, “[i]t is respectfully requested that the Court make a finding as to the children’s Indian Child Welfare Act Status.” The report further stated that ICWA “does or may apply” as each child might be an Indian child in the Chippewa tribe and was ICWA “eligible” (capitalization & boldface omitted). SSA proposed the court find “ICWA does not apply,” and the juvenile court’s minute order, dated April 22, 2014, contains the finding, “ICWA does not apply.” In a minute order dated June 19, 2014, the juvenile court again stated: “Court finds ICWA does not apply.”
The Court of Appeals held:
Given the above cited authorities, the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA did not apply. Not only did insufficient evidence support that finding, but also two tribes responded to SSA’s ICWA notice, by stating that the children were eligible to enroll in them. The court was thereafter required to proceed as if the children were Indian children.
Under these circumstances, we must reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions for the juvenile court to order SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children. (In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 458–459.)
We are getting a lot of questions about when the standards of ICWA apply if a child or parent is enrolled after the initiation of the child welfare case. Here’s a not particularly helpful or clear decision out of the Oregon Court of Appeals:
Parents’ position depends on a selective understanding of the record before the juvenile court. Specifically, as noted, testimony at the August 22, 2014, hearing established that the “Karuk Tribe” notation for mother in DHS’s database had been entered, as a preliminary matter, in 2004, but that, in response to subsequent, contemporaneous inquiries from DHS, the tribe had explicitly denied that mother or her children met the requirements for tribal membership. See 278 Or App at 431-32. That negative response—a response within DHS’s constructive knowledge in 2011—negated the 2004 preliminary notation. Further, the record established that, while that notation automatically “popped up,” there was no evidence that it had ever been renewed or supplemented based on any subsequent information. Similarly, parents’ reliance on mother’s reference to having a tribal membership card does not engage with the complete context that, at the same time mother made that remark in February 2011, she was adamantly refusing to complete ICWA-related forms provided by DHS. Indeed, mother did not obtain a tribal membership card until May 2012—and, even then, did not so inform DHS.15 Given the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in denying parents’ motions to dismiss. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Tucker, 76 Or App 673, 677, 10 P2d 793 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 605 (1986) (affirming juvenile court’s denial of petition to “invalidate” foster care placement based on purported ICWA noncompliance; record did not establish that, as of the time the child was placed, ICWA applied, and subsequent determination that the child was an Indian child did not render ICWA retroactively applicable to prior actions of the juvenile court).
Turtle Talk 
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